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

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE,

CONTAINING

PRACTICAL RULES

FOR

ACQUIRING A KNOWLEDGE

OF

ENGLISH GRAMMAR,

WITH REMARKS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SYNTAX AND COMPOSITION.

BY WILLIAM CRAMP,
AUTHOR OF "JUNIUS DISCOVERED," &c.

"Though Grammar be usually amongst the first things taught, it is always one of the last understood."—TOOKE.

LONDON:
RELFE AND FLETCHER, 17, CORNHILL.

1838.

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
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LONDON:
J. UNWIN, ST. PETER'S ALLEY,
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PREFACE.

KNOWLEDGE is the birthright of man; but the means and opportunities of acquiring it are available only to a very limited extent by the subordinate classes of society. These privations might be lamented, if the happiness of those who toil depended on a participation of that mental and refined pleasure which scientific pursuits afford. The lowly, however, are often happy in their ignorance, because, in their rude and uncultivated state, their desires are circumscribed, and they feel less acutely the miseries of want and dependence. But there are many whose avocations are less constant and less laborious—many who have raised themselves by industry to comparative ease and affluence, and on the correctness of whose opinions the stability and good order of civilized society chiefly depend. These have sufficient leisure to cultivate their minds; and it is a duty they owe to themselves—to their dependents—and to their country—to claim their right to a share of that stock of knowledge which the industry of past ages has accumulated for the common benefit of posterity.

But there is a preliminary and indispensable acquirement to be secured, before the treasures of science and learning can be opened to their view. WRITTEN LANGUAGE must be understood; and it is not only necessary to become acquainted with those mute signs by which

thought is arrested in its fleeting progress, but every reader should also obtain a competent knowledge of the fundamental principles which regulate and determine the propriety of artificial language.

Hence *Grammar* is a subject of more importance than most persons are willing to admit; and though it has not the attractions which many other studies possess, still it would perhaps be difficult to name a science more extensive in its application, or more generally useful in directing the conduct of the understanding. Even those who appear to pay least attention to the arbitrary rules by which language is often controlled, are nevertheless compelled to observe the fundamental laws of speech; and though they may affect to despise a knowledge of the use of words, they too often betray their solicitude for grammatical accuracy, by their hesitation and confusion—for they feel, though they do not perhaps know, that SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF THE MIND.

It concerns every one, therefore, who is called upon to judge and act for himself, to possess the means by which alleged improprieties of diction may be corrected. This art grammarians profess to teach; but do the works of those writers always afford the means by which the learner may be enabled to decide for himself, on subjects which, perhaps, no individual has a right to determine for another? In answering this important question, we shall, hereafter, have occasion to claim the indulgence of the candid reader.

The primary object of this treatise on language is to render the principles of grammar easy, and the rules of syntax practically useful, to those who have in early life neglected the theory of speech. There are many, we feel convinced, who would willingly devote some portion of their leisure to the study of grammar, if the knowledge to be derived from works on that subject proved commensurate with the attention the science necessrilya demands;

but there are few *grown persons* who will not rather depend on their own judgment, than voluntarily submit to *learn the lessons* of grammarians.

To blend the philosophy of language with the best instructions of the best teachers is perhaps the surest means of attracting the attention of the self-educated reader. Such students do not wish to be taught, they desire only to be informed; and it may be presumed that one who has experienced similar difficulties knows better the kind of information they require than more learned writers on the subject. Whether we have supplied such information must be left to the decision of that class of our readers.

The liberty we have taken with the writings of the learned, will probably subject us to still severer criticism; but we ask no favour for the errors we have committed. The works of writers on language are the fittest for the selection of grammatical inaccuracies, for grammarians at least ought to attend to the rules they inculcate. It was not, however, from any invidious motive, but from a principle of justice, that we in general gave their blunders the preference to those of less reputable writers.

But there is one class of readers whose disapprobation we may expect, and whose commendation would be no proof of the practical utility of this volume.—We mean those persons who learn the principles of a science, as many learn the words of an Italian song, merely that they may be able to repeat a given number of sounds, without caring to understand the meaning of the writer. Such readers are impatient to became learned at an easy rate, and esteem that instruction the best which is soonest committed to memory. They are unwilling to bestow the thought and attention which an abstruse subject demands, and without which *scientific practical knowledge* can never be acquired. It matters not, therefore, what system of grammar such persons adopt; for as they are too indolent,

or too incapable, to think for themselves, they must after all be contented to imitate the phraseology of others.

But if the hitherto superficial reasoner should be inclined to apply himself seriously to the study of this indispensable science, he may still ask, "Must we be constantly thinking of our grammar whenever we speak or write?" It may be answered, certainly not. This mistaken notion has perhaps made more bad speakers and bad writers than a total want of a knowledge of grammar. The subject, and what he intends to say concerning it, ought solely to occupy the attention of the speaker or writer during the time he is employed in forming his sentences. Those who write best are probably those who think least about the choice of words or the structure of sentences *while* they are composing. The mind will in general suggest the preferable words and phrases; and the writer, having previously acquired a competent knowledge of the principles of language, will be prevented from committing gross improprieties. The practice of grammar is chiefly useful in enabling any one *to correct* errors that *have been committed* in speaking or in writing. Those, therefore, who understand the theory of language, have acquired the means of applying the rules by which grammatical accuracy is regulated. But it is not essential that those rules should be "learnt by heart;" the anomalies only require to be committed to memory.

In the arrangement of the Etymological Chapters of this volume, the syntax and construction of each part of speech have been connected with the etymology of the word. Whatever was considered useful to the uninformed student, has also been included; and an illustration or two containing words classed under each particular part of speech have been added, in order that those who wish to acquire the science may have the means at hand of ascertaining the progress they make in the knowledge of words. These lessons (if they must be so called,) are progressive,

and may be repeated as the learner proceeds with the subsequent chapters. The selections are such as will not, it is hoped, displease even our better informed readers.

As regards the *philosophy* of this volume, we cannot reasonably expect a uniformly favourable opinion. Some may think that the remarks contain too much of the theory of language, and that the author has too often indulged in controversial disquisitions; but before his readers form their decided opinion upon these points, they are requested to examine whether the philosophy of the language has not been made subservient to the practical utility of the rules of grammar, and whether the controverted questions do not merit the calm consideration of all who desire to be informed on this subject.

It would have been easy for the writer to have given a greater appearance of originality to this treatise, by adopting as his own the valuable extracts which he has selected from the works of his predecessors, but he feels well assured that such remarks will have more weight in their original language. Whenever it has been possible to trace the author, the benefit of his assistance has been acknowledged. This could not be always attended to in selecting the rules of syntax. These have long been considered the property of every writer on language, therefore whenever they have been clearly expressed, they have frequently been taken verbatim from grammarians.

As the principal design of this work is to instruct the English scholar, it would justly be considered inconsistent to refer for proofs and examples to the learned languages, or to aim at a display of deep research. That the latter might have been accomplished by one with very little pretensions to learning our classical readers will admit, for the author has found some difficulty in avoiding any appearance of this parade of learning. His constant endeavour has been to simplify and render intelligible an abstruse science, and if possible to shew that a knowledge

of English Grammar is not necessarily dependent on a previous knowledge of the structure or the grammar of any other language.

We here feel it necessary to offer some excuse to our scientific readers for controverting opinions that have been universally received, and that are by grammarians considered indisputably established.

It is the general opinion that "the province of the grammarian is not to dictate what usages ought to be, but simply to discover what they are."

This apology for not investigating the propriety of established usages may serve the compiler of Greek and Latin grammars. The *dead* languages must be learned with all their imperfections, since the anomalies are now a legitimate portion of those languages. But the circumstances are very different with a *living* language like our own—a language that has been progressively improving since its infancy, in spite of the restrictions of the learned. Here the grammarian has a higher duty to perform. He is regarded as the arbiter of taste in deciding doubtful and discordant idioms—as the dictator of propriety, and as the promulgator of the established laws of language. It is true he cannot enforce obedience, but it is his duty to resist useless innovations; and such resistance, seconded by sound argument and philosophical research, will seldom fail to overcome the prejudice of custom, and, though slow in its operation, must ultimately prevail.

The rules of grammar owe their origin to *written* language. It was not till mankind began to use signs for sounds that the necessity of a strict conformity between the signs and the ideas intended to be expressed by them became obvious. In oral language the tone or the gesture of the speaker often supplied the deficiences and inaccuracies of speech, but in written discourse it became essential to attend to the grammatical structure of sentences. Hence originated among our first writers the

office of the critic and grammarian. Those idioms which from their purity and general use were best understood were taken as a standard of propriety, and considered as forming a legitimate portion of the *national* dialect, in contradistinction to the anomalies of the ignorant, and the dialects of the remote and less cultivated provinces, and thus the language of the learned at first superseded that of the uneducated and vulgar. The established phraseology of our best writers, therefore, must ever be regarded with respect, even by those who may be disposed to question their unlimited authority, for it cannot be denied that our authors are the guardians of our language, and are amenable to ordinary criticism only when by their example they give currency and permanent existence to grammatical improprieties. The anomalies of speech may be tolerated, but they cannot be, or at least they ought not to be, recommended; for when the union of right and wrong is attempted every effort to explain the consistency of the contradiction adds only to the difficulty of comprehending the commentator.

The elements of artificial speech are arbitrary, and so are the forms or idioms of a language. Every one is at liberty to use what particular signs he may think proper in recording his own thoughts, and to accept or reject any form of words which may be suggested by another. Even the Roman tyrant admitted his inability to force a new word upon the people, though in other respects he was master of their wills, and their lives and liberties were at his disposal. But there is a more powerful inducement than the mandate of a sovereign, which will always ensure a cheerful submission to improvements in speech, and which among the rudest people at first gave currency to the elements of their language—it is the COMMON INTEREST of those who have occasion constantly to communicate their wants and their opinions, to establish by tacit consent a uniform manner of expression, and to

avoid as far as possible the use of ambiguous words or phrases.

CUSTOM OR USE is said to give law to language, and has long been considered by the learned as the only standard of propriety. He, therefore, who opposes the errors of POPULAR USAGE, or questions the correctness of FASHIONABLE PHRASEOLOGY, will perhaps be treated little better than as an outlaw in the republic of letters—still as a disinterested inquirer, having no theory of his own to establish, and willing to admit the theories of others as far as they are comprehensible, the author may claim indulgence if he question the wisdom and justness of a decree which the law-makers themselves do not seem to understand.

What (we have often asked) is "Reputable Usage?" Not, says an eminent critic, the usage of the multitude, nor the usage of the learned, much less the usage of the court, but a sort of *compound ratio* of all three. And this "*compound ratio*," as yet undefined, is nevertheless to be taken as the standard of propriety. Another writer declares that "Language is a species of *fashion*, and that every anomaly stands upon the same basis—custom having prescribed for it a particular rule." In addition to these authorities we are compelled to admit that writers on language invariably coincide in their opinions on this point; and grammarians, in particular, strongly inculcate implicit obedience to usage, unless in cases which custom has left dubious.

It is not the desire to be thought capable of controverting the opinions of great men, deservedly esteemed for their talents and learning, nor any vainer motive, which induces the writer of this volume to oppose the universal assent of grammarians to a long established maxim. It is the firm conviction that the *dictum* is unphilosophical and dangerous—that it is the chief cause of the many difficulties which the study of language presents, and affords an un-

answerable excuse for the little attention that is often paid to the more valuable instructions of grammarians. For who will spend much time in acquiring the rudiments of a science, the principles and rules of which are ever varying, since the knowledge of what is right must depend upon the capricious decisions of those who pretend to understand the precise limits of "Reputable Usage."

But it may be asked, what then is the legitimate standard of propriety in language? Or rather, what is grammar? We shall answer without hesitation, because we can appeal to the experience of every intelligent writer, and to the practice of every grammarian, whenever he has been able to see clearly, and to correct with certainty, any impropriety of long established usage.

GRAMMAR IS THE STRICT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIGNS AND THE IDEAS WHICH SUCH SIGNS ARE INTENDED TO EXPRESS. It was this concordance that first gave law to language, and currency to original forms of speech; and it is to maintain this conformity between words and ideas that the rules of grammar are so useful. It is to the *mind*, and not to the *vox populi*, which the grammarian appeals when he is able to *prove* any grammatical inaccuracy; it is only when a difficulty occurs, that custom is allowed to have the supremacy.

The authority of reputable usage is perhaps less restricted in determining the propriety of single terms, than it is in regulating the laws of construction. An increase of knowledge necessarily demands an increase of means for the communication of that knowledge. In the progress of civilization new words are constantly required to express new ideas; and when ingenuity fails to invent suitable expressions a modification of some established term frequently supplies the deficiency; but even in establishing the arbitrary elements of language, the fundamental principle of grammar is attended to by the learned, the fitness of the new term is ascertained by referring to

its etymon or derivation, and its propriety is estimated by the conformity which exists, or is supposed to exist, between the sign and the object it is intended to represent. If there be no real nor any imaginary resemblance discernable, nor any circumstance to fix the meaning of the expression, it is generally left to the use of those who are contented to adopt the vague phraseology of the illiterate.

Sometimes, however, from frequent application and general use, an indefinite word acquires at length a precise signification, and, when sanctioned by authority, is, after a time, incorporated in the language. So far does reputable usage *ennoble* that which was at one time justly condemned as belonging to the jargon of the vulgar.

The authority which gives currency to single terms is also sufficient to sanction any improvement in the idioms of a language, but the laws of construction must ever be subservient to the principles of Universal Grammar. Nothing therefore, in our humble opinion, can justify an illogical departure from *established grammatical usage*. Why grammarians should wish to substitute custom for the unerring laws of the human mind, in determining the propriety of contradictory idioms, will perhaps be sufficiently shown in the subsequent pages of this work.

It would not become the author to speak in extenuation of the defects of this volume, yet it will be readily admitted, by those best acquainted with works of this kind, that considerable difficulty must be experienced by him who endeavours to condense into one volume the Theory and Practice of an art so extensive in its details as that of Grammar. This difficulty suggested the plan of combining a technical Dictionary with the Index; and it is hoped that the form in which the notes are there given will be more acceptable to the reader than that usually adopted.

Among those who have assisted to render this volume deserving the notice of the public, the author may be allowed to distinguish JAMES HENRY HURDIS, ESQ.,

of *Newick*, a gentleman ever willing to devote his highly cultivated talents, either to the service of the public, or to promote the welfare of a private individual. The engravings are intended to illustrate parts of the subject that appeared to require attraction, but if they fail to instruct, they cannot fail (as specimens of art,) to be admired, and will give a value to this volume which its intrinsic merit may not perhaps entitle it to receive.

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THE

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

"Language is an art, whose influence extends over all the others, and in which, finally, all science whatever must centre."—HORNE TOOKE.

WHEN we consider how inseparably LANGUAGE is connected with man's happiness, and how much the successful development and improvement of his intellectual faculties depend on its resources, we may, without impropriety, inquire why the study of so important a science as grammar should be so generally neglected. Few acquire a competent knowledge of its rules,—a slight acquaintance being all that is usually considered essential by those who wish to speak correctly, and when this object has been attained, the study of language is too often abandoned in disgust.

What, then, is the nature of this science, so repulsive to many, so imperfectly understood even by its professors? What are the advantages any one may expect to derive from the study of grammar?—and can the subject be rendered agreeable to the student by more efficient means than those hitherto adopted? These are questions to which we shall direct our attention; and should we fail in our purpose to render the subject more intelligible, our efforts may still be attended with advantage, for the hints of the unlearned sometimes supply materials for the learned to work upon.

A modern writer asserts, "The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement." This observation may be very true, if it be limited to those who really investigate the principles of a science; but if we include all who write upon any particular subject, the proportion of success may indeed be questioned. Grammar is one proof of the inverse proportion of labour to the success of its application. The writers on language are *many;* their discoveries *few*. The subject has been often handled, but seldom investigated, unless the repetition of rules, enforced by new authorities, can be called investigation. But what has authority to do with the rules of grammar? Usage may sanction inaccurate language, but the most reputable usage cannot alter the nature of the science. Its fundamental principles are unchangeable. Grammar should teach the correct use of words. Its rules should not be *annulled* by exceptions, nor should errors be palliated by quoting precedents from classical writers. This servile compliance with usage is the cause of the many difficulties which occur in acquiring a knowledge of grammar. Its principles are rendered obscure and uncertain, when the grammarian, instead of exposing erroneous phraseology, employs his pen in its defence; and until this method of treating the subject be exploded, there can be little hope of much *permanent* improvement in our language. For when authority is permitted to supersede the principles of science, the most effectual barrier is fixed against the progress of improvement. Authority in language ought to extend no further than to the choice of words and phrases, in reference to their just application; and when this point has been established, the construction and modification of terms should conform to the principles of grammar.

It is, however, confessed, that the structure of language,

like the materials of which it is composed, is, in a great degree, arbitrary, and depends upon the order in which different nations are accustomed to think; as long, therefore, as the peculiar idioms and *established* phraseology of a particular people are perspicuous, they cannot be deviated from with propriety. But the decisions of grammarians, determined by the dictation of usage, should not be like the laws of the Medes and Persians, which altered not. The rules of grammar should be subject to *revision*, whenever they are found inconsistent with the principles of right thinking; and the science should be made subservient to the mind, whence alone it takes its origin.

A writer on grammar has, nevertheless, to contend against many difficulties. He is called upon to give proofs of his ability in the frequent exercise of the rules he inculcates. The prejudice of habit, the caprice of fashion, and the authority of the best writers, conspire against his precepts. Axioms, founded on rational principles, are sometimes contemned, because they are not understood; while the idle and half-educated prefer imitation to originality, and adopt, without questioning, the errors of their instructors.

"It is not," says Mr. Locke, "worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another." Every attempt to exercise the judgment of such a learner is considered as a tax upon his exertion, and he resents the imposed condition as if it were an insult to his understanding. It is not for such that we have undertaken the task before us. Knowledge can never be acquired by rote; — the reasoning faculties must be employed, if men desire to profit by and remember what they learn.

The practice of grammarians has been to conceal those difficulties which they could not explain. They have dwelt, with tedious prolixity, upon the elementary principles of the science, while they have left the most useful branch of it

comparatively unexplored. They content themselves with repeating, that language is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts; they confine themselves to general definitions, but they are cautious how they descend to critical investigation. "Sensible and learned men," says Mr. Brenan," conceal the truth, through a fear that too much knowledge may divert the pupil from a proper steadiness to the observance of rules." What is this but a tacit acknowledgment that the rules are founded in error, and will not bear the investigation which science, properly so called, should at all times be ready to undergo? Will such an apology satisfy the reader? Let him mark the consequences of this injudicious forbearance: "These scrupulous teachers," says the same spirited writer, "give directions that positively mislead, fill the mind with wrong notions, and throw a most prejudicial taint of doubt and error upon the future reasonings of the learner."

The science of grammar must be learned by studying language, in connection with the operations of the mind, for therein only are its principles to be found. Whatever knowledge men acquire of the nature and use of words has been deduced from this source. It is well known that a good memory, and frequent opportunities of mixing in the best society, will teach any one to speak grammatically. It will do more. It will make some appear to reason correctly, who have no other pretensions to abilities than an aptitude to remember the sayings of others. They have perhaps heard or read certain phrases and arguments, and they adopt them, without observing their propriety, or examining their correctness. But when such persons are called upon to express their own thoughts, they feel the want of a knowledge of the rules and principles of grammar.

The facility with which men are able to receive and impart knowledge depends greatly upon the clear conceptions they have of the *signs* used for this purpose. The precise mean-

ing of words, and their proper order and distribution in a sentence, should be carefully attended to by the young student. The importance of these fundamental principles may be inferred from the remarks of an elegant writer on composition:—

"All that regards the study of eloquence and composition merits the higher attention, upon this account,—that it is intimately connected with the improvement of our intellectual powers. For when we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating reason itself. True rhetoric and sound logic are very nearly allied. The study of arranging and expressing our thoughts with propriety, teaches to think as well as to speak accurately. By putting our sentiments into words we always conceive them more distinctly. Every one who has the slightest acquaintance with composition knows that when he expresses himself ill on any subject, when his arrangement is loose, and his sentences become feeble, the defects of his style can, almost on every occasion, be traced back to his indistinct conception of the subject; so close is the connection between thoughts and the words in which they are clothed."

We shall conclude these preliminary remarks with a quotation from Mr. Murray, on the utility and importance of the study of grammar:—

"As words are the signs of our ideas, and the medium by which we perceive the sentiments of others, and communicate our own, and as signs exhibit things which they are intended to represent, more or less accurately, according as their real or established conformity to those things is more or less exact, it is evident that in proportion to our knowledge of the nature and properties of words, of their relation to each other, and their established connection with the ideas to which they are applied, will be the certainty and ease with which we transfuse our sentiments into the minds of one

another; and that without a competent knowledge of this kind, we shall frequently be in hazard of misunderstanding others, and of being misunderstood ourselves. It may, indeed, be justly asserted, that many of the differences in opinion among men, with the disputes, contentions, and alienations of heart, which have too often proceeded from such differences, have been occasioned by a want of proper skill in the connection and meaning of words, and by a tenacious misapplication of language."

CHAPTER I.

ORTHOGRAPHY.

"The conversation of men of rank and eminence regulates *pronunciation*: authors of reputation are our standard for all that concerns the construction and application of *words*."—CAMPBELL.

GRAMMAR is usually divided into four parts—ORTHOGRAPHY, ETYMOLOGY, SYNTAX, and PROSODY.

ORTHOGRAPHY and PROSODY treat of the nature and power of elementary sounds, and comprise rules for spelling and pronunciation. As these parts of grammar have been minutely investigated by others, and as every thing really useful in them may be soon learned, and easily understood, we shall confine ourselves to a few observations on modern refinement and improvement in *orthography* and *pronunciation.*

Writers on language repeatedly complain that the characters of the alphabet are both redundant and defective, yet they do not attempt to lay aside the redundant letters, nor supply a suitable number of characters for the elementary sounds. They acknowledge that the art of pronunciation might by these means be greatly facilitated and improved; but they have no authority to justify a deviation from long established usage. They are perhaps alarmed at the temporary inconvenience such changes might produce. The experiment is, notwithstanding, well worth the trial; and the man who, by his popularity and talent, could add a few new letters to the alphabet, would render an essential and lasting benefit to posterity. Precedents for such improvement might be quoted from the Greek and other languages.

Volumes have, from time to time, been published respect-

ing the precise powers of the elementary sounds. One specimen will perhaps content the reader:—

CONSONANTS.—"Here, then, are three things to be distinguished.—1st. The perfect mute, having no sound of any kind. 2ndly. The perfect consonant, having not only a proper but continued sound. And 3rdly. Between these extremes we find the letter *b* having a proper sound, but so limited, that in respect to the perfect consonant it may be termed a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may properly be termed imperfect."

Can we feel surprised that many should experience a disgust for grammar, when such are its introductory lessons?

"It is the nature of a consonant to require the assistance of the organs of speech to give it utterance.

"A vowel is a simple sound, formed by a continued effusion of the breath, and a certain conformation of the mouth, without any alteration of the position or any motion of the organs of speech, from the moment the vocal sound commences till it ends.

"A consonant may be defined to be an interruption of the effusion of vocal sound, arising from the application of of the organs of speech to each other."

ORTHOGRAPHY, as the term implies, includes rules for spelling, though this part of grammar is chiefly occupied in nice distinctions between the nature and powers of letters.

SPELLING is the art of expressing words by their proper letters, and the best and only sure rule for dividing the syllables in spelling is to divide them as they are naturally divided, in a right pronunciation, without regard to the derivation of words, or the possible combination of consonants at the beginning of syllables.

Every attempt to improve the English language must be ineffectual, while reason and common sense stoop to the dictates of fashion and caprice. The orthography and pronunciation of to-day, though perfectly consistent with analogy, may be denounced as vulgar and inaccurate to-morrow, if a popular character chance to deviate from established usage. The servile multitude are too apt to imitate the senseless eccentricities of some idol, and to be proud of a resemblance that might justly expose them to ridicule and

contempt. "Words," says an eloquent writer, "most frequently in use are most liable to be contracted, and they contract more rapidly in the mouth of the illiterate vulgar, and mincing courtiers and insects of fashion, than in the mouth of the learned professional man, and in the middle class of the people. Extremes, it is often said, meet; and when my ears were lately saluted with such pronunciations as Lunnun for London; gemmen (or something more like it than gentleman,) from the mouth of a royal duke, I could not help reflecting how very nearly high life and low life—the court and Wapping, or Petticoat-lane—are related."

It is a certain indication of a weak and frivolous mind to seek distinction by imitating, or by introducing novel terms or phrases, or by altering, unnecessarily, the established pronunciation of a language. Words are the means by which men's thoughts are interchanged, and, like other means, their beauty and perfection consist in their simplicity, and uniform application.

Mr. Walker, in his "CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY," has endeavoured to expose this fashionable absurdity; and it is much to be regretted that the excellent remarks, interspersed throughout that work, are not better known. We quote one example of the triumph of common sense, as recorded by that writer.

AUTHORITY. This word is sometimes pronounced as if written *autority*. This affected pronunciation is traced to a gentleman who was one of the greatest ornaments of the law, as well as one of the politest scholars of the age, and whose authority has been sufficient to sway the bench and the bar, though *author, authentic, theatre, theory*, &c., and a thousand similar words, where the *th* is heard, are constantly staring them in the face.

The public ear is not, however, so far vitiated as to acknowledge this innovation; for though it may with security, and even approbation, be pronounced in Westminster Hall, it would not be quite so safe for an actor to adopt it on the stage.

I know it will be said that *autoritas* is better Latin; that the purer Latin never had the *h*; and that our word, which is derived from it, ought on that account to omit it. But it

may be observed that, according to the best Latin critics, the word ought to be written *auctoritas*, and that, according to this reasoning, we ought to write and pronounce *auctority* and *auctor*; but this, I presume, is farther than these innovators would choose to go;—the truth is, such singularities of pronunciation should be left to the lower class of critics, who, like coxcombs in dress, would be utterly unnoticed, if they were not distinguished by petty deviations from the rest of the world.

We are persuaded that many of the existing improprieties of speech would be corrected if grammarians and writers on language did their duty by pointing out the inaccuracies, and were not quite so fond of quoting *si volet usus*.* May we not suspect they compromise their ignorance of the fundamental principles of the science by granting a licence in favour of popular usage, and, more particularly, since they often acknowledge such usage to be at variance with perspicuity and correctness. What can we think of the propriety of a precept which forbids a man to do right as long as the majority of mankind persist in doing wrong? yet this is the spirit in which most English grammars are compiled.

The arbiters of polite pronunciation appear to delight in unmeaning deviations from correct and well established usage: those anomalies and defects which render the acquirement of the English language so difficult are held sacred, while the most unwarrantable violations in orthography and diction are tolerated because "fashion will have it so." We are told that *again* and *against* should be pronounced *agen* and *agenst*; *haunt* and *taunt*, *hant* and *tant*; that *docile* should be pronounced *dossel*; and many similar alterations are recommended in the works of modern orthoepists. It might be urged, in answer to these innovations, that the dipthongs *ai* and *au* are what grammarians call proper

* Mr. Tooke is an exception: speaking of the author of this maxim, he remarks—"I do not think him of any authority whatever upon this occasion. He wrote divinely, and so Vestris danced; but in this, our enquiry, we are not poets nor dancers, but anatomists."

"The polished attendants on a throne," says Mr. Walker, "are as apt to depart from simplicity in language as in dress and manners, and novelty, instead of custom, is too often the *jus et norma loquendi* of a court."

dipthongs, in which both the vowel sounds should be heard, as in pain, gain, main, laudable. Whatever exceptions may exist should therefore be accounted as so many defects in the language, the orthography being at variance with the pronunciation: these improprieties might be obviated, either by new modelling the words, or by restoring the original sound to the letters. But our modern critics pursue a very different course. They take for a guide what they are pleased to call "reputable usage;" and though, in many instances, they confess its insufficiency and danger, yet they persist in recommending it; hence the orthography and pronunciation of the English language is becoming daily more fluctuating, incongruous and defective.

This puerile fondness for error is often apparent in the absurd precision which many writers observe when they quote from the works of our earlier authors: they seem to feel a pride in giving the passage verbatim, though the intention of referring to it was to serve some more useful purpose than merely to gratify a silly curiosity, or to show how strangely our ancestors spelled and wrote. It may be asked of those who defend this practice, whether there is any thing wonderful in the change which a few centuries have produced in a science so fluctuating as language, and more particularly as regards that part of the science which depends so much on whim and fashion? Those critics who, with a secret complacency, contrast their improved compositions with the rude specimens of their forefathers, will probably in their turns be ridiculed by succeeding generations. But if they would have their writings descend uncorrupted to posterity, let them endeavour to fix the elementary sounds to appropriate characters; for this is the first step towards establishing a permanent language.

CHAPTER II.

ETYMOLOGY.

"The essential parts of speech are the same in all languages. There must always be some words which denote the *names* of objects, or which mark the subject of discourse; others which denote the qualities of those objects, and express what we affirm concerning them; and other words which point out their connections and relations."—BLAIR.

BEFORE any one can apply the rules of syntax, or correct errors in composition, it is indispensably necessary that he should acquire, as far as possible, a knowledge of those differences which have induced grammarians to class words under the several denominations called parts of speech.

ETYMOLOGY explains the nature of the different sorts of words, and treats of their modifications and derivations.

The parts of speech are variously reckoned; but the following is the usual distribution:—the *article*, the NOUN, the *adjective*, the *pronoun*, the *verb*, the *adverb*, the *preposition*, the *conjunction*, and the *interjection*.

When mankind converse, their discourse is always concerning the existence of properties, actions, states, or relations of NOUNS.

The article limits, or points out *the noun*. The NOUN denotes the subject, or some *object* connected with the subject. The adjective expresses a quality belonging to *a noun*. The pronoun is used instead of *a noun*. The verb indicates the existence, or the action or state of *a noun*. The adverb either qualifies an adjective or another adverb, or it more correctly defines the action or state attributed to *the noun*. The preposition connects, and shows what relation one *noun* bears to another. The conjunction joins two or more words or sentences together which refer to the same *noun*, or

it qualifies the clause or sentence which it connects. The interjection is no part of artificial language, though it is often used by poets and sentimentalists.

The *verb* is usually denominated *"the chief word"* in a sentence; but, as the *noun* denotes the subject of our thoughts, it may be considered of equal importance. The propriety of this remark will be more evident when we come to examine the nature of the verb, a part of speech which has hitherto been confounded with the predicate, and is seldom distinguished from it when they are united into one term.

Before we enter upon the analysis of the several parts of speech, we shall hazard some general observations on the nature and properties of words, and, in doing this, it will be necessary to refer to a science which has hitherto been too little consulted by writers on grammar.

The connection between *ideas* and the *signs* which represent them is so inseparable, that the rudiments of Logic* appear essential in acquiring a correct knowledge of the nature and properties of words; but while that science has been treated of by men of learning and abilities, the principles of language, and the rules of grammar, have too often been

* We refer to those parts of logic which treat of the connection between terms and ideas, and of the nature and formation of propositions, and not to the *art of syllogizing*; for we perfectly agree with Dr. Campbell, that "the rules are cumbersome to the memory, and unnecessary in practice. No one was ever made a reasoner who needed their aid. Ostentatious and artificial, they give that which is shallow the appearance of profundity."

This writer has been considered singular in his opinion, but if we look into the writings of Mr. Locke, we shall find that he entertained nearly the same view of the subject. "Nobody is made any thing by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory; practice must settle the habit of doing, without reflecting on the rule; and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker or strict reasoner by a set of rules showing him wherein right reasoning consists."

Nor does Dr. Watts, in his work on logic, appear to speak very highly of the advantages of those artificial means which teach men to reason by mode and figure. His testimony of the insufficiency of logic as an art may be considered of more weight than any arguments which might be adduced in favour of Dr. Campbell's opinion. "The light of nature, a good judgment, and due consideration of things, tend more to true reasoning than all the trappings of moods and figures."—WATTS' LOGIC, part iii., ch. 2, § 3.

left to the decision of men of ordinary endowments and capacities. Should these studies ever become united, there may then be some chance that the principles of both will be acquired with pleasure, and their practical advantages somewhat better understood.

It is a favourite maxim with the higher class of writers on grammar, that the noun and verb are the only essential parts of speech; but they do not demonstrate in what manner a communication of ideas could be effected by these means. They should give a specimen of intelligible composition, consisting entirely of nouns and verbs, and not have recourse to those words which they profess to consider as only convenient, but not indispensable. If the verb be simply a word which affirms, and not the attribute which is affirmed of the noun, we do not hesitate to pronounce such a theory impracticable. But while grammarians mistake the predicate for the verb, because affirmation is frequently *conjoined* with the attribute, they may indeed deceive themselves and others in the belief that language might consist only of nouns and verbs. Permitting, however, the indulgence of this misconception, let us inquire in what manner they prove the subordinate utility of the other parts of speech.

"The pronoun" says Dr. Crombie, "is clearly a substitute for the noun; it cannot, therefore, be deemed essential. The adjective, expressing merely the property or quality *in concreto* without affirmation, may be dispensed with, the connection of a substance with a quality or property being expressible by the noun and verb. Thus, a good man is equivalent to a man with, or join, goodness. Adverbs, which have been termed attributes of the second order, are nothing but abbreviations, as *here* for *in this place*, *bravely* for *brave-like*; these, therefore, cannot be considered essentials in language. In the same manner it might be shewn that all parts of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substitutes or abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indispensably requisite."

We will not ask whether the foregoing illustrations are *proofs* of the hypothesis, which the writer maintains, but we will proceed to examine the *truth* of that proposition which has hitherto misled some of our most reputable philologists.

The pronoun appears the least essential part of speech; but let any one, who has occasion to speak of himself, substitute his proper name instead of the pronoun *I*, and, in most cases, he would fail to make himself understood; but the utility, if not the indispensable necessity, of personal pronouns is evident from the fact that the proper names of individuals who converse are not always known, and, if pronouns were abolished, the preliminary of fixing names must be settled before strangers could carry on a conversation. The indispensable use of adjectives and definitives can, however, be more clearly demonstrated.

"If it were *possible*," says Mr. Locke, "that every particular thing should have a distinct particular name, it would be useless, because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood, which is then only done when by use, or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it the idea I apply to it in mine. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice."

"Now from this necessity of general terms," observes Mr. Tooke, "follows immediately *the* NECESSITY *of the article*,* whose business it is to reduce their generality, and upon occasion, to enable us to employ general terms for particulars.

The origin of the composition of ideas may be traced to that act of the mind by which it is enabled to attribute qualities or circumstances to nouns. Every simple proposition, whether true or false, is the result of comparison. Thus a man is called good or bad, in proportion as his conduct corresponds to the abstract notions of the speaker, in reference to the import of the terms goodness and badness;

* Notwithstanding this concession, Mr. Tooke adopts the principle that the noun and verb are the only *necessary* parts of speech.

he may *possess* the quality ascribed to him but he cannot be said *to be* that quality; for this, in every case where the terms were not synonymous, would imply a gross absurdity—as man is goodness, woman is gentleness.

When we say virtue is happiness—vice is misery,—we speak figuratively, but not correctly, for happiness is the result of virtue, and misery the consequence of vice; but if we affirm that virtue is amiable, and vice detestable, we speak correctly, for amiable and detestable are the names of attributes predicated as existing in the nouns, and these qualities not being made the subjects of affirmation, the mind does not recognise them as existing distinct from their substantives, but as inherent, and forming a part of the ideas represented by the words virtue and vice.

Our knowledge of the nature of any object of thought can extend no farther than to the perception of the several attributes connected with such object, for we know and distinguish things only by their qualities. The composition of terms is the consequence of the composition of ideas, and thence the true source of abbreviation. The imperfection of language is, however, so great, that several terms are sometimes required, in order to express a complex idea;—as, "a man that has not music in his soul," "a truly benevolent mind," "a virtuous woman."

It is no argument against this subserviency of terms to ideas to say that single words which represent complex ideas *may* be resolved into more simple terms, each of which may represent a distinct idea, for the object denominated by the single term requires *the whole* of the simple terms to complete the sign by which that particular idea is to be represented:—thus, a holy man and a saint are equivalent names; "one who dies for religion" is a *martyr;* and "a cruel and oppressive ruler" is a *tyrant.*

Now Mr. Tooke affirms that the composition of ideas is merely a contrivance of language, and that the only composition is in the terms. This opinion is so contrary to the experience of every one who has attentively considered the operations of the human mind, and the ideas with which it is impressed, that it would not deserve notice if it were not used by the author as an argument in favour of his Theory

of Language. It will be seen that Mr. Tooke considers ideas to be subservient to terms, whereas the converse of the proposition is generally admitted, for "Language signifies the expression of our ideas by certain articulate sounds, which are used as the signs of those ideas."

There are very few words which represent pure and uncompounded ideas, but this does not prove that the composition of ideas is the result of abbreviation of terms; for the names of complex ideas are as necessary in recording our thoughts as are the names of those simple ideas from which the complex are derived.

Mr. Tooke affirms that "the only composition is in the terms, and that it is as improper to speak of a complex idea as it would be to call a constellation a complex star, and that they are not ideas, but merely terms which are general and abstract."

In answer to the assertions of Mr. Tooke, we may remark that the words constellation, mob, city, &c., are the representatives of as distinct *single* objects of thought as the terms star and man, and it would be as absurd to call a mob a complex man, or a city a complex house, as it is to deny that constellation and city are the names of complex single ideas. For the word mob, or constellation, or city, represents *the whole* as *a collection*, without reference to the individuals which compose that collection. Hence the difference of agreement in nouns of multitude: when the complex idea is present in the mind of the speaker, the verb is singular, and agrees with the abstract noun which represents the idea, formed by viewing a collection of individuals as a whole or entire object. But it is by this kind of sophistry that Mr. Tooke has attempted to impose upon his readers.

"All words," says Mr. Tooke, "are the *names* of things; for that is not a word which is not the *name* of a thing; but a noun substantive is the *name* of a thing, and nothing more." If this *reasoning* be correct, then, the interjections are *names* of things,—for they are both sounds and signs; yet few will allow that they represent objects of *thought*, even when they are artificially employed; therefore, they (although signs significant of emotions) are not *the names* of things, nor do the words by which they are expressed denote distinct ideas.

Let us proceed to examine how Mr. Tooke makes the adjective "a noun and *something more.*"

"Good represents all the ideas signified by the term goodness; and all the difference between a substantive (as goodness) and its corresponding adjective (good) is, that by some small difference of termination, we are enabled, when we employ the sign of an idea, to communicate at the same time to the hearer that such sign is then meant to be added to another sign, in such a manner as that the two signs together may answer the purpose of one complex term, and this contrivance is merely an abbreviation in the sorts of words, to supply the want of an abbreviation in terms."

Now this contrivance, which Mr. Tooke seems to think so lightly of, is just sufficient to signify that the noun adjective means something *less** as well as something *more* than it did when it stood only for the name of a thing, for it takes away the notion of the separate existence of the attribute, and by thus *lessening* its force of signification, renders it fit to be associated with a noun, and the noun and its attribute supply the want of a complex term; and what but the composition of ideas, and the impossibility of finding a distinct name for every individual object of perception, has produced this necessity for adjectives in language.

The example given by Mr. Tooke, in proof that an adjective and its noun are equally names of things, and convey distinct ideas to the mind, will perhaps convince the reader of the error of such an opinion.

Ex.—"A holy man. Here is a difference of termination in one sign, *holiness,* to show us that it is to be joined to another sign, *man,* and that these two together are to serve the purpose of one complex term. In this last instance our language enables us to exchange them both for one complex term, which we cannot do with *good man,* and instead of a *holy man* to say a *saint.*"

We need scarcely here repeat, that whatever words are used to define a noun, these, with the noun, are equivalent to a complex term, and are to be taken as the sign of a complex idea.

* "Quodlibet *substantivum adjective* positum DEGENERAT in adjectivum."

Mr. Tooke proceeds:—"In some cases our language is so deficient as not to enable us to use either of these methods, when we want to express a certain collection of ideas together, and we then have recourse sometimes to prepositions, and sometimes to another expedient. If we speak, we do it by joining the terms close in pronunciation; if we write, we do it by using a mark of junction, thus -, which mark is not a word, nor a letter, because it is not a sign of a sound, but is itself what a *word should be*, the immediate sign of an idea, with this difference, that it is conveyed to the eye only, not to the ear."

Mr. Tooke here affirms that the hyphen, which is a sign only to the eye, is nevertheless the representative of an idea; now we all know that the hyphen is used merely *to show* that one word is to be joined to another, and that two or more terms so united form a complex term: but this *sign* of our *intention* or *desire* to have such terms united, is not the sign of an idea, and it is only necessary when we communicate our thoughts to others in writing.

The predicating verb, or that word which simply affirms, is also a mere sign. It is neither the name of a thing, nor the representative of an idea; yet it is so essential to the communication of thought, that grammarians denominate it the "chief word" in every sentence. There can be no proposition without the sign of affirmation, but it does not follow that a *distinct word* is necessary when this sign is required. The juxta-position of the noun and the attribute, or a modification of the latter, is often sufficient, and this union of the sign with a noun denotes activity, or state of being, and has given rise to that numerous class of words called verbs, so called because the force of affirmation is often included in the attribute, as he walk*s*, for he *is* walking; the horse trots, for the horse *is* trotting.

Some grammarians," says Dr. Jones, "overlooking the force of juxta-position, and judging of the importance of the substantive verb from its frequent use in modern speech, have hence supposed it absolutely necessary to the existence of language, and that no proposition can be communicated without it. But if those critics had been conversant with, and drawn their inferences from, the more ancient lan-

guages, they would not have advanced such a groundless assertion. In Hebrew the substantive verb is comparatively of rare occurrence, and *its place* is supplied by the collocation of the terms to be connected, a principle in itself extremely simple, and suggested by the great law of the human mind. In those derived immediately from the Hebrew, it is used oftener, yet not so often as in modern tongues; and I know not whether it be a fact, capable of proof, that the earlier Greek writers, whose situations enabled them to be conversant with the Egyptian or the Asiatic tongues, are less frequent in its use than the later Greeks. But, be this as it may, it appears to be certain that the usual collocation of the substantive verb, either in the beginning or end of a clause, and not in the middle, arose from a desire of keeping together words that are related as subject and predicate."

From this we perceive that *the word* which denotes affirmation is not so essential for the communication of thought as those terms expressing objects and attributes, and this is the case with all those words which are merely signs, or have no determinate meaning, being known only by their use.

"No simple word," says Mr. Tooke, "can imply assertion. Till one single thing can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an *ad*-sersion, or an *ad*-firmation, for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing."

Mr. Tooke appears to have fallen into the error of grammarians, and has included the predicate or attribute with the sign that unites it with the subject; but surely a very slight knowledge of the structure of language, or the rules of logic, will inform us that the copula frequently *implies* nothing more than mere assertion; nor can this sign mean a couple when it merely unites two terms, which the mind had previously associated in the composition of its ideas.*

But the verb *to be* sometimes implies *existence*, and it is then the sign of that idea, and *represents* while it *affirms* that

* This property of the verb *to be* has been noticed by grammarians. "It appears" says Mr. Lewis, "that this verb, when placed after or before a noun or pronoun, only places it in a situation or makes it capable of being joined to something else."

attribute in the subject. "What is is," says Mr. Locke, "and it is impossible for the same thing *to be*, and not *to be*."

In this example the copula implies *existence*, as well as affirmation, and may be supplied by that verb, viz. "What *exists, exists*, and it is impossible for the same thing *to exist*, and not *to exist;* but this exchange cannot take place when the predicating verb is used merely as a copula, and the notion of existence is not included.

"By removing the sign," says Mr. Harris, "by which assertion is implied, the verb is destroyed." This proves that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. The attribute is called a participle, when it is distinct from the verb, and when it includes the notions of time and activity. This can only be the case when the sign of affirmation is also expressed, as he *is* tired, they *are* travelling. When the attribute is joined to a noun it becomes an adjective, as tired horses, wearied travellers.

The constant effort of the mind, while communicating its thoughts, is to express its ideas by signs, significant of the combinations of objects and their attributes as they exist in the mind, and to form complex terms for complex ideas; but in order to *explain* the different combinations, and the relation which one idea bears to another, or one collection of ideas to another collection, certain words are necessary, the most essential of which is the sign of affirmation; next to this in importance, in the construction of sentences, are the prepositions and conjunctions; but as grammarians have not attempted to show how these words may be dispensed with, we shall, for the present, decline the task of proving their indispensable utility.

Adverbs follow the same rule as adjectives. They are added to other words to increase or diminish the signification, and thus supply the want of more appropriate complex terms. They denote, more accurately, the degrees of qualities, and the manner of action, and could not be dispensed with unless new words, or an increase of termination pointed out the addition made to or the modification of the original idea.

Some authors imagine that because adverbs may be expressed by a circumlocution, or be resolved into other parts

of speech, they are not therefore essential to language. But independently of the adverbial signification of the phrases, "in a high degree," "in a bravelike manner," we find the noun and its attributes attended by a preposition, and this sufficiently demonstrates that the indeclinable parts of speech, or equivalent phrases, are essential to language.

Mr. Tooke has laid great stress on the manner of signification, and intimates that we are to acquire our knowledge of the meaning and nature of words by attending to their manner of signification. But he should have explained what is meant by the manner of signification, and wherein it differs from the signification itself.

The manner of signification, if it mean any thing, appears to amount to this,—a modification of an idea necessarily requires a modification in the term which represents that idea, and that the composition and modification of terms is the result of the composition and modification of ideas. For abbreviation in language, "for the sake of despatch," occurs only when some word or words are omitted, being (to use a grammarian's phrase) understood; but this is a very different kind of abbreviation from that which arises from the complexity of ideas, where a complex idea includes many simple ideas, and is sometimes represented by a single word.

Mr. Tooke was right in his observation, that all words were not immediately the signs of things or of ideas; but he seems to have erred greatly when he denied the necessity of the several parts of speech. Many words in common use are abbreviations, while some are signs of other words, used for the sake of despatch. Yet attributes require appropriate terms, significant of their limited force, and their peculiar manner of signification. Such words are comprehended under verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Definitives answer the purpose of proper names, and pronouns are put for other words.

Our perceptions steal upon us so early in life, and are so soon associated with words, that it is with difficulty we persuade ourselves there is no necessary connection between ideas, and the signs which represent them. To give names to individual objects was probably the first step towards establishing a primitive language; but a mere catalogue of

names would not be sufficient to enable a man to communicate his thoughts; other signs are indispensably necessary; and those who tell us that "if we had a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names," should show us how these names could be arranged, so as to render their several relations distinct and intelligible. Until this has been accomplished we may reasonably infer that the assertions of Mr. Tooke and others on this point are unfounded, and tend only to mislead those who wish to acquire a correct knowledge of the principles and structure of language. We shall, therefore, adhere to the established classification of words, and proceed to notice, severally, the parts of speech, in the order which they have been given at the commencement of this chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARTICLE.

"Without the article, or some equivalent invention, men could not communicate their thoughts at all."—HORNE TOOKE.

"The use of the articles *a* and *the* in English is to convert general terms into particular ones. This idea of particularity, as a quality or property of a noun, is one of the primary ideas suggested by these articles, and the other is that of its appertaining to some particular noun substantive, without which it is not intelligible."—DARWIN.

A SLIGHT acquaintance with the principles of language will convince any one how vague the usual description of this part of speech is when confined to the terms *a* and *the*. "Articles," says Mr. Murray, "are words put before nouns, to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends."

This definition applies to all words which restrict or point out a noun, and individuation cannot therefore be considered exclusively the characteristic distinction of articles. The specific properties of these words remain undefined.

"Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain. Language, therefore, must be composed of general signs, that it may be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals. Now, whatever mode be adopted to render general terms significant of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must be regarded as a substitute for *a proper name*. Thus, *man* is a general term, to denote the whole of a species; if I say "the man," "this man," "that man," it is obvious that

the words *the*, *this*, and *that*, termed definitives, serve with the general term, as a substitute for the proper name of the individual."*

From the preceding observations we learn that articles supply the place of proper names; but grammarians, overlooking the economy of words, have excluded many from this class, because the terms imply a more extensive meaning than the simple definitives A and THE.

The *necessity* of articles, or some equivalent invention, is generally admitted by Etymologists, though, at the same time, they deny the article to be a *necessary* part of speech.

"The visible and individual substances of nature," says Mr. Harris, "are infinitely more numerous than for each to admit of a particular name. To supply this defect, when any individual occurs which either wants a proper name, or whose proper name is not known, we ascertain it as well as we can, by referring it to its species, or if its species be unknown, then at least to some genus."†

But this reference is not sufficient, for to whatever species or genus the object may be referred, it still wants an essential characteristic, by which it may be known from every other of its kind; therefore when a general term is used to denote an individual, it is necessary first to attach some *circumstance* or *quality* to that particular object, by which it may be identified; this property or quality being affixed, the definite article will recal the circumstance, and will afterwards serve as a proper name to distinguish that particular individual from others of its kind. For the article causes a review in the mind, and refers to something previously known concerning the object represented by the general term.

The use of the articles *a* and *the* has been thus explained and exemplified by Mr. Harris:—

"*A* respects our primary perception, and denotes individuals as unknown; THE respects our secondary perception, and denotes individuals as known. To explain by an example —I see an object pass by which I never saw till now. What do I say?—There goes A man with A long beard. The man departs, and returns a week after; what do I say then?—

* Dr. Crombie,—Etymology and Syntax of the English Language, p. 18.

† Hermes, book ii. chap. 1.

There goes THE man with THE long beard. The article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered. Yet mark the force of this apparently minute change:—The individual once vague is now recognized as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present perception to a like perception already past."*

The indefinite article† may be considered as a name applicable to each individual of a class or species, but attached to none. It applies to no particular object, comprehended under the general term. It cannot, therefore, identify the individual, since it refers to no peculiar property of the noun; for every tree may be called *a* tree, and every plant *a* plant, when the general notion of its genus or species is alone considered. But every tree is not understood when we say *the* tree, nor is every plant *the* plant, for the mind is directed by the article *the* to some particular individual of the species, which the speaker has previously defined, or is about to particularize by a subsequent definition, as—

> "*The* man *that hath no music in himself,*
> *And is not moved with concord of sweet sound,*
> Is fit for treasons.

Here the words in italics define the noun, and justify the application of the definite article.

The indefinite article is so called because it does not define the noun, nor does it refer the mind to any particular individual of the class, which the general term, in its unlimited application, comprehends. In the example adduced by Mr. Harris, we find that the man and his beard had both been recognized, and therefore the definite article (the) is properly used before the *two* nouns; for there goes THE man with *a* long beard, would imply that the man had been previously known by some other circumstance, and that the beard was a new object, or primary perception. But let us

* Hermes, book ii. chap. 1.

† "It is the nature of both the articles to determine or limit the thing spoken of. *A* determines it to be one single thing of the kind, leaving it still uncertain which; *the* determines which it is, or of many which they are."—MURRAY.

illustrate the properties of *both* articles by another example, —"*A* critic is like *a* dog at *a* feast."

In this example the three nouns are spoken of indefinitely, and the general terms are only so far limited by the article that they may represent individuals, and not the classes to which those individuals severally belong; nor will the addition of adjectives render their individuality determinate.

Ex. 2.—A *true* critic is like a *hungry* dog, at a *sumptuous* feast.

Here the general terms are limited to distinct classes by the adjectives, but the *individuals* are still undefined. The particular critic, dog, and feast, are unknown. They have received no particular names, nor have any circumstances been attached to them by which they may be distinguished from other individuals of the same classes, possessing the like qualities. Nor will the definite article identify the precise individuals.

Ex. 3.—*The* critic is like *the* dog at *the* feast.

Here the definitions or peculiar characteristics of the nouns are still wanting, and the particular objects are therefore not recognized. For it may be asked,—what critic? what dog? what feast? This leads us to conclude that the article *the* merely supplies the place of the definitive, either expressed or understood, and in this respect it bears a striking analogy to the personal and other pronouns.

The article *a* separates a noun indefinitely from its class, and without any distinct reference to number, as *a* plant, *a* tree, *a* man. The expressions, *one* plant, *one* tree, *one* man, include the idea of *quantity*, and would therefore be felt to express *more* than the speaker intended. The numeral adjective *one*, is however occasionally employed in the indefinite manner of the article, and without having any distinct reference to numbers, as "Whachum, according to Sir Roger L'Estrange, was *one* Thomas Jones, a foolish Welshman. According to another commentator, he is said to have been *one* Richard Green." This use of the numeral, however, cannot be recommended for its elegance. Dr. Crombie has, with his usual ability, demonstrated the difference between the numeral adjective *one*, and the articles *a* or *an*.

"Though our words," says the learned writer, "are

general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences, and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity, or one of a class, our forefathers employed *ae* or *ane*, as *ae man*, *ane ox*. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence *ae*, by celerity of pronunciation, would become *a*, and *ane* be shortened into *an*. The words *a* and *an* are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c., or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations, for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms *a*, *an*, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence *a* or *an* cannot be joined with a plural noun."

"Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted, that in every example where *a* or *an* occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without, in the least degree, injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this,—If I say, Will *one* man be able to carry this burden so far? I evidently oppose one to more, and the answer might be, No; but *two* men will. Let us substitute the term *a*, and say, Will *a* man be able to carry this burden? Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is, for the answer might naturally be, No, but a horse will. I have here substituted *a* for *one*, the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying 'A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a

horse!' I should say, 'one horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse;' the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded, but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea—'one kingdom for one horse.' In this respect our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. *Donner moi un livre*, means either give me one book, i.e. not two or more books, or give me a book, that is, a book, not something else."*

A noun appellative, without an article to restrict its signification, represents the whole class, without referring to the individuals comprehended under the general term, as "Language consists of intelligible signs." But when a proper name, or an equivalent adjective, is added to an appellative, the article is no longer required, as "English language consists chiefly of general terms." Usage, however, permits the article *the* to be placed before the adjective; but as there is but one English language, properly so called, the article is superfluous, unless the noun be thought to require an additional term to render it more emphatic, or to distinguish *the* English language from its dialects. The adjective, English, serves as a definitive to language; but should the same language be again mentioned, the article *the* would sufficiently define it, as "*English* language is chiefly composed of general terms, and in this respect *the* language differs but little from other languages." *The* generally refers to some known object, or to some definitive, either expressed or understood; by definitive, we mean that word, or combination of words, by which a noun is separated and distinguished from every other of its species: for example, "It is by no means the same thing to assert that pleasure is *a* good, or *the* good; the first only makes it a common object of desire, upon a level with many others which daily raise our wishes;

* Etymology and Syntax, pp. 53, 54.

the last supposes it that *supreme and sovereign good*—the ultimate scope of all our actions and endeavours."*

When no particular object, therefore, is referred to by the speaker, the indefinite article limits the signification of the general term to an individual. Individuation is the extent of its use, though its primary meaning may be that of unity. It separates, but does not particularise, the noun to which it is attached, while *the* both separates and limits the noun, and often supplies the place of a proper name.

Both the articles may be applied to the same appellative in a compound sentence, but the indefinite can be used only *once*, and not *after* the noun has been associated with any circumstance, by which it may be known from others of its kind.

Ex.—A hare ran across *a* field, belonging to *a* farmer; but *the* hare had scarcely quitted *the* field before *the* farmer entered it, with *a* gun in his hand: *the* gun was loaded, and *the* hare would probably have been killed had it loitered in *the* field.

Attempts have been made by some grammarians to class under the term definitive all words which are used to define nouns;—the words *one, two, three, all, every, few, both, each, either, neither, whether, or, other, several, some, many, first, second, third, former, latter, this, that,* are by them called definitives, because when these words are placed before nouns they serve to define or point them out; but if this arrangement were adopted, we see no reason why adjectives, and participles used as adjectives, should be excluded from the class of definitives; for these words are employed to describe nouns, and to limit the signification of general terms.

An eminent writer has remarked, that "It would be advantageous if all words modifying nouns were classed under adjectives;" but the primary and more important use of adjectives appears to preclude the practicability of such an arrangement.

The peculiar force and advantages of the articles *a* and *the* have been pointed out by Dr. Hugh Blair, in his Lectures

* Hermes, book i. chap. 1.

on Rhetoric, and the following extract from that work will convince the reader that, in this respect at least, our language excels the Latin:—

"Articles contribute much to the clearness and precision of language. In order to illustrate this, remark what difference there is in the meaning of the following expressions, in English, depending wholly on the different employment of the articles:—'The son of *a* king,—the son of *the* king,—*a* son of *the* king's.' Each of these three phrases has an entirely different meaning, which I need not explain, because any one who understands the language conceives it clearly at first hearing, through the different application of the articles *a* and *the*. Whereas, in Latin, 'Filius regis,' is wholly undetermined; and to explain in which of these three senses it is to be understood (for it may bear any of them), a circumlocution of several words must be used. In the same manner, 'Are you *a* king?' 'are you *the* king?' are questions of quite separate import, which, however, are confounded together in the Latin phrase, 'Esne tu rex.' 'Thou art *a* man' is a very general and harmless position; but 'thou art *the* man' is an assertion capable, we know, of striking terror and remorse into the heart.'"*

SYNTAX OF ARTICLES.

The indefinite article is used before nouns in the singular number only, as *a woman, an angel,* or before a noun of multitude, when the individuals represented by the term are collectively considered, as *an army, a herd, a score, a thousand.*

The definite article is used before nouns in the singular or in the plural number, as *the army, the armies, the man, the men.*

A noun appellative, without an article to limit its signification, applies to the species only, and not to any individual or individuals, otherwise than as belonging to such species, as "Men are more courageous than women."

* Blair.—Structure of Language, Lect. viii.

"The natural associators with articles," says Mr. Harris, "are all those common appellatives which denote genera or species of beings. It is these which, by assuming a different article, serve either to explain an individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recognition, or repeated knowledge. *Those are* THE *men*, means, those are individuals of which we possess some previous knowledge. *Those are men*,—the article apart means no more than they are so many vague and uncertain individuals; just as the phrase, *a man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number."

Remarks on the use of the Indefinite Article.

Many writers repeat the indefinite article when words joined by a conjunction require a different *form* of the article. Instead of saying, "Mary is an amiable and virtuous woman," it would be considered more correct to say, "Mary is an amiable and a virtuous woman." The last form of expression is also more emphatic.

But when adjectives or nouns refer to the same individual, and the construction does not require a change in the form of the definitive, it is better to omit the article before the last noun or adjective,—as *"A wise and prudent man,"—The secretary and treasurer of the institution,"—"The great moralist and philosopher."*

A rather unphilosophical method has been recommended by Dr. Irving, and other grammarians, in cases of impropriety arising from ellipsis of the article:—

"Sometimes," says that writer, "the ellipsis is improperly applied to nouns of different numbers, as—a beautiful field and trees. In this case, we should use another adjective, as —a beautiful field, and fine trees; or put the nouns in the same number, and say—beautiful fields, and fine trees."

But it may be asked, What if the trees be not fine? or suppose the speaker has neither intention nor motive for describing them? or how can *a* field, with the least shadow of propriety, be made plural? This rule of grammar is as false in principle as it is in fact. A beautiful field *with* trees, obviates the difficulty.

The indefinite article sometimes has the meaning of *each* or *every*, as ten shillings *a* bushel, i.e. *each* bushel; once *a* year, i.e. *every* year.

The utility of this article as a *definitive* may be perceived in the following example:—

"If miracles were again to be wrought in favour of humanity, the most beneficial would be a common faith and common language." It should be, *a* common language, i.e. a universal language.

"The use of *a*," says Mr. Tooke, "after the word many, is a corruption for *of*, and has no connection whatever with the article *a*, i.e. *one*. Instead of this corrupt *a*, after many was formerly written *of*, without the corruption, as—

'Ye spend a great many *of* words in vain,'
'I have spoken a many *of* words,'

and innumerable instances may be produced of the same manner of expression. As for the collective nature of the idea that is confined to the word many:—many is indeed a collective term, and may therefore be preceded by the article *a;* but message is not a collective term, therefore many a message is not right. It should be a many of messages."

Notwithstanding the observations of Mr. Tooke, the phrase appears to be correct, and perhaps the only one that could express, in so few words, the meaning of *many* messages sent *singly*. The derivation of *many*, from miscere, to mix, to mingle, tends rather to obscure the meaning of this idiom, for the messages are neither mixed nor mingled, but sent *one* by *one*, and distinct from each other, and are thus *scantled* out by the writer, when he ingeniously places the indefinite article between the collective term *many* and the singular noun *message;* nor are the ideas of mixed, associated, or company, implied by *many*, but the collective quantity is alone referred to.

Mr. Murray's observations on this idiom are to the purpose:—"The indefinite article is sometimes placed between the adjective *many* and a singular noun, as—

'Full many *a* gem, of purest ray serene,
The deep unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
Full many *a* flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.'

In these lines, "many a gem," and "many a flower," refer to many gems, and many flowers, separately, not collectively, considered.

As the modification of the indefinite article is intended to assist pronunciation, it should occur in those cases where euphony requires it.

A is now used before all words beginning with a consonant, and *h* aspirated, and likewise before words beginning with *u*, pronounced long, and the dipthongs *eu, ew*, sounded *you;* also before the word *one*, as a man, a heart, a union, a university, a European, a ewe, and such a one.

It has been justly remarked, that sometimes a virtual consonant exists at the beginning of a word, without being written, as in *union* and *once*, where the ear catches the initial sound of *y* and *w*, as younion and wunce. Before such words it is customary to drop the final letter of the article, at least in pronunciation, and there can be no good reason for not writing—a union, a once beloved monarch.

An is used before all vowels, except in the cases before mentioned, as—an essay, an island, an uproar. This primitive form of the article is also retained before words beginning with silent *h*, as—an hour, an honest man; and also before the *h* aspirated, when the accent is on the second syllable, as—an heroic action, an historical picture.

Remarks on the use of the Definite Article.

The definite article is sometimes used before an adjective, to denote an individual eminently distinguished for some particular quality, as—Aristides the just, John the divine, Charles the bad; or to denote a class of individuals expressed by an adjective, used as a general term, as—the just; but if the adjective be not construed, as a general term, the noun understood is in the singular number, as—the just man.

"The gods love the modest, but hate the arrogant." In this example the adjectives, modest and arrogant, with the article, are equivalent to "modest men," "arrogant men," and are thus construed in the original.

The definite article is often used before a general term, to

distinguish an individual from others of the same *name*, as—John the baptist, John the evangelist, King Charles the martyr, Bruce the traveller. The epithets in these examples distinguish the individuals from others of the same *name*, and not from individuals of the same *kind;* as—the traveller distinguishes Bruce from other Bruces, not from other travellers, for in this case the proper name is sufficient.

The definite article frequently indicates a general reference, and denotes the character of a species, rather than a particular individual, as may be seen in the following examples:—

"It is precisely the sort of work we should have expected from the author, in which the learning of *the* scholar and the fancy of *the* novelist blend to illustrate the genius of *the* poet." That is, the learning of *a* scholar and the fancy of *a* novelist blend to illustrate the genius of *a* poet.

THE is also used indefinitely, when an individual is taken to represent a species, as—

"The poet, the moralist, and the divine, speak in the praise of virtue." That is, poets, moralists, and divines, speak in the praise of virtue.

In the following example, also, the definite article has a more general reference than when it is applied to a known individual:—

Read *the* grammar throughout often; consult it on every difficulty.

The particular grammar here alluded to is that used by the student, and the definite article might have been supplied by the more expressive definitive, *your*,—read your grammar often.

Appellative nouns, restricted by this article, are occasionally used emphatically, to denote individuals, as—the city, means London; the speaker, a high officer in the British parliament. Thus, among the Greeks, the poet meant Homer, and the stagerite meant Aristotle; not that there were not many poets beside Homer, and many stagerites beside Aristotle, but none equally illustrious for their poetry and philosophy.

THE is used emphatically before adverbs in the comparative and superlative degree, as—the wiser *the* better; this is *the* best. Sometimes this article is used figuratively before

proper names, to denote indefinitely a class of individuals, as—Goldsmith is a very pretty poet, but not to be compared to the Popes, the Drydens, and the Otways. It is occasionally put for a pronoun possessive, as—

> "Ambition, half convicted of her folly,
> Hangs down *the* head, and reddens at the tale."
>
> BLAIR.

We shall conclude our observations on the articles, with a few examples of inaccurate construction, chiefly selected from Dr. Lowth's Introduction to English Grammar:—

Ex.—"And I persecuted this way unto *the* death."—Acts xxii. 4.

The apostle does not mean any particular sort of death, but death in general; the definitive article, therefore, is improperly used. It ought to be—unto death—without any article, agreeably to the original αχρι θανατυ.

But when a particular death, or *the* death of an individual, is spoken of, an article is properly employed, as—"*the* death of a traitor;" "*the* death of the righteous."

Ex.—"But Pythias were unjust, did he let Damon suffer *a* death that the tyrant prepared only for Pythias."

Ex.—"When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into *all truth*."—John xvi. 13.

This translation signifies into all truth whatsoever,—into truth of all kinds; very different from the meaning of the Evangelist, and from the original, εις ωασαν την αληθειαν, into all *the* truth; that is, into all evangelical truth.

In the following passage, the distinction made by the article between a particular truth, and truth in general, is still more obvious.

Ex. "Every one that is of THE *truth* heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth."—John xviii. 38, 39.*

Pilate alludes to truth as opposed to falsehood, and not to the particular doctrine pre-eminently distinguished by the name of *the truth*.

* Πᾶς ὁ ὢν ἐκ ΤΗΣ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ, ἀκουει μυ τῆς φωνῆς.—Λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλάτος Τί ἐστιν ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ.

Ex.—Truly this was *the* son of God.—Matt. xxvii. 54, and Mark xv. 39.

"This translation supposes that the Roman centurion had a proper and adequate notion of the character of Jesus, as *the* son of God, in a peculiar and incommunicable sense; whereas, it is probable, both from the circumstance of the history, and from the expression of the original, that he only meant to acknowledge him to be an extraordinary person, and more than mere man, according to his own notion of sons of gods in the Pagan theology. This is also more agreeable to St. Luke's account of the same confession of the centurion,—"Certainly this was δικαιο,—a righteous man," not ὁ Δικαιο,—the just one. The same may be observed of Nebuchadnezzar's words, (Dan. iii. 25.)—"And the form of the fourth is like *the* son of God;" it ought to be by the indefinite article,—like *a* son of God, ὁμοια υιῳ Θεου; that is, like an angel, according to Nebuchadnezzar's own account of it, in the 28th verse,—"Blessed be God, who hath sent his *angel*, and delivered his servants." See also Luke xix. 9.

"These remarks may serve to show the great importance of the proper use of the article; the near affinity there is between the Greek article and the English definitive article; and the EXCELLENCE of the English language in this respect, which, by means of its articles, does most precisely determine the extent of signification of common nouns; whereas the Greek has only one article, and it has puzzled all the grammarians to reduce the use of that to any clear and certain rules."

"The perpetual use of the article," says Dr. Darwin, "besides converting general terms into particular ones, contributes much to the force and beauty of our language, from another circumstance, — that abstracted ideas become so readily personified, simply by the omission of it, which perhaps renders the English language better adapted to poetry than any other, ancient or modern." The following prosopopœia from Shakespeare is thus beautiful—

> "She let *concealment* like a worm i' 'the' bud
> Feed on her damask cheek."

And the following line, translated from Juvenal by Dr.

Johnson, is much superior to the original, owing to the easy personification, of *worth* and *poverty*, and the consequent conciseness of it:—

> " Difficile emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat
> Res angusta domi."—
>
> " Slow rises *worth* by *poverty* depressed."

To these examples, given by Dr. Darwin, may be added the following, in which, also, by the omission of the article, adjectives are converted into nouns:—

> " The *wise* and *active* conquer difficulties,
> By daring to attempt them: *sloth* and *folly*
> Shiver and shrink at sight of toil and hazard,
> And make th' impossibility they fear."

Illustration of the use of the Definite Article.

As there are only two articles in the English language (*an* being considered a mere modification of *a*,) a *rule* is not requisite to distinguish these words from the other parts of speech:—

THE MEDLEY OF THE GRAVE.

> " Here are *the* wise, *the* gen'rous, and *the* brave;
> *The* just, *the* good, *the* worthless, *the* profane;
> *The* downright clown, and perfectly well-bred;
> *The* fool, *the* churl, *the* scoundrel, and *the* mean;
> *The* supple statesman, and *the* patriot stern;
> *The* wrecks of nations, and *the* spoils of time;
> With all *the* lumber of six thousand years."
>
> BLAIR.

Illustration of the Indefinite Article.

BUTLER'S DESCRIPTION OF HUDIBRAS' TALENTS AS A LOGICIAN.

> " He was in Logic *a* great critic,
> Profoundly skilled in analytic;
> He could distinguish and divide
> *A* hair 'twixt south and south west side;
> On either which he would dispute,
> Confute, change hands, and still confute;

He'd undertake to prove, by force
Of argument, *a* man's no horse;
He'd prove *a* buzzard is no fowl,
And that *a* lord may be *an* owl,
A calf *an* alderman, *a* goose *a* justice,
And rooks committee men and trustees;
He'd run in debt by disputation,
And pay with ratiocination:—
All this by syllogism true,
In mood and figure he would do.

Canto i. v. 65—80.

These and other illustrations of the parts of speech are given for such readers as may be yet unacquainted with the classification of words. The foregoing illustrations will furnish examples to *familiarize*, not only the articles, but also nouns and adjectives, which, in the first quotation, are nearly the only kinds of words employed with the definitive.

Before the practical part of grammar can be well understood, it is indispensably necessary to acquire a facility in distinguishing the different sorts of words. These extracts, therefore, may serve as progressive parsing lessons, for those who feel themselves deficient in this particular.

In the first illustration, *here* and *perfectly* are adverbs; *are*, the verb, in the plural; *and* is a copulative conjunction; *of* and *with* are prepositions. These words being known, the nouns and adjectives will be readily distinguished, by those who have perused the preceding chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NOUN.

"A noun is the simple or complex,—the particular or general,—sign or name of one or more ideas."—HORNE TOOKE.

A noun, or substantive, represents some individual conception, and is either the name of an object which exists, or the sign of an idea, resulting from the operations of the human mind, as—*man, life, immortality, virtue, army, parliament.*

Every theme of men's thoughts,—whether it be an object capable of affecting the senses, a mere creation of the imagination, or a conception arising from abstract reasoning,—belongs to this class of words, as—*fire, dragon, goodness, temperance, reading, walking; to act, to work.* A noun may be also known by making sense of itself.

"A noun may be considered to be at once the name of a thing, and the sign of the idea. But these may be separated. It may denote a thing without a correspondent idea, as when we repeat that which we do not understand; or it may denote an idea without a corresponding thing; such, for instance, are abstract terms, representing ideal not positive objects; such also are those words which express creatures of the imagination."

From this it appears that nouns are the *names* of objects, whether such objects have a real or imaginary existence. They are likewise the arbitrary signs of ideas.

Nouns represent either simple or complex ideas; but in language they are considered merely as the *names* of things, whether the ideas they stand for are simple, compound, complex, or collective.

Nouns are either proper or common.

A proper name is the sign by which an individual is distinguished from the rest of the species to which it belongs, as *London, Thames, England.*

A common name is applicable to every individual of the class which it denotes, and is the sign of that idea, as *river, city, island, country.*

There is this difference between a proper name and an appellative, the former serves as a definitive, while the latter always denotes the subject of our thoughts. Thus, London is a large *city*, i.e. London City, where city is the theme and not the individuating word London.

After a proper name has long been associated with a general term, the latter is commonly omitted, as London, Thames, England. The appellative is, however, sometimes added, as London city, Thames river. As these nouns are in apposition, they will not admit the sign of the possessive case. The city of London, the river of Thames, are inaccurate phrases, for the city is London, and not a city belonging to London. The inaccuracy is perceived when the relation is rendered more conspicuous, as London's city, Thames' river. But if we say the people of England, no impropriety is perceived, for people and England are distinct objects; and though the latter noun is used as a definitive, still it is not in apposition, but is equivalent to an adjective, and may be supplied by its derivative,—the English people.

A name can no longer be strictly called proper when it represents more than one individual, at least it cannot serve the purpose for which proper names are given. When several persons are called by the same name, some circumstance or epithet is necessary to distinguish one person of that name from others of the same name, as John Smith, *the elder.*

Substantives become adjectives when they are joined to a noun, to qualify or define it, as—an *oak* tree, a *gold* watch, a *silver* spoon.

Adjectives become nouns when used as names of classes of species, collectively considered, as—the *English*, the *valiant*, the *wise*, and the *good.*

"The oak, the pine, and the ash, are names of whole classes of objects, each of which includes an immense num-

ber of undistinguished individuals. Here, then, it appears that though the formation of abstract or general conceptions is supposed to be a difficult operation of the mind, such conceptions must have entered into the very first formation of language. For if we except only the proper names of persons, such as Cæsar, John, Peter, all the other substantive nouns which we employ in discourse are the names, not of individual objects, but of very extensive genera or species of objects, as—man, lion, house, river, &c. We are not, however, to imagine that this invention of general or abstract terms requires any great exertion of metaphysical capacity, for by whatever steps the mind proceeds in it, it is certain that when men have once observed resemblances among objects, they are naturally inclined to call all those which resemble one another by one common name, and of course to class them under one species."—BLAIR.

To nouns belong *gender*, *number*, and *case*.

GENDER.

The simplicity of the rules for denoting the genders of nouns in English is an advantage few languages possess. "The English and the Chinese are the only languages," says Blair, "in which the distinction of gender is properly and philosophically applied in the use of words, and confined, *as it ought to be*, to mark the real distinctions of male and female."

All nouns in English denoting males are masculine, those which represent females are feminine, and all inanimate subjects are neuter. Any departure from these rules is a breach of the true principles upon which language is founded, and tends only to cause misconception and error. For, surely, nothing can be more absurd than to apply, on ordinary occasions, the ideas of masculine and feminine to inanimate objects, when common sense declares such nouns are neuter. The ancients, who worshipped "stocks and stones," had some excuse for this practice. They believed that the sun was Phœbus, and that the moon was sister to that god, and therefore they might, with some propriety, call the one a *he*,

and the other a *she;* but when we say of the sun, *he* is rising, or of the moon, *she* is waning, it not only causes a confusion in our ideas, but approaches very near to the style of the most illiterate, who commonly make *hes* and *shes* of things which a heathen would have blushed to rank among his gods.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the grammarian who affirms that the practice of assigning anomalous genders to nouns, "forms a singular and striking beauty in our language." In prose it generally mars the sense, the mind being diverted from the real subject while contemplating an imaginary creation. "It is evident that neither reason nor nature has any share in this matter, and that in assigning sex to inanimate things, the determination is purely fanciful." A few examples will sufficiently demonstrate the absurdity of such deviations from reason and common sense.

"It was reserved for Bacon to proclaim aloud to the *ear* of Science that *she* could only hope to be regenerated by first sacrificing *herself* on the altar of Truth, and that if ever *she* took an upward flight, *she* must pass the fiery ordeal, and rise like a Phœnix from *her* own ashes."

This may be considered fine writing, but the *sense* of incorporating all the sciences into one, and forming a creature who was to listen to the voice of Bacon,—to attend to his instructions, and ultimately to sacrifice *herself* at the altar of Truth, that *she* might rise from *her* ashes like a Phœnix,—is too unintelligible to pass for a poetical effort of the imagination, and is altogether inconsistent with the sobriety of philosophical disquisition.

The following examples are from Dr. Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric:—

Ex.—"The *sphere of demonstration* is narrow, but *her* sway despotic; *her* rival, with less power, has the empire of the world. Society would perish without *her*, and human nature become extinct."

The *sphere of demonstration* is, in this sentence, converted into a female; and if the meaning of the writer has been obscured by the personification, he has perhaps a still greater claim to sublimity of expression. "For *obscurity*," says Dr. Blair, "is not unfavourable to the *sublime*. Though it

render the object indistinct, the impression may be great; for it is one thing to make an idea *clear*, and another to make it affecting to the imagination, and the imagination may be strongly affected, and, in fact, often is so, by objects of which we have no *clear* conception."

Ex.—"The natural division of man is into soul and body. Analogous to this are the sense and expression of discourse; in other words, the thought and the symbol by which it is communicated. It is by the sense that RHETORIC holds of LOGIC, and by the expression that *she* holds of grammar."

Which of the sciences is here made feminine, or what the meaning of the last sentence, we do not pretend to unriddle. It is sufficient for our purpose to show that logic or rhetoric is personified, and that confusion and *obscurity* are the consequences.

"I have attempted," says Campbell, "to explain what that *use* is which is the sole *mistress* of language, and to ascertain the precise import and extent of these *her* essential attributes,—reputable, national, and present; and to give the directions proper to be observed in searching for the laws of this *empress*."

In one part of the foregoing sentence "use" is called a *mistress*, in another an *empress*.

To show the facility which writers possess in personifying neuter nouns, we may quote another instance from a modern writer on language:—

"Whatever may be the future decision of usage—that great *arbitress* of all language (for at present *she* is divided,) Harris's arrangement seems more comformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley's own rule, than that which the latter recommends."

We have remarked that the homage granted by grammarians to usage — "the great *arbitress* of language,"—is conferred only when some difficulty in composition compels the writer to decline its investigation; but when the error is palpable, and *can* be exposed, then usage—"the great arbitress,"—is treated with very little ceremony.

Dr. Blair, in his excellent lectures, observes, "that personification is the boldest of all rhetorical figures; it is the style of strong passion only, and therefore never to be

attempted unless when the mind is considerably heated and agitated. A slight personification of some inanimate thing, acting as if it had life, can be relished by the mind, in the midst of a cool description, and when its ideas are going on in the ordinary train. But it must be in a state of violent emotion, and have departed considerably from its common tract of thought, before it can so far realize the personification of an insensible object, as to conceive it *listening* to what we say, or making any return to us."

The poet may be allowed the licence of personifying what he thinks proper: his art teaches him to deal in fiction, and to please the imagination at the expense of reason. Orators, too, who wish to embellish their language, that they may awaken the passions, or conceal the truth, may be indulged the use of tropes and metaphors; but let these "flights of *fancy*" be confined, as nearly as possible, within the limits of their proper spheres. Let not science and philosophy be incumbered by such vagaries, nor let the purity of the English language be infringed by allowing, in ordinary discourse, so gross a violation of truth and consistency; for, be it remembered, that, "by following the order of nature in the distribution of gender, our language is rendered, in this respect, both simple and animated;" and it should also be borne in mind that the majority of mankind do not aspire to that subtle kind of reason which can discern, even in things without sex, a distant analogy to that great natural distinction.

The genders of nouns are distinguished in the English language:

First. By different words, as—boy, girl, brother, sister.

Secondly. By difference of termination, as—lion, lioness, actor, actress.

Thirdly. By prefixing a noun, pronoun, or adjective, to the appellative noun, as—a man servant, a maid servant, a he goat, a she goat, male descendants, female descendants.

It has been justly observed, that nouns with variable terminations contribute to conciseness and perspicuity of expression. We have only a sufficient number of them to make us feel our want; for when we say of a woman, she is

a philosopher, an astronomer, a builder, a weaver, we perceive an impropriety in the termination, which we cannot avoid; but we can say, that she is a botanist, a student, a witness, a scholar, an orphan, a companion, because these terminations have not annexed to them the notion of sex. Dr. Crombie's remarks on this imperfection in the English language contain nearly every thing that it will be necessary to add concerning the genders of nouns.

"It is to be observed, however, that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male and female, and is always employed when the office, occupation, profession, &c., and not the sex, of the individual, is chiefly to be expressed, and that the feminine term is used in those cases only when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be illustrated by the following examples: if I say, 'the poets of this age are distinguished more by correctness of taste than sublimity of conception,' I clearly include in the term poet, both male and female writers of poetry: if I say she is the best poetess in this country, I assign her the superiority over those only of her own sex: if I say she is the best poet in this country, I pronounce her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female." "Spinning," says Lord Kames, in his Sketches, "is a *female** occupation, and must have had a female inventor." If he had said a female inventress, the expression would have been pleonastic: if he said, "must have had an inventress," he would not have sufficiently contrasted the male and the female, he would have merely predicated the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the term inventor, as applicable to each of the sexes, limiting it to the female by the appropriate term.

When distinction of sex is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather than the general idea, implied by the term, is the primary object, a modification of

* An occupation can have no sex. The adjective is here improperly used for the definitive, a female's occupation; but an inventor may be male or female; therefore a female inventor is correct. We have seen a similar error publicly exhibited near London, "A female school," instead of a school for females. School is a *neuter* noun, and no one can with propriety venture to call it a *she*, or attach to it the notion of sex.

the noun must be employed to express the female, thus: "I hear that some authoresses are engaged in the work."

If we perceive an impropriety in the terms, when we say of a woman, she is a philosopher, or a mathematician, it is, perhaps, because the notion of a particular gender was originally associated with these appellations. Hence we may infer, that women were formerly otherwise employed than in studying the laws of nature or solving the problems of Euclid; neither have we yet discovered an appropriate term for a female professor of political economy.

NUMBER.

Appellative nouns being employed to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called number, by which we signify whether one or more individuals of any genus or species be intended.

Appellative nouns have two numbers; the singular, which speaks of one as *plant*, the plural, which speaks of more than one, as *plants*. The general rule for the formation of the plural of appellative nouns is to add *s* to the singular, as —horse, horses. Compound words, used to denote quantities, are made plural by adding *s* to the final syllable, as —handful, handfuls; cartload, cartloads; spoonful, spoonfuls. The apparent inaccuracy in some of these terms arises from the force of signification which the component parts of the compound words retain. Thus some persons are induced to write spoonsful, barrowsful, &c.

The exceptions to the general rule for the formation of the plural of nouns are—

1. Nouns ending in *ch*, *sh*, *ss*, or *x*, form their plurals by adding *es* to the singular, as—peach, peaches; lash, lashes; loss, losses; fox, foxes.

The reader will readily perceive the necessity for this deviation from the general rule. The plural of such nouns cannot be distinguished from the singular, unless a distinct syllable be added.

Nouns ending in *ch* hard, are formed by adding *s* only to the singular, as monarch, monarchs.

2. Nouns ending in *f* or *fe*, are made plural by changing *f* or *fe* into *ves*, as half, halves; life, lives.

3. Nouns ending in *o*, preceded by a consonant, are made plural by adding *es* to the singular, as hero, heroes; except junto, canto, tyro, grotto, portico, solo and quarto, which are formed by adding *s* to the singular, as junto, juntos.

Nouns ending in a vowel, preceded by another vowel, form their plurals regularly, as—folio, folios; die, dies.

4. Nouns ending in *y*, preceded by a consonant, change the *y* into *ies*, as—cherry, cherries. If a vowel precede the *y*, the plural is formed by adding *s* only, as day,—days; and there is no good reason why *all* nouns in *y* should not be formed regularly; the exceptions cause many errors in orthography, as—vollies, attornies, Anthonies, Henries.

Nouns ending in *ff*, form their plurals by adding *s*, as—muffs, puffs, skiffs, cliffs.

5. The following nouns form their plurals in *en*, as—man, men; ox, oxen; child, children; woman, women; brother makes brethren, when persons of the same society or profession are designated. Nouns, expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural, have no singular, as—lungs, scissors, bellows, ashes. "Many of those words which have no singular, denote things consisting of two parts, and, therefore, have a plural termination. Hence the word pair is used with many of them, as—a pair of colours, a pair of drawers."

Some nouns have no plural; 1st, Those which denote things measured or weighed, as—sugar, tea, wheat; unless when they express varieties, as—sugars, teas, wheats. Here not the unlimited appellative noun is signified, but different species or classes of the appellative are referred to, and in this sense the nouns are used plurally. 2ndly. Names of abstract and also of moral qualities, as—hardness, softness, prudence, envy, benevolence, have no plural. Several nouns in this class ending in *y*, when they do not express the quality or property in the abstract, but either its varieties or its manifestations, are used plurally. Thus we say, levities, affinities, gravities, &c.

There may be different degrees and different exhibitions of the quality, but not a plurality.

"Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using, with Hume, the plural, insolences, the expression, acts of insolence, would be preferable."

Proper names admit the plural form when they are used to denote classes, or the names of families, as the Cæsars, the Scipios, the Smiths, the Townsends, the Howards. In this sense the proper name ceases, strictly speaking, to be a definitive, and hence the necessity for surnames.

Nouns from the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and other languages, retain their original plurals, as—cherub, cherubim, phenomenon, phenomena, crisis, crises, beau, beaux.

Some nouns are entirely anomalous, as—die, dice, penny, pence. Dice is commonly used both for the singular and the plural, and may be considered as belonging to the next class of nouns. Even our best writers occasionally disregard this useless anomaly. "When a *dice*," says Campbell, "is thrown out of the hand, we know its gravity will make it fall, and that its cubical figure will cause but one side to face upwards. This we know from experience; but there is no principle which can lead me to conclude that one side rather than another will be turned up, unless the *die* be falsely loaded for the purpose of cheating."

Penny makes pennies when distinct coins are spoken of, and pence when their value is denoted in computation.

The last exception, or, to speak more correctly, anomaly, is, that some words are used alike in both numbers, as—deer, sheep, swine.

Writers not having precise ideas to attach to the terms, mathematics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, and some other plural nouns, use them indiscriminately, and this inattention to precision causes much inaccuracy in the grammatical structure of sentences.

The word, means, is a striking instance of the respect paid to authority and popular usage, in opposition to the dictates of common sense and the fundamental principles of grammar. If the word, means, had been uniformly used by our best writers, as a noun singular, this would be no argument for

continuing the practice; for every time it is improperly applied, the thought and the term are at variance, and the mind is too often diverted from the subject of the sentence; yet a teacher of language will say that it is idle and fastidious to propose a change: thus we are taught to continue an acknowledged inaccuracy, because classical writers have set us the example; but for a writer of no ordinary abilities openly to sanction such abuses, is more mischievous than quoting a thousand authorities in favour of the abuse. The business of the grammarian is to point out the right road, and to leave to the choice of the reader to take the wrong if he thinks proper. Dr. Crombie concludes his remarks on this word with the following pertinent observations:—

"As a general rule for the use of means, as either singular or plural, it might render the construction less vague, and the expression therefore less ambiguous, were we to employ it as singular when the mediation or instrumentality of one thing is implied, and as plural when two or more mediating causes are referred to."

Ex.—"He was careful to observe what means *were* employed by his adversaries to counteract his schemes. Here means is properly joined with a plural verb, several methods of counteraction being signified."

"The king consented, and by *this* means all hope of success *was* lost. Here only one mediating circumstance is implied, and the noun is therefore used as singular."

"While for the sake of perspicuity we offer this general rule, we cannot but remark that, though the term mean is at present, by general usage, confined to the expression of a middle between two extremes, we are inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a more extended use of the noun singular. A means is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported by analogy, is yet repugnant to the general idiom of our language, and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause, that we should be pleased to see it dismissed from use. If we say, 'this was one of the means which he employed to effect his purpose,' analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending *a mean*, or *one mean*, as preferable to a means. News, alms, riches, pains, have been used as either singular

or plural, but we never say 'one of the news,' 'one of the alms,' 'one of the riches,' 'one of the pains,' as we say 'one of the means;' we may therefore be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general usage, in pronouncing "a means" a palpable anomaly."—CROMBIE.

The word news is sometimes construed as a plural, but more generally as a singular noun. It would be more *correct*, as well as useful, to consider this noun as singular when only one article of intelligence is communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported, as—"no news so bad as *this* at home;" "the news of the day *engage* the attention of the idle."

Dr. Crombie observes that a celebrated grammarian has pronounced the noun, pains, to be in all cases plural; but, says Dr. Crombie, this assertion might be proved erroneous by numberless examples. Now, the examples given do not prove the assertion to be erroneous, for they only prove that the plural noun, pains, *has been used* as a singular, but the sentences quoted do not demonstrate the propriety of the preference.

Pains mean repeated efforts (collectively considered) of the mind or body, but should in no case be applied to signify a single exertion of either.

When the word pains is followed by a verb in the singular number, it is considered as a collective noun, the words *amount, aggregate*, or such other term, being understood as the nominative, as—the pains they had taken *was* very great, i. e. not great in number, but in the aggregate, collectively considered.

A proof that pains is sometimes used as a collective noun, may be adduced from the use of much before the term.

Ex.—Much pains has been bestowed upon the work.

Nouns in the plural, used without an article to limit their signification, resemble nouns of multitude, and are similar to those anomalies which do not admit the distinction of number.

Nouns of multitude depend for their signification chiefly on the idea in the mind of him who uses them. If the collective idea be dwelt on, and be the subject of the attribute, the noun is construed as singular, as—the mob

was large—the army *has* been defeated; but if the individuals which compose a collective noun be referred to, then the noun is considered plural, as—the committee *have* agreed. It will be observed that collective nouns, used as plurals to denote the individuals which constitute such particular associations, are generally employed figuratively, as—the House of Commons, for the members of that assembly.

Case.

Case denotes the relation the noun bears to the predicate, or the relation which one noun bears to another in a sentence, as—Dryden translated Virgil's poems; in this sentence, *Dryden* is the nominative, *Virgil's* the possessive or genitive, and *poems* the objective case.

In the analysis of every sentence there will be found some noun, pronoun, or phrase, equivalent to a noun, either expressed or understood, which may be considered as the *subject* of the assertion, and to which "that which is asserted" pertains. This noun, or phrase, is the nominative case; it governs the verb in number and person, and is thus distinguishable from every other noun in the sentence, as—the *horse* draws the carriage. Here the *act of drawing* is *attributed* to the horse, and *horse* is therefore said to be in the nominative case. But there is another noun in the sentence connected with the nominative and its attribute; it is the *object* acted upon by the nominative, but concerning which nothing is expressly affirmed. Carriage is therefore said to be in the objective case.

But if carriage be taken as the principal noun, or subject of affirmation, it then becomes the nominative, or governing, case of the sentence, as—the carriage is drawn by the horse. Here the state or condition in which the carriage is placed by the horse, and not the act of drawing, is the predicate; and this state or condition is attributed to the carriage; the agent, therefore, is connected to the predicate by a preposition, and is said to be governed in the objective case.

But the relations which subordinate nouns bear to each other in a sentence would, if denoted by change of termi-

nation, give rise to an unlimited number of cases. In English this inconvenience is obviated, either by position or by the use of prepositions, which denote the several relations of nouns connected with the subject and its attribute.

Dr. Darwin, speaking of the cases of Greek and Latin nouns, observes, that "When to the variation of the terminations of nouns in the singular number are added those equally numerous of the plural, and the great variety of these terminations correspondent to the three genders, it is evident that the prepositions of our own and modern languages, instead of the changes of termination, add to the simplicity of these languages, and to the facility of acquiring them."

The only case in English which admits of modification is that which denotes possession, and in which case the modified noun is used as a definitive to some other noun, as—the people's rights; the king's prerogative.

The sign of the genitive case was for a long time considered to be an abbreviation of the pronoun *his*, as—"the man *his* duty;" "the scholar *his* task;" but modern grammarians contend this cannot be correct, because, although we may say—the man *his* duty, we cannot, with equal propriety, say—the woman *his* duty. But these writers seem to overlook the true character of this sign. The possessive pronouns *his, hers*, represent the nouns, and the relation of property also; they are, therefore, signs of complex ideas. But when it is necessary to mention the name of an individual, represented by a possessive pronoun, the pronoun becomes redundant, and the relation of property is *all* that remains to be expressed. Hence the impropriety of the primitive mode of expression,—"for Christ *his* sake;" "the children *their* bread." This tautology appears to have been at first obviated by uniting the pronoun masculine to the noun, by which means the *repetition* of the notion of gender, number, and person, was prevented, and the abbreviation served simply to denote the relation of property or possession. The present mode of distinguishing the genitive may be considered an abbreviation of the original termination.

By the modification, therefore, of the adjective pronoun, it no longer conveys the notion of gender or number, and it

is thus rendered capable of being affixed or added to *any noun*, simply to denote the relation of property or possession. We may further remark, that "the man's duty," and the duty *of* the man, are equivalent expressions, yet no one expects the preposition *of*, which is a substitute for the sign *s*, should convey the notion of sex, or agree in gender, with the noun to which it belongs. It may also be observed that the pronoun *his* was formerly used before neuter nouns, and this strongly confirms the opinion once entertained of this abbreviation.

There is yet another case distinct from the nominative, at least as regards its power of governing the verb:—this is the *vocative case;* being, in its nature, interjectional, it simply names the object addressed, as—"sir;" "men and brethren;" "my lord;" "madam."

Ex.—"Awake, awake, put on thy strength, *O Zion*, put on thy beautiful garments, *O Jerusalem.*"

Grammarians, indeed, say, that the verb *agrees* with these vocatives in number and person; but where there is no *government* there can be no *concord;* besides, the verb in the imperative mood (awake) is, in fact, the *object* commanded, and not an attribute predicated of Zion,—"I command thee (O Zion) *to awake.*"

Ex.—"My Lord,—your lordship may be surprised at the liberty I take in writing to you."—POPE.

In this example, "my lord," and "your lordship," mean the same person, but the latter is in the nominative, or governing case, and the verb and pronoun agree with it. The former is in the vocative, and has no power in regulating the construction of the sentence. These cases are, therefore, essentially different; for, "my lord," taken as the nominative, would imply a person spoken *of*, and not a person spoken *to*, and the verb and pronoun must then agree with it in the third person.

The nominative or governing cases of the first and second persons are always pronouns, and when nouns are used with these, they are said to be in apposition; but these nouns do not govern the verb.

Ex.—"Now, I, Paul, myself, beseech you." Here the verb agrees with the pronoun *I*, though "Paul" and "myself" represent the same person as the nominative.

SYNTAX OF NOUNS.

CONCORD AND GOVERNMENT.

CONCORD and GOVERNMENT are so closely connected with the syntax of nouns, that the distinction between these terms may be most conveniently noticed in this chapter.

GOVERNMENT is that power which one word has over another, to determine its gender, number, person, case, or mode. The word that *yields* to this power is said to *agree* with the word that *governs* it, and this agreement is called CONCORD.

RULE 1. Two or more nouns, denoting the same individual, are in the same case,—*David, son of Jesse, king of Israel; Hume, the historian; Johnson's, the Bookseller's.*

In these examples the additional nouns express or explain the principal nouns more fully, and are said to be in apposition to those nouns.

In the last example the sign of the genitive may be properly omitted after the second noun, as that term is explanatory, and serves as an adjective to its noun in apposition, as—*Johnson's, the bookseller.*

RULE 2. A noun in the nominative case governs the verb; that is, the nominative requires the verb to agree with it in number and person, as—the storm *is* past; the sun *shines;* the husbandmen *return.* Here the verbs—*is, shines, return,* are in the same number and person as their several nominatives.

The place of the nominative is before the verb. The word that governs may be discovered by asking, who? or what? with the verb and its attribute, as—What is past?—the *storm.* What shines?—the *sun.* Who return?—the *husbandmen.* The words that answer to the questions are the nominatives to the verbs.

This rule is violated in such examples as these,—"I likes," "Thou loves," "he need," "you was." "In reference to this last example," says Dr. Crombie, "the reader should observe that *you* is PLURAL, whether it relate to only *one* individual or to *more,* and ought, therefore, to be joined with

a plural verb." As we do not admit the force and conclusiveness of Dr. Crombie's argument, we shall risque a few remarks on the subject of this troublesome anomaly.

It may be observed, then, that "*you was*" might indeed be called a solecism, if the pronoun did not serve for both numbers; but in this case the pronoun is analogous to the substantives *swine, deer, sheep;* and when the pronoun denotes *an individual,* and the verb is in the singular, it is not a solecism to say "you was." But, "you were" *is* a solecism when it is applied to a *single object,* because the verb is said to be changed to the plural, to *agree* with its nominative; but the nominative is singular, and by this change also the necessary distinction between a single and a plural subject is destroyed. It is a weak and fallacious argument in support of this anomaly to say, that if we use the pronoun "you" as singular, we *must* use the second person of the verb "wast." The change in the verb to denote the first and second person is unnecessary, when appropriate pronouns are employed, and it can be considered correct only when the original pronoun is used. This agreement, from long association, may be thought necessary; but when the pronoun is alike in both numbers, a different form of the verb is requisite, to distinguish the singular from the plural. To produce one exception, to show the propriety of another, is no proof of the correctness of either. No substitute but "you are" has been offered for "thou art." But this is not the case with "thou wast." Here there is a choice, and the question is which is the best grammar?

Now, when any particular form of expression becomes obsolete, the people are at liberty to choose any equivalent phrase or term for the one which has for some cause been set aside. Where usage differs, the minds of thinking men generally determine the preference, and, by adopting that mode of expression which is most in unison with the ideas intended to be represented, establish, by their authority, the correct phraseology. It is this sense of propriety, in reflecting minds, that preserves the *grammar* of a language; and it is this sense of propriety that at first suggested "you was," as a substitute for the formal expression, "thou wast;" and which substitute would be now universally employed by

writers, if it were not for the constraint the mind imposes on itself, in order to submit to fashion, supported by the arbitrary law of the grammarian. For the truth of this last assertion we appeal to the experience of the reader.

RULE 3. An infinitive mood is sometimes the nominative to the verb, as—"*to promise* is easy, *to perform* and *to satisfy* are often difficult."

RULE 4. A phrase or part of a sentence may be the nominative to the verb, as—

"*To be ever active in laudable pursuits,* is the distinguishing characteristic of a man of merit."

"*As far as regards his interest,* he will be sufficiently careful not to offend." That is, as far as *it,* or as far as *offending,* regards his interest, he will be sufficiently careful not to offend.

As far as is an adverbial phrase, therefore *as* cannot, as Dr. Crombie and other grammarians suppose, be intended to supply the place of a nominative. The derivation which refers the reader for the meaning of *as* to the pronoun *it, that,* or *which,* is worse than useless, for in no instance does *as* now serve as a pronoun.

RULE 5. A noun of multitude governs the verb in the singular or in the plural, according as the notion of unity or plurality is suggested by the attribute. When the noun represents an object formed by the union of several individuals, and the attribute refers to that individual as a whole, the verb will be singular, as—a committee is appointed; the parliament is dissolved. But when the individuals are referred to separately, the noun governs the verb in the plural, as—the committee are deliberating. The VERB, therefore, shews whether the *thing* or the *persons* are referred to. It is often much better to use a periphrasis when the *individuals* composing a noun of multitude are the subject of the verb, as—the *members* of the committee are deliberating.

This rule affords another instance of the insufficiency of usage as the standard of propriety. Here the grammarian is compelled to admit, that the *mind* must decide which form of expression ought to have the preference. The verb is to agree with the noun of multitude *according to the sense.*

Ex.—The assembly *which* was composed of honourable men rejected the petition.

Ex.—The assembly *who* rejected the petition *were* honourable men. In the first example the verb agrees with the neuter noun, assembly. In the last example the verb agrees with the noun men or members who composed the assembly. It would not be correct to say "the assembly *who* rejected the petition *were* composed of honourable men." Because the *assembly*, and not individuals who composed *it*, is the subject of the predicate. The assembly *which* rejected the petition was composed of honourable men.

RULE 6. One noun governs another in the genitive when possession or property is intended to be expressed, as—the miser's gold; the King's ministers.

The governing noun is either the nominative or objective of the verb, and the name of the possessor is used as a definitive, serving, in this respect, as an adjective to the principal noun. The nouns thus employed form a complex term, and denote an individual *possessed* by the definitive noun; and, in this respect, the genitive differs from the common adjective; for *qualities* are *possessed* by or belong to the nouns, which they assist to define. So the quality, whiteness, is said to belong to snow, but the definitive, miser's, does not belong to gold, but that substance is particularised as being the property of the miser. Still the noun, miser's, is used adjectively, and does not represent the object as a distinct individual.

And this is the reason why little explanatory circumstances are particularly awkward between a genitive case and the word which usually follows it, as—she began to extol the farmer's, as she called him, excellent understanding. It ought to be, "the excellent understanding of the farmer, as she called him."

When neither possession nor property is implied, we say horse-shoe, dog-collar, &c.; but when the idea of pertaining to is added to the noun, the possessive case is employed, as—the horse's shoe, the dog's collar.

Yet where ambiguity cannot arise, reference is sometimes made to the genitive, as representing the noun itself; but in this case the sign of the genitive is generally exchanged for the preposition *of*, which connects the subordinate noun.

Ex.—"They flew to arms, attacked the house of Northumberland, and put *him* to death." Here the pronoun him does not, of course, refer to the "house of Northumberland," which

was the object of the preceding clause, but to the definite noun, divested of its characteristic as an adjective, and considered as the name of a distinct individual. But Northumberland's House, and "the house of Northumberland," denote the same object, and neither can, with propriety, be referred to as the object represented by the pronoun (him). By employing the preposition, however, the mind more readily divests itself of the subordinate character of the noun, and ambiguity does not so frequently occur. But in some cases even this contrivance will not sufficiently conceal the impropriety.

Ex.—The reader of Caramuel (*who*, together with Campenella, may be found in the Bodleian Library,) will not be disappointed in him, but most egregiously by him,"—H. Tooke.

The relative (who) refers to "Caramuel," and not to "the reader of Caramuel;" but the latter is the noun first suggested to the reader.

The following sentence, though pronounced by Mr. Cobbett as ungrammatical, is strictly correct:—

"This determination led me to Metissa, the daughter of Chrysophilus, who was, at least, without deformity."—Johnson.

The relative refers to Metissa, who is the only person mentioned in the sentence; the name of Chrysophilus is used as a definitive to the appellative noun (daughter), and forms a part of the complex term, used in apposition with Metissa.

"When the noun," says Mr. Cobbett, "which is in the possessive case, is expressed by a *circumlocution*, that is to say, by many words, in lieu of one, the sign of the possessive case is joined to the last word, as—'John, the old farmer's wife;' 'Oliver, the spy's evidence.' It is, however, much better to say, 'the wife of John the old farmer;' 'the evidence of Oliver the spy.'"

But Mr. Cobbett has not shown why it is much better to say—the wife of John, the old farmer; nor did he seem aware that his examples are complete nonsense. For how can John be the old farmer's wife, or how can Oliver be his own testimony. If Mr. Cobbett had said, *Joan* the old farmer's wife, his readers would have understood him.

The circumlocution of which Mr. Cobbett speaks, is "the old farmer," used in apposition with John, to limit that proper name; but this explanatory cognomen does not necessarily require the sign of the genitive, unless it be placed before the principal noun; but John is expressly intended as a definitive to wife, and the sign of the possessive case is indispensable, as—"John's, the old farmer's, wife; or, to avoid the repetition of the genitive—"the wife of John the old farmer." By this last arrangement the noun in apposition is governed only by John, and is not subject to the government of the principle noun, being thus properly confined to the purpose for which it was intended.

If Mr. Cobbett, in copying Dr. Lowth's remark, had quoted the doctor's *example* also, he would not have been chargeable with the blunder he has committed.

"When the thing to which another is said to belong is expressed by a *circumlocution*, or by many terms, the sign of the possessive case is commonly added to the last term, as—"the king of Great Britain's soldiers."—LOWTH.

In this example "the king of Great Britain" is a complex term, to denote an individual, and the nouns *king* and *Britain*, which compose the term, are not in apposition; the sign of the genitive cannot, therefore, belong to both substantives. Thus, we cannot say, with propriety, "Solomon's, the son of David, king of Israel's Proverbs;" but "Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel's Proverbs;" or, as in the original, "The Proverbs of Solomon, king of Israel."

"When," says Dr. Crombie, "I say, neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God, it may mean either the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for God's love may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity *may be prevented*, by saying—love to God."

We do not think Dr. Crombie was required to exercise his own or his reader's patience, by striving to explain a phrase which ought to need no explanation; for if writers say one thing, and mean another—if they say *God's love*, and mean the *creature's love*, a grammarian is not bound to countenance their blunders; for "language should be not such as the

reader may understand, if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend."

When no direct reference is made to property or possession, the noun assumes the nature of an adjective, denoting a quality belonging to the subject, as—a summer-day, a horse-shoe, a dog-collar.

"The English genitive," says Mr. Murray, "has often an *unpleasant sound*, so that we daily make more use of the particle *of* to express the same relation." The sound in this case is not unpleasant to the *ear*, but to the *mind*. The English genitive suggests the notion of property or possession more vividly than the particle *of*, and hence the *harshness* complained of by Mr. Murray. This writer has remarked, that "the preposition *of*, joined to a substantive, is not always equivalent to the possessive case. It is so only when the expression can be converted into the regular form of the possessive case. We can say—the reward of virtue, and virtue's reward; but though it is proper to say—a crown of gold, we cannot convert the expression into the possessive case, and say—gold's crown." And the reason is clear, for, in this case, the noun, "gold," is used as an adjective, and the preposition serves merely to connect it with the noun. So we sometimes say—a man of activity, but cannot, with the least propriety, say—activity's man, because the preposition and the noun are equivalent to the adjective, *active*, and do not denote that "man" is the property of activity, but that "activity" is the property of the man; and this will, perhaps, explain the origin and distinct character of this class of adjectives.

"When a single subject is expressed, as the common property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of the genitive, as—this is John, William, and Richard's house; that is—this is the house of John, William and Richard."

"But when several subjects are implied, as severally belonging to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all expressed in the genitive case, as—these are John's, William's, and Richard's houses. In such examples as these, the use of the genitive involves an ambiguity, which it

is sometimes difficult to prevent. "Instead of saying—John, William, and Richard's house, or John's, William's, or Richard's, house, I should prefer—a house belonging in common, or severally, (as the meaning may be) to John, William, and Richard."

The double genitive is, in general, improperly employed. In all cases it would be better to use another form of expression: thus, instead of saying—"this is a picture of my friend's," it would be less ambiguous, and, therefore, more grammatical, to say—"this is a picture *belonging to* my friend." Instead of—"a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton's," it should be—"a discovery by Sir Isaac Newton, or made by Sir Isaac Newton."

"As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it should be avoided, unless in cases where this plurality may be implied: thus, we may say—'a kinsman of the traitor's waited on him yesterday,' it being implied that the traitor had several or many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to a kinsman of the traitor's kinsman. But if the subject possessed were singular, or the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple genitive: thus, if he had only one house, I should say—this is the house of the traitor, or this is the traitor's, and not this is a house of the traitor's."—CROMBIE.

The possessive case is distinguished from the plural number of nouns by an apostrophe, as—books, book's. When the noun ends in *ss* the apostrophe only is employed, as—for goodness' sake; also in the genitive plural, ending in *s*, as—the commons' vote; the peers' dissent; the *s* is occasionally omitted, for the sake of euphony, as—for conscience' sake.

RULE 7. A noun governed by a verb, participle, or preposition, is in the objective case, as—Judas betrayed *Christ*; Peter, having denied *Christ*, went out and wept bitterly; they led him unto *Pilate*. When the relation is denoted by the attribute and verb, the objective noun is distinguished from the nominative by its *place* in the sentence, as—the lion killed the man. The noun "man" being placed after the verb, distinguishes that noun from the nominative or

subject, and shews the case or relation it bears to the attribute as its object.

But enough has at present been said of the syntax of nouns, since the subject of *concord* and *government* must necessarily be referred to, when the construction of the remaining parts of speech is examined, and more particularly that of the verb, to which this rule of syntax may be thought more properly to belong.

"A noun," says Mr. Lewis, "may be distinguished by placing before it the words, *I think of*, or *I think of a*; and though we cannot say, *the good sobriety*, yet we can say, *I think of sobriety*, without any violation of good sense.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF NOUNS.

On the importance of Grammar.

"The *structure* of *language* is extremely artificial; and there are few *sciences* in which a deeper or more refined *logic* is employed than in *grammar*. It is apt to be slighted by superficial *thinkers* as belonging to those *rudiments* of *knowledge* which were inculcated upon us in our earliest *youth*. But what was then inculcated before we could comprehend its *principles*, would abundantly repay our *study* in maturer *years*; and to the *ignorance* of it must be attributed many of those fundamental *defects* which appear in writing."—Blair.

Immortal *gods*, I crave no *pelf*;
I pray for no *man* but myself;
Grant I may never prove so fond
To trust *man* on his *oath* or *bond*,
Or a *harlot* for her weeping,
Or a *dog* that seems a sleeping,
Or a *keeper* with my *freedom*,
Or my *friends* if I should need 'em.
Shakespeare. *Timon of Athens.*

"It is certainly as easy to be a *scholar* as a *gamester*, or many other *characters*, equally illiberal and low. The same

application—the same *quantity* of *habit* will fit us for one as completely as for the other; and as to those who tell us, with an *air* of seeming *wisdom*, that it is *men* and not *books* we must study to become knowing, this I have always remarked, from repeated *experience*, to be the common *consolation* and *language* of *dunces*."—HARRIS. *Hermes, book* iii. *chap.* v.

CHAPTER V.

ADJECTIVES.

"'The true genuine sense of a noun adjective will be fixed to consist in this, that it imports the general notion of *pertaining* to."—WILKINS.

ADJECTIVES represent certain qualities or attributes, and are the concrete names of modes treated of by logicians.

"A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to and subsisting by the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject."*

An adjective, therefore, expresses a quality as subsisting in a noun, and does not represent the quality as having a distinct or separate existence,—as, *good, wise, solid, virtuous.* But when these qualities are considered without reference to the subjects which possess them, the terms which represent those ideas are called abstract nouns,—as, *goodness, wisdom, solidity, virtue.*

Dr. Crombie defines an adjective to be "that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as *conjoined* with a subject, or *pertaining* to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as—fool, foolish; wax, waxen. Sometimes no change is made, and the simple name of the substantive or attribute is prefixed to the name of the subject, as—*sea fowl, race horse, corn field.* In writing these and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as—*sea-fowl, river-fish, wine-vessel.*" From this it will be

* Dr. WATTS—Logic, part i. ch. ii. sec. 3.

seen that the juxta position of two nouns suggests that one denotes a quality of the other; and hence the former, losing its own independent meaning, assumes the dependent character of an adjective.

Mr. Tooke erred greatly when he affirmed that *gold, brass,* and *silk,* when conjoined with appellative nouns, were still the names *of things,* and denoted *substances.* Gold and brass, when not used adjectively, are the *names* of metals, and silk the *name* of that substance; but when these appellatives are used as adjectives, they denote the *qualities* only of those nouns to which they are joined. Mr. Tooke also asks whether *golden, brazen,* and *silken,* do not convey to the hearer's mind, and denote the same thing, as *gold, brass,* and *silk.* After amusing his reader for some time by trying to convince him that no difference exists between *gold* and *golden,* and asserting that they are both substantives, he at length admits the fact that *a noun with its attribute is a complex term,* but he does not attempt to explain in what respect the noun and the attribute differ in their nature, or in the extent of their signification.

Impressed with the notion that all words were nouns, or names of things, Mr. Tooke could perceive no difference between *wood* and *wooden;* he also affirms that "a perverse nature" and "a natural perversity" mean *precisely* the same thing. It may be maintained (notwithstanding the high authority of Mr. Tooke's name) that the adjectives *perverse* and *natural* denote *species* of different things—a species of *disposition* (for this is, we presume, what Mr. Tooke means by the vague expression—nature) and a species of perversity, namely, a natural perversity.

Mr. Tooke was accustomed to confound his acquaintance by a subtilty of reasoning, and by a peculiar and confident manner in the delivering of his opinions, which frequently left his opponent nothing to say in reply to his arguments or assertions. This was, perhaps, done more for the sake of amusement than to gratify his vanity by a display of the acuteness of his intellectual powers. The same habit prevails in his treatise on language; and since the publication of that work, few grammarians have ventured to dissent from *any* of his opinions: the consequence has been that his valuable

discoveries have never been rendered so practically useful in the science of grammar as they might otherwise have been.

The manner in which substantives may be converted into adjectives has been thus shewn and exemplified by Mr. Harris:—"When we say,—the party of *Pompey*; the style of *Cicero*; the philosophy of *Socrates*,—in these cases the party, the style, and the philosophy, spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect; those persons, therefore, perform the part of attributes; that is, stamp and characterise their respective subjects. Hence, then, *they actually pass into attributes*, and assume, as such, the form of *adjectives*; and thus it is we say,—the *Pompeian* party; the *Ciceronian* style; and the *Socratic* philosophy. It is, in like manner, for a trumpet *of brass*, we say a *brazen* trumpet; for a *crown of gold*, a *golden* crown, &c. Even *pronominal* substantives admit the like mutation; thus, instead of saying, the book *of me*, *of thee*, and *of him*, we say, *my* book, *thy* book, and *his* book; instead of saying, the country *of us*, *of you*, and *of them*, we say, *our* country, *your* country, *their* country, which words may be called so many *pronominal adjectives*."

"In English," says Mr. Tooke, "instead of adjectiving our own substantives, we have borrowed, in immense numbers, adjectived signs from other languages, without borrowing the unadjectived signs of those same ideas, because our authors frequently found they had occasion for the former, but not for the latter; and notwithstanding the nature of the language, or the nature of the very benefit they were receiving, they did not, as they might and should have done, improve their own language by the same contrivance within itself, but borrowed from other languages abbreviations ready made to their hands. Thus they have incorporated into English—

FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE.	THE FOREIGN ADJECTIVE.
Child	Infant, infantine
Boy	Puerile
Man	Virile, human, masculine, male
Woman ..	Female, feminine, effeminate
Mind	Mental, magnanimous, pusillanimous, unanimous
&c., &c.	&c., &c.

In the copious list of these borrowed adjectives, given by Mr. Tooke, it will be found that they chiefly denote qualities derived from nouns which have no corresponding *verbs* in the language, and that the notions attached to them are derived immediately from the nouns. Will not this lead to the conclusion that substantive nouns are the roots of adjectives? and also that the mind must form an abstract idea of every quality before it can join that quality to a noun? Hence some grammarians have concluded that there is not any accident whatever which has not a grammatical substantive for its sign, when it is not attributed; nor is there any substance whatever which may not have a grammatical adjective for its sign, when there is occasion to attribute it.

Participial adjectives are derived from verbal nouns: they are distinguished from participles as *pertaining to nouns*, and as being the means by which such nouns are characterised and *defined*, as—"a *flattering* tongue," "a *contented* spirit." The adjectives here lose their power as participles, and indicate a person *possessed* of an habitual quality. Some adjectives, having this participial termination, are derived from substantives, and have no corresponding verbs in the language, as—a wretched being; a winged insect; an aged horse. Mr. Tooke, in his remarks on certain adjectives which he terms official mood passive adjectives, observes, that "the words of this sort which we have hitherto adopted are barely these —*legend, reverend, dividend, prebend, memorandum*. We can hardly be said to have adopted deodand, multiplicand, subtrahend, and credenda; i. e., which ought to be given to God; which ought to be multiplied; which ought to be subtracted; which ought to be believed. The first of these, legend, which means 'that which ought to be read,' is, from the early misapplication of the term by impostors, now used by us as if it meant 'that which ought to be laughed at,' and so it is explained in our dictionaries. How soon REVEREND, i. e. *which ought to be revered*, will be in the same condition, though now with great propriety applied to our judges and clergy, will depend upon themselves. DIVIDEND, that which ought to be divided, is perpetually abused, while each man calls the share of the dividend which he has received *his* DIVIDEND, though he means to keep it all him-

self. Memorandum alone stands clear from abuse and free from danger, *that which ought to be remembered.*"

Numeral adjectives are such as denote number; they are either cardinal, as—one, two, three; or ordinal, as—first, second, third.

The only modification which the adjective admits in English is to denote the degrees of a quality, as—white, whiter, whitest; tall, taller, tallest.

The degrees of comparison are three;—the positive, the comparative, and the superlative.

"In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite. Hardness (for example), gravity, magnitude, genius, wisdom, folly, are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it would elude the capacity of any language to discriminate: to denote these degrees is, therefore, utterly impracticable, as it is wholly unnecessary." —CROMBIE.

The positive simply expresses the quality, as—white.

The comparative degree denotes an increase of the quality, as—whiter.

The superlative signifies the highest state of the quality, as—whitest.

The comparative is formed by adding *r*, or *er*, to the positive, as—long, longer; tall, taller.

The superlative is formed by adding *st*, or *est*, as—longest; tallest.

Some adjectives are formed irregularly, as—good, better, best; bad, worse, worst. These adjectives are generally of frequent occurrence, and this may partly account for their irregularity: like the substantive verb, they probably originate from different roots.

"Terminational comparison, as well as that denoted by more and most, does not, as some of our grammarians teach, increase or diminish the signification; it always increases it. In shorter and shortest, the property of shortness is always increased, not made less; the property of a thing is diminished by less or least."—GRANT.

The termination *ish* denotes a degree of a quality less than that denoted by the positive, as—bluish.

The terminations which mark the degrees of comparison

are equivalent to the adverbs more and most, as—wis*er*, more wise; wis*est*, most wise.

Words of one, and sometimes of two, syllables are compared by using the terminations. Words of two, and more than two syllables, by the adverbs more and most, as—correct, more correct, most correct; fortunate, more fortunate, most fortunate.

Some adjectives, from the nature of the qualities they represent, will not admit degrees of comparison, as—eternal, infinite, universal; such also as refer to figure, as—circular, square, triangular, straight; and many others which denote the highest or lowest possible degree of a quality, as—chief, supreme, perfect.

There are some writers who question the propriety of admitting three degrees of comparison; but since the adjective is used to distinguish appellative nouns, the positive may be considered as denoting an indefinite degree* of a quality, compared with the abstract notion of that quality as it exists in the mind. A common standard of any quality may be supposed to be taken as appropriate to the individuals of a species: thus, mountains are *high*, contrasted with plains; but *compared* with individuals of their own kind, those only are called *high* which exceed the mean height: thus, also, a man, *compared* with the *ordinary* stature of men, and found to *exceed* it, would be denominated a *tall* man; but should two men, possessing this quality in different degrees, be compared, there would be a direct comparison of the quality as to its extent in reference to the common standard. For example—a man five feet ten inches is a *tall* man, and so also is a man six feet in height a *tall* man, but when the exhibitions of the quality in these two individuals are compared and referred to the ordinary stature, the disparity in the heights is determined, and the excess is denoted, by modifying the positive term, as—tall, taller; but when more than two individuals, possessing the like quality in different degrees, are compared, the one which exceeds the rest is

* The very nature of the adjective implies comparison; for it is by comparing one object with another that we are enabled to predicate the existence of qualities in nouns: thus, one man is rich, another tall, and a third valiant, compared with the wealth, stature, or valour, possessed by men in general.

denominated the tallest, but if one should exceed the usual stature in an extraordinary degree, and the comparison be simply made between his and the ordinary height of men, then an appropriate adverb is employed to modify the adjective, as—*very* tall, *extremely* tall, &c. This has been called, by some grammarians, the superlative of eminence; we might as justly denominate "much taller" the comparative of eminence, and "rather tall" the positive of eminence; for what becomes of the superlative of eminence in such comparisons as these—John is *very* tall, Harry is *much* taller, but Richard is the tallest.

When nouns of different species are compared, there can be no precise standard to which the degrees of comparison can be referred; thus—a lion is *larger* than a mouse; an elephant is *larger* than a lion, and is esteemed the *most sagacious* of all animals; where it may be observed that if there be a superlative of eminence, it is in those cases which express the *ne plus ultra* of a quality.

Mr. Lennie has assigned gender, number, and case, to adjectives, and would have the reader comprehend that sex, and case, and number, make part of the notion of qualities. This *supposed* agreement between nouns and adjectives (which it is necessary to observe in the Latin and some other languages) is so contrary to common sense, and so totally inconsistent with the character of the English language, that it would be scarcely worthy of notice, if it were not to caution those who are desirous to understand the nature of speech to beware of such instructors. "Adjectives," Dr. Epps justly observes, "have no changes to point out genders, numbers, and cases. The reason of this is that adjectives are used to point out something particular in the person, place, or thing, of which the noun is the name, not in the gender, number, or case, which are pointed out by changes of the noun itself. Thus—wise man, wise woman; here the nouns change, but the adjectives do not, because the particular thing, wisdom, is common not only to the man, but to the woman." The only approximation to agreement in number and gender is either in the adjective pronouns *this*, *that*, and *other*, or in words derived from appellatives, appropriated to a particular sex, as—this book, these

books; a sluttish woman, a slovenly man. But the quality denoted by the adjectives, sluttish and slovenly, is the *same quality*, whether ascribed to the male or to the female.

SYNTAX OF ADJECTIVES.

RULE I. Every word used as an adjective belongs to some noun, either expressed or understood.

Ex. "*Few* think *these mad*, for *most*, like *these*,
Are *sick* and *troubled* with the *same* disease."

The noun to which an adjective belongs may be ascertained by asking the question, who or what, with the adjective, as—few what?—persons; these what?—these persons or people, &c.

RULE II. Adjectives are generally put before the nouns they qualify.

Ex.—A *faithful* friend is tried in *adverse* fortune.

Ex.—"The Bible, for the size of it, is the most *accurate grammatical* composition that we have in the *English* language."—MURRAY.

Ex.—"My *stronger* guilt defeats my *strong* intent."—SHAKSPEARE.

RULE III. Adjectives are sometimes placed after the nouns to which they belong, either for the sake of variety or emphasis, or to admit, more conveniently, some modifying term or phrase. They also follow nouns when, by ellipsis, the relative and verb are omitted.

Ex. "The present time's so sick,
That present medicine must be ministered,
Or overthrow, *incurable*, ensues."
King John, act v. sc. 1.

Ex.—"A man *wise* in his own conceit, i.e. who is wise in his own conceit."

RULE IV. Double comparatives, or double superlatives, are improper; and although they were formerly admitted and sanctioned by reputable writers, they were nevertheless as UNGRAMMATICAL *then* as they are justly pronounced to be so *now*.

Ex.—"Your wisdom should show itself *more richer.*"—SHAKESPEARE.

Most, whether it precedes or follows the adjective, is a sign of the superlative, in the same manner as *more* is a sign of the comparative, degree, as—outmost, furthermore, furthermost.

The definitive article cannot be correctly used before superlatives, unless it be to denote what, in the Latin, is expressed by *quam maxime*, or the highest possible degree of a quality.

Ex.—"This distinction is *the* most precise and *the* most worthy of attention."—CROMBIE.

There cannot, strictly speaking, be more than one thing *most precise*, or *most worthy*, of the same kind; still the article may be used for the sake of emphasis.

RULE V. Adjectives, which do not admit either increase or diminution, cannot be compared, as—universal, infinite, chief.

Ex.—"As no one has exercised the powers of speech with juster and *more universal* applause than youself."—HARRIS.

It should be "more *general* applause."

Ex.—"Being connected with that *politer* literature."—HARRIS.

There can be no *degrees* of politeness in *polite* literature; the comparative is affectedly employed, instead of the positive, and the sentence is thus rendered ungrammatical. It should be "being connected with *polite* literature." The affectation noticed in this last example is a very common refinement among *polite* writers.

Ex.—"This deserves *most* particular notice."—BRENAN.

The adverb, most, in this example, is redundant.

Ex.—"Our *chiefest* courtier, cousin, and our son."—SHAKSPEARE.

Ex.—"With whom it was his *chiefest* boast to say he had been acquainted."—SIR W. SCOTT.

Chief is equivalent to highest, and does not admit the inflections of comparison:—"It was his *chief* boast to say he had been acquainted.

RULE VI. Adjectives are often improperly used for adverbs, as—scarce ever, exceeding great, exceeding strong,

excessive good, extreme dear, excellent well; instead of—scarcely ever, exceedingly great, &c.

Ex.—"The passions are the natural spurs to volition or action, and so need only to be *right* directed."—CAMPBELL.

It should be *rightly* directed, i.e. properly directed.

Dr. Crombie, after having vindicated, or at least palliated, this grammatical inaccuracy, admits—that exceedingly strong, exceedingly good, are the preferable phraseologies. It is thus that grammarians assist to perpetuate error, and to increase the difficulties of a science, which it is their duty to simplify and defend against the corruptions of popular usage. The only instances in which the adjective form is to be preferred to the adverbial, is when the word to which the adverb belongs ends in the same syllable, as—exceedingly lovely; or when an adjective, ending in *ly*, is used as an adverb, as—wily, wilily; but even in these cases the inaccuracy may generally be avoided by using another adverb, or an equivalent phrase, as—"very lovely," "in a crafty manner."

There is another case in which an adjective appears to be improperly used for an adverb.

Ex.—"Etymology is that part of grammar by which we are instructed *relative* to the origin, kinds, and properties, of words."—LEWIS.

Relative is an adjective, and cannot properly qualify the verb, The phrase, "relative to," might have been obviated by using the participial preposition, *concerning*,—"by which we are instructed *concerning* the origin kinds and properties of words."

The comparative is used when only two things are compared. The superlative, when one thing, or an aggregate number of things, are compared with the class to which they belong, or to which we refer them.

Ex.—"Mad as the *sea* and *wind*, when BOTH contend which is the *mightier*."

Ex.—Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians.

Ex.—Methuselah was the oldest man; Solomon was the wisest.

RULE VII. The comparative of adjectives is followed by *than* when opposition is signified, and by *of* when selection is implied.

Ex.—Sorrow is better than laughter; Heraclitus was therefore the wiser *of* the two philosophers.

The simplicity and excellence of the English language is obvious in the etymology and syntax of its adjectives.

"In the Latin and Greek languages," observes Dr. Darwin, "adjectives possess a great variety of terminations. Some of these, when declined through all their cases, and genders, and numbers, in their positive, comparative, and superlative degrees, enumerate fifty or sixty terminations; all which, to one who wishes to learn those languages, are so many new words, and add much to the difficulty of acquiring them."

An adjective may be known by its admitting or requiring an appropriate substantive with it, to complete the construction, as—few are happy, i.e. few persons.

Illustrations of Adjectives.

THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE GLOBE.

These, our actors,
As I foretold you, were *all* spirits, and
Are melted into air,—into *thin* air,—
And like the *baseless* fabrick of this vision,
The *cloud-capped* towers, the *gorgeous* palaces,
The *solemn* temples, the *great* globe itself,
Yea *all* which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And like this *unsubstantial* pageant, faded,
Leave not a rack behind.

Tempest, act IV.

Consequences of the want of perspicuity in a writer.

If we are obliged to follow a writer with *much* care, to pause and to read over his sentences a *second* time, in order to comprehend them fully, he will never please us *long*. Mankind are too *indolent* to relish *much* labour. They may pretend to admire the authors depth, after they have discovered his meaning; but they will seldom be inclined to take up his work a *second* time."—Blair.

In these illustrations the words printed in *italic* are adjectives, and they PERTAIN to some noun, either expressed or understood; Thus, *baseless* denotes a quality belonging to

fabric; *cloud-capped*, that which pertains to or distinguishes towers. The adjective *all*, requires the noun "things" to complete the subject, and the word *long*, limits the signification of the noun understood, as—"a long time."

The force and beauty of the adjectives, baseless and cloud-capped, in the illustration from Shakespeare, has been noticed by Mr Brenan in his chapter on synonymous words. We quote his suggestion and remark, for the consideration of those who are too fond of latinized English, and we would remind the unpractised writer, that if the Latin derivatives are to be preferred for their *sound*, the English synonyms are generally superior in their force of signification.

"Should any foolish pedant annoy you about the superior beauties of the classical languages, desire him to translate into Latin or Greek "cloud-capped towers" or "baseless fabric." He may with many words give the sense in a round about way, but as to energy and conciseness, they are confined to the *English*."—BRENAN, *Composition and Punctuation*, chap. xi. p. 207.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PRONOUN.

"The *personal* pronouns give information which *no other words** are capable of conveying; but the other pronouns may, in general, have their place supplied by the words or clauses to which they relate."—M'Culloch.

There are no words that have a juster claim to originality and indispensable use in language than personal pronouns. Even those who deny their *necessity* are compelled to admit their *utility*. "The rude savage," says Dr. Crombie, "could not converse with his fellow without some sign to discriminate the person speaking from the person addressed; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be first adopted we may reasonably presume, on several grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions." Notwithstanding this opinion, Dr. Crombie insists that nouns and verbs are the only indispensable parts of speech. The maxim—*alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur*, may indeed be serviceable in a treatise on logic, as distinguishing the subject from the predicate, but it cannot apply to the component parts of speech. It tends only to perplex those who wish to understand the cause and origin of the different kinds of words.

A pronoun is a word used for a noun, to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word.

Pronouns are either personal or definitive.

A personal pronoun denotes an individual, and necessarily includes the proper name or definitive by which that par-

* Yet this writer asserts that the noun and verb are the only indispensable parts of speech.

ticular object is distinguished from others comprehended under the general term. The pronoun, therefore, does not supply the place of *any* noun, neither does it refer to the proper name *only*, but it refers to both;—to the proper name, or other definitive, as denoting the *individual*, and to the general term, as denoting the *class* to which the individual belongs. The pronoun *I* denotes the person *speaking*, THOU the person *spoken to*, and the pronouns HE, SHE, and IT, the person or object *spoken of*. Pronouns, as Mr. Lewis has observed, represent not only that single word which, in every specific description, is called a noun; but they represent, also, the adjectives, and *all* the adjectives and definitives which are connected with such noun; thus, in the example, "a holy man is called a saint," and *he* is an object of religious veneration; the word *he* is used instead not only of man, or a man, but instead of a holy man. And if it were necessary to use the noun instead of the pronoun we should likewise be obliged to use also the definitive and the adjective.

A definitive pronoun is a substitute for a definitive, and requires an appellative noun to be added to complete its signification, as—*his, my, her, its*, &c. These, by a slight modification, are made to include both the definitive and general term, as—mine, thine, ours, yours, theirs, &c.

"That there is a near relation," says Mr. Harris, "between pronouns and articles the old grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this,—the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place. The genuine article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as attributes and adjectives."

After discriminating so clearly the properties of a definitive and a pronoun, it is rather surprising Mr. Harris did not arrive at the source whence the distinction originated, and that he did not ascribe to the difference of nouns the cause of the difference existing in their substitutes.

Though pronouns are commonly considered as "words used instead of nouns, to avoid the repetition of the same

word," yet it is evident that the pronouns *I* and THOU imply something more than the nouns which they represent; for if the nouns were substituted, the subjects would be of the *third* person, and no longer represent the person *speaking*, or person *spoken to*, but the person *spoken of*, and the verb would agree with the nouns in the *third* person.

Dr. Crombie has noticed this peculiarity, and his remarks are so much to the purpose that we need make no apology for laying them before the reader:—

"I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred that even the repetition of the name would in all cases answer the same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the pronoun. For as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name belonging to more persons than one would not so clearly specify or individuate the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would be often necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to discriminate the person intended from others of that name, or the speaker would be obliged to point to the individual, if he happened to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology would have nothing of that simplicity and energy which accompany the pronoun. If, instead of saying 'I am the God,' we should say, 'the Lord is the God,' or instead of 'thou art the man,'—'David is the man,' the energy of expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person speaking of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation it is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom perspicuity and vivacity of a letter."

Not only the *utility*, but the *necessity*, of pronouns, or some equivalent *signs*, is evident from the fact that the name of the speaker or the name of the person addressed may be

unknown; and so also may be the name of the person or thing spoken of, as—when it is asked, who or what is it? The pronoun *it* stands in the place of the name of the unknown or undefined person or object; and it may be here remarked, that the neuter pronoun *it*, when thus applied to persons, is more correct than he or she, because the word *person* is intended, and the sex being unknown, the use of the other pronouns would be absurd.

The personal pronouns are, *I, thou, he, she, it,** and their plurals *we, ye,* or *you, they*. The pronouns *thou* and *ye* are nearly obsolete, the pronoun *you* supplying the place of singular and plural, nominative and accusative.

"*You*, formerly was confined to the objective case, and ye exclusively used for the nominative."—MURRAY.

The pronouns *I, thou, he, she, we,* and *they*, are changed when they represent a noun in the objective case, as—*me, thee, him, her,* and *them*.

The possessive pronouns are definitives and do not make sense of themselves, but require to be joined to a noun to complete the signification. They are *my, thy, his, her,* (the same as the objective,) *its, our, your, their*.

Those writers who give *mine, thine, hers, ours, yours,* and *theirs*, as the possessive cases of their several pronouns, appear to overlook the extent of signification applied to these modifications of the corresponding definitives; for the pronouns *mine, thine, hers*, include not only the possessive noun, but the *subject* noun also, as—this book is mine, i. e. *my book*; here the pronoun *my* stands in the place of the *owner's* name, and is the true possessive pronoun, or word put in the place of a noun in the possessive case. The pronouns *my, thy,* &c., do not, as Dr. Crombie affirms, *express the subject*, but only that *part* of the subject which distinguishes an individual from others of its kind, the name of the possessor, or a pronoun in the same case, being used as a definitive to the subject noun, as—*my* book, *thy* book, *her*

* The pronoun IT is generally used for irrational or inanimate objects, and some grammarians scruple to class *it* among the personal pronouns, but since this pronoun is sometimes employed to represent persons as well as things, it may, without much impropriety, be permitted to retain its place among *personal* pronouns.

book, *their* book. It is true the words mine, thine; hers, theirs, *sound* better in a grammar when ranged with the pronouns *I* and *me*, *thou* and *thee*, *she* and *her*, *they* and *them*, because they seem to correspond with the definition of a pronoun; but it should be remembered that a noun in the possessive case does not make sense of itself, but requires to be joined to another word, as—this is the king's; whereas *mine*, *thine*, *hers*, *theirs*, include the subject and its definitive, and may properly be denominated pronouns, for they stand for individuals, and the *names* of the individuals the nouns belong to also.

Mr. Cobbett says the nouns denoted by the pronouns *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, &c., are *understood (subauditur)*, and he misleads his reader by adducing this illustration—"this is HERS, that is to say, *her* property, *her* hat, or whatever else."

In the pronoun *hers*, the subject noun is not only understood, but it is *included* in the same manner as adjectives and definitives are included in the nominative and objective cases of personal pronouns; but in the pronoun *her*, the subject noun, when omitted, must be supplied by the mind to complete the sense. The first abbreviation (hers) is employed to diminish the force of signification, the last (her, without its noun) for the sake of dispatch.

"The notion," says Mr. M'Cullock, "that pronouns have been invented to prevent the too frequent iteration of nouns, seems erroneous. Even supposing the pronoun fit to stand as the representative of the noun in every case (which it obviously is not), it must be expressed as often as the noun of which it is the representative: and in what respect is the repetition of one class of words preferable to the repetition of another?"

This question can be satisfactorily answered only by referring to that leading principle in the formation of language —THAT WORDS SHOULD EXPRESS IDEAS AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE SAME FORCE, AND IN THE SAME MANNER OF SIGNIFICATION, AS THOSE IDEAS HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED IN THE MIND. Hence the origin of the different sorts of words.

For the purpose of denoting emphatically the relation of possession or property, the word *own* is frequently joined to

the possessive cases of pronouns, as—*my own, their own*; and to mark the person with emphasis, the pronouns are compounded with *self*, as—*myself, himself, yourselves, themselves*. These pronouns also often represent that abstract notion which man forms of *himself* when he is the subject of his own thoughts, or when the mind contemplates its own operations. In the following example the pronoun *yourself* is used for both these purposes :—

"Nay, we speak it with sorrow, even you *yourself*, whom we should least suspect of all mankind, can hardly acquit *yourself* of having given us some cause of complaint."—*Spectator*.

So also a man is said to accuse *himself—he* being the accuser, and *himself* the culprit. But let not the reader imagine that we wish to defend the opinion that man is essentially composed of *two distinct beings*, or that such a chimera as *an abstract man* actually exists; the *proofs* of these hypotheses must be left to metaphysicians: all that we aim at is to show that a man sometimes finds it convenient and agreeable to speak of *himself*, and that language furnishes the means by which he may be enabled to do so.

Pronouns of the third person singular admit the distinction of gender, but rather for convenience than from necessity; for by means of this distinction a greater latitude is given to the use of the several pronouns. We concur with Dr. Crombie in his opinion on this point, and shall close our observations on the personal pronouns by quoting the words of that writer, in preference to giving the substance of his remarks as our own;—

"The pronouns of the first and second persons are either masculine or feminine; the reason is, says Mr. Harris, because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed is generally obvious. This explanation, which has been adopted by most grammarians, appears to me unsatisfactory and erroneous. Others have said that the pronouns of the first and second persons have no distinction of sex, because all distinction of this kind is foreign to the intention of the speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun I, means the person who speaks, be it man or woman; and when he employs the pronoun thou, means the person addressed, without any regard to the sex of the individual. This matter seems suffi-

ciently plain: language, to be useful, must be perspicuous and intelligible, exhibiting the subject and its attributes with clearness and precision. If it should be asked why the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, Mr. Harris would answer, 'to mark the sex.' If it were inquired, whence arises the necessity of marking the sex, he would answer, and very justly, 'in order to ascertain the subject of discourse.' It is obvious, therefore, that to note the sex is not the primary object, and that the principal aim of the speaker is to discriminate and mark the subject. The pronouns of the first and second persons have no variety of form significant of sex, because the speaker and the person addressed are evident without it. Mr. Harris, therefore, should have said that the pronouns in question have no distinction of gender, not because the *sex* of the speaker and of the person addressed, but because the *persons* themselves, are in general obvious without the aid of sexual designation. The intention of the speaker is not to denote the sex, but the person spoken of, whether male or female; to ascertain which person, if absent, the discrimination of sex is generally necessary. The sex, therefore, enters not as an essential, but as an explanatory circumstance,—not as the subject of discourse, but to distinguish the subject. Where the person is present, and is either the speaker or the person addressed, discrimination of sex becomes unnecessary, the pronoun itself marking the individuals. When the person or subject of discourse is absent, the distinction of sex serves frequently to determine the subject. Hence the pronoun of the third person has three varieties,—*he* for the masculine, *she* for the feminine, and *it* for the neuter."

Relative Pronouns.

As all pronouns refer to some noun either expressed or understood, the characteristic of reference to an antecedent, appropriated to this class, does not comprehend any essential property by which relative pronouns may be distinguished.

It has been observed that "relatives partake the nature of conjunctions, both as they are the instruments of linking the

members of sentences together, and as they have no independent signification of their own."

But it appears hitherto to have escaped the notice of grammarians that relatives, like many conjunctions, lessen the force of affirmation in the members or clauses which they connect, and leave the leading proposition of a compound sentence more emphatic and distinct; for example—The man hath no music in himself, and he is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, and he is fit for treasons. Here are three distinct assertions; but in the original there is but one, the force of affirmation being qualified by the relative.

Ex. The man *that* hath no music in himself,
And (that) is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons.

The first and second clause are definitive, and do not require a direct assertion. The same power is observable in other pronouns.

Ex.—I desire to know *whether* you have finished your task.

The pronoun *whether* (equivalent to a conjunction) qualifies the last clause, and the sentence, though containing *two verbs*, expresses but *one* affirmation.

The pronouns called relative are *who, which, that,* and the compound relative *what.*

The pronoun *who* is either masculine or feminine, and refers to persons only; the pronoun *which* is neuter; *that* is common to the three genders; *what* is equivalent to the demonstrative *that,* and the relative *which;*—this is what I sought, i.e. *that which* I sought. The pronoun *who* is varied to denote the case of the noun for which it stands, as—nominative *who,* possessive *whose,* objective *whom; which* is the same in the nominative and objective; *whose* is commonly, and without inconvenience, used for the possessive *of which;* where obscurity is apprehended, the periphrasis *of which* should be employed. By the use of this licence, one word is substituted for three, as—"philosophy, *whose* end is to instruct us in the knowledge of nature; that is, philosophy, *the* end *of which* is to instruct us.

The pronouns *who, which,* and *what* are used as interrogatives.

Ex.—Who first seduced them to this foul revolt?

Mr. Harris observes that, even when these pronouns become interrogatives, they do not lose their character as relatives, The difference is that, without an interrogation, they have reference to a subject which is *antecedent*, definite, and known; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain.

In interrogative sentences the tone or emphasis distinguishes whether the subject represented by the relative be known or unknown. The emphasis is indicated in writing by the note of interrogation.

Adjective Pronouns.

Adjective pronouns are used as definitives whenever they require a noun to complete their signification. In this respect (as well as in limiting general terms) they resemble adjectives.

Ex.—Every man should act honestly towards *his* neighbour.

Ex.—Do to *other* men as you would have others do to you.

Ex.—All are not just because they do *no* wrong.

The words usually assigned to this class of pronouns are—

my	your	both	some	such	no
thy	their	either	every	latter	thus
his	this	neither	other	former	few
her	that	whether	any	another	many
our	each	all	one	none	several

"One method," says Mr. Harris, "of expressing particulars is that of proper names. This is the least artificial, because proper names, being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those who know the language perfectly well, and can hardly, therefore, with propriety, be considered as parts of it. The other, and more artificial method, is that of *definitives* or articles, whether we assume

the pronominal, or those more strictly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite art of language, which, without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say, in other words, which, by the small tribe of definitives, properly applied to general terms, knows how to employ these last, though, in number, infinite, to the accurate expression of infinite particulars."

To explain what has been said by a single example:—"Let the general term be *man*. I have occasion to apply this term to the denoting of some particular. Let it be required to express this particular, as unknown, I say, *a* man; known, I say, *the* man: indefinite, *any* man; definite, *a certain* man; present and near, *this* man; present and distant, *that* man; like to some other, *such* a man; an indefinite multitude, *many* men; a definite multitude, a *thousand* men; the ones of a multitude, taken throughout, *every* man; the same ones, taken with distinction, *each* man; taken in order, *first* man, *second* man; the whole multitude of particulars, taken collectively, *all* men; the negation of this multitude, *no* man." —HARRIS. *Hermes*, book iii. chap. 3.

With this view of the definitive, we conclude the etymology of pronouns.

SYNTAX OF PRONOUNS.

RULE 1. Pronouns agree in gender, number, case, and person with the nouns they are intended to represent.

Ex.—"Answer a FOOL according to *his* folly lest *he* be wise in *his* own conceit."—*Proverbs* xxvi. 4.

Ex.—"As to the book *itself*, *it* can say this in *its* behalf, that *it* does not merely confine *itself* to what *its* title promises."—HARRIS.

The frequent repetition of the pronoun in this example is scarcely perceived, but if the noun had been used the recurrence of the more emphatic term would not only have been irksome, but would have rendered the other terms of the sentence less forcible. For example:—

As to the *book*, the *book's* self, the *book* can say this in the *book's* behalf, that the *book* does not merely confine the *book's* self to what the *book's* title promises.

Pronouns, therefore, are used to avoid the force of signifi-

cation which is attached to the noun, and not merely to avoid the repetition of the *same* word, for it is evident that the same pronoun may be repeated in cases where the repetition of the noun would be considered inelegant. The noun, however, should be repeated as often as the subjects are changed in a sentence, or whenever perspicuity requires the repetition.

Ex.—"The bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that whilst they remain between *them*, they do by an insurmountable force hinder the approach of our hands that press them."—LOCKE.

The pronoun *them* has no antecedent, and as both the subjects of the sentence are in the plural number, the pronouns should have been used more sparingly.—Thus,

The bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that whilst they remain between *our hands*, they do by an insurmountable force hinder the approach of our hands that press them.

"When I see too many *its* in a page" says Mr. Cobbett, "I always tremble for the writer."—We are surprised that Mr. Cobbett did not detect and quote in justification of his fears, the following illustration from the pen of Dr. Lowth, for Mr. Cobbett seems to have studied Dr. Lowth's Introduction carefully, and with no small advantage.

Ex.—"In English the preposition is more frequently placed after the verb, and separates *it* from *it* like an adverb, in which situation *it* is no less apt to affect the sense of *it*, and to give *it* a new meaning, and may still be considered as belonging to the verb, and a part *it*."—LOWTH.

This example may serve to exercise the ingenuity of the inexperienced grammarian, by supplying the appropriate nouns in the places of the neuter pronoun.

Each personal pronoun has a corresponding plural, because,

1st. There may be many persons at once of the same sentiment, and the person speaking includes these under the pronoun WE.

2ndly. An address may be made to many, as well as to one, the pronoun YE or YOU denotes the plural.

3rdly. The subject of discourse often includes many, and the individuals are denoted by the appropriate pronoun THEY.

In the arrangement of pronouns in a sentence the pronoun of the second person is generally placed before the pronoun of the third; but the pronoun of the first person ought always to be placed last.

Ex.—You and he have quarrelled, i.e. *ye* have quarrelled; he and I are friends, i.e. we are friends.

It was Mr. Cobbett's ignorance of the principles of grammar that caused him to condemn this construction. The first person is preferred to the second, and the second to the third, because the first person *plural* can represent the three persons singular, and the second person *plural* can include the third person singular; whereas neither the second nor the third person *plural* can include the first person singular, nor can the third person *plural* include the second person singular.

The neuter pronoun "it" is used to denote a *person* when the sex of the individual is either unknown or not referred to.

Ex.—Who is it?—It is the person who called yesterday.

The same pronoun is also used as an expletive to introduce a plural subject, whether the nouns represent persons or things.

Ex.—"'Tis they that give the great Atrides' spoils."—PRIOR.

Ex.—"'Tis these that early taint the female soul."—POPE.

Dr. Crombie justly observes that "when a question is asked, the subject of which is totally unknown, there must be some indefinite word employed to denote the subject of the interrogation. The word which we use for this purpose is *it*, as—'who is *it*;' 'what is *it*.' This being the case, there can be no impropriety in repeating, in the answer, the indefinite term employed in the question. We may, therefore, reply, 'it is I;' 'it is he;' 'it is she.'"

"Now if the term be admitted in questions and answers, where the subject may be either male or female, and of the first, second, or third person, it surely is admissible in those cases also where the subject is in the plural number; nay, to use in answer any other word to express the subject than that by which it is signified in the question, would be, in all cases, if not productive of ambiguity, at least less precise.

Who is it? says the master to his servant, hearing a voice in the hall. It is the *gentlemen* who called yesterday, replies the servant. Who sees not that, "they are the gentlemen," would be an answer *less accordant** with the terms of the question, and would less clearly show that "the gentlemen," and "the subject of inquiry," both being denoted by one term, are one and the same? Had the master known that it was the voice of a gentleman, and that there were more than one, and he accordingly said, "who are they?" the answer would have properly been, "*they* are the gentlemen," But when the question is, "who is it?" I apprehend the only apposite answer is, "*it* is the gentleman," the identity of the terms (it being repeated) clearly evincing the identity of the subject in the question and in the answer; in other words, that the subject of inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same."†

The plural pronoun *we* is often employed to denote an individual, instead of the personal pronoun *I*. The writer of these pages has frequently had recourse to this excusable *licence*, because the pronoun *we* appeared to him less obtrusive, and less likely to withdraw the attention of the reader from the subject, than the *egotistic* pronoun *I*. Under this impression *we* shall not hesitate to continue the practice.

The pronoun *thou*, and consequently the pronoun *thee*, are now rarely employed on ordinary occasions.

"*Thou*," says Dr. Ash, in his Grammar, "is used to denote the greatest respect, as—O thou most high; and, likewise, to denote the greatest contempt, as—thou worthless fellow.

It was probably some remark of this kind which assisted to bring the useful pronoun *thou* into contempt:—Mankind are too apt to credit the assertions of the learned, and to be overawed by the authority of a great name. The *respect* and *contempt* attributed by Dr. Ash to the pronoun is implied in

* And *therefore* less grammatical. Phraseologies established by universal usage are not, as Dr. Crombie asserts, unexceptionable *because* they are *universal*. but *because* such phraseologies are in general (if not always) grammatical idioms. It is their *perspicuity* and *accuracy* that cause them to be *universally* adopted.

† Crombie.—*Etymology and Syntax*. pp. 86, 87.

the attributes *highest* and *worthless*. The pronoun is merely emphatic.

But the agreement which *grammarians* require to be observed between this pronoun and the verb, and which the *mind* perceives to be unnecessary and formal, is perhaps the chief cause of its disuse. For, except in the irregular verb "to be," the variation of the second person of the verb might be dispensed with. But *custom* has so long associated the termination with the pronoun, that it will be difficult to persuade a *scholar* that "thou love" is as grammatical as "thou lovest." In fact, the former is better grammar; for the syllable *est*, in the latter, is redundant.

The last, it is true, is conformable to usage, but the first would be in strict conformity with the principles of construction. We would, however, remind the reader that these remarks are not intended as practical, but as theoretical; for, having shown, in another place, the inconvenience of using the pronoun *you* for *both* numbers, we have added these observations to prove that the *abuse* is not necessary.

The pronouns *my*, *thy*, *her*, *our*, *your*, *their*, *his* and *its*, do not express the subject, but the subject's possessor. They are the possessive cases of their several personal pronouns.

The pronouns *mine*, *thine*, *hers*, *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, belong to a class *sui generis*, and they cannot, with propriety, be included in the DECLENSIONS of *personal* pronouns. The possessives *his* and *its* end in *s*, and have not received the additional modification by which others of this class are distinguished, when they include, in their signification, the subject noun.

Mine and *thine* were formerly used for *my* and *thy* before words beginning with a vowel.

The pronoun *her* is used both as the possessive and as the objective case of the nominative, *she*.

RULE II. The relative pronoun agrees with its antecedent in gender, number, and person. The relative is in the same case the noun would be in if used in its stead.

Ex.—"He *who* renders full justice to his enemy shall have friends."

Who is the nominative case to the verb renders, and agrees with its antecedent pronoun *he* in gender, number, and person.

Ex.—Arrangement prevents trouble, *which* is always a consequence of confusion.

The relative *which* is the nominative to the verb "is," and refers to *trouble*, as its antecedent, in the *objective* case.

Mr. Cobbett asserts that the relative can never be the nominative or subject of the verb. It does not require much grammatical knowledge to detect the inaccuracy of this opinion. The last example sufficiently contradicts Mr. Cobbett's assertion. But in cases where ambiguity might arise, the noun should be repeated.

The relative *that* is used sometimes either for *who* or *which*.

Ex.—"The poor man *who* envies not the rich, *who* pities his companions of poverty, and can spare something for him *that* is still poorer, is, in the realms of humanity, a king of kings."

The pronoun *that* refers to *him*, and the relative is the nominative to the substantive verb.

Ex.—"The sweetest attribute of humanity, and *that which* affords the most solid and permanent satisfaction in social intercourse, is good nature."

The relative *which* is the nominative to the verb "affords," and refers to the antecedent "attribute." The antecedent is also the noun belonging to the demonstrative *that*. The parenthetical clause is elliptical:—"*That* is the attribute, *which* ATTRIBUTE," &c., and not "which sweetest attribute of humanity." This double relative is called by grammarians the compound relative, when it is expressed by the single term *what*.

What has a less determinate signification than "that which," and cannot, with propriety, always supply the place of those pronouns.

In the above example it *might* be used, but it would, perhaps, be considered less elegant.

Ex.—"Happy are they *whose* amusement is knowledge, and *whose* supreme delight is the cultivation of the mind."

The relative *whose*, in this example, represents a noun, pertaining to another noun, as its possessor. The relative is, therefore, put in the possessive case. It may be observed that the pronoun *they*, in this example, is incorrect, as the

persons the pronoun represents are indefinite, and the relative clause merely contains the description of *those* persons who are happy. It should be—happy are *those* whose amusements, &c.

RULE III. The relative is the nominative case to the verb when no nominative comes between it and the verb.

Ex.—True philosophy, *which is* the ornament of our nature, consists more in the love of our duty, and in the practice of virtue, than in great talents and extensive knowledge.

When a nominative comes between the relative and the verb, the relative is governed by some word in its own member of the sentence.

Ex.—He *who* preserves me, *to whom* I owe my being, *whose* I am, and *whom* I serve, is eternal.

"In the several members of the last sentence the relative performs a different office. In the first member it marks the agent, in the second it submits to the government of the preposition, in the third it represents the possessor, and in the fourth the object of an action, and therefore it must be in the three different cases correspondent to those offices."—MURRAY.

RULE IV. When the relative is preceded by two nominatives, it will govern the verb according to the antecedent it represents.

Ex.—I am *he* who *is* condemned, but *I* who *have* been condemned, am not the guilty person.

The order of the clauses will determine the person or concord of the verb.

Ex.—I am the man who commands you.

Ex.—I am the man who command you.

Of these two examples the first is correct, the last is not. It should be, "I who command you am the man."

"The construction" observes Dr. Crombie, "is by no means arbitrary." If we say, "I am the man who commands you," the relative clause, with the antecedent man, form the *predicate*, and the sentence is equivalent to "I am your commander." If we say "I am the man who command you," the *man* simply is the *predicate*, and "*I who command you*," the *subject*, thus "I who command you," or "I your commander am the man."

Ex.—I am verily a man who am a Jew.

The relative stands in the place of the speaker as representing the *man* the speaker is describing, and the verb should be of the third person, "a man who *is* a Jew."

The relative *that* is used when the verb refers to persons and things.

Ex.—The woman and the estate *that* became his portion, were too much for his moderation.

"There are cases," says Mr. Murray, "wherein we cannot *conveniently* dispense with this relative as applied to person;" but neither Mr. Murray, nor has any other grammarian attempted to explain the cause of this singularity.

Ex.—Who, *that* has any sense of religion, would have argued thus?

The relative *that* has the power of a conditional conjunction, and is not simply the nominative to the verb.

Ex.—Who (if that man has any sense of religion,) would have argued thus?

The conditional clause connected by the relative may be as conveniently added by using the present participle of the verb *without* the relative.

Ex.—Who, having any sense of religion, would have argued thus?

The relative *that* is used in preference to *who*, after the words "same" and "all." Custom has decided this preference, since both are grammatical and equally perspicuous.

The relative is sometimes made to refer to one of the terms of a complex noun, and as the term or phrase the relative refers to is the one used definitively or *adjectively*, the mind in general perceives an impropriety. This idiom is often the cause of ambiguity, and should if possible be avoided.

Ex.—The object of this work, *which* is entirely new, is to comprise.

The mind perceives that "work," only, is the antecedent to the pronoun, and not the whole subject of the leading sentence, but this is not always so evident.

Ex.—"For this very remarkable success I am chiefly indebted to *my anxiety for plain explanation, which* I am highly gratified to perceive is every day gaining strength and popularity."—BRENAN.

The logical or rather grammatical structure of this sentence, would induce the reader to suppose that the author's *anxiety for plain explanation* is every day gaining strength and popularity. The absurdity of this assertion alone makes the reader look for another meaning, when he discovers that the subordinate noun and its adjective, "plain explanation," connected with the principle noun to form the subject is the only part of the phrase to which the writer refers.

This construction sometimes obtains in the use of the personal pronouns.

Ex.—"Had *the opinion of my censurers* been unanimous, *it* might have overset my resolution; but since I find *them* at variance with each other I can without scruple neglect *them*, and follow my own imagination."—JOHNSON.

A remarkable instance of the liability to error arising from this mode of expression, occurs in the writings of Dr. Watts.

"If the question be proposed whether *excess* of wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the sophister should prove that *it* revives his spirits, *it* exhilerates his soul, it gives a man courage, and makes him strong and active, and then he takes it for granted that he has proved his point."

The fallacy of this mode of reasoning is detected by the grammarian, for he perceives that the subject in the subsequent part of the sentence is changed; for what is there stated refers simply to "*wine*," and not to the "EXCESS *of wine*," as proposed by Dr. Watts in the question.

RULE V.—When the relative refers to a noun of multitude, that represents a collection of individuals taken as a whole, the pronoun "*which*," should be employed, and the verb it governs should be in the singular number.

Ex.—The crowd WHICH *was* assembled in the street, *was* dispersed by the constables.

But if the relative *who* be employed, the individuals are separately referred to, and the verb agrees with the noun in the plural.

Ex.—"The crowd WHO *were* assembled in the street pelted the constables."—i. e. *they*, the persons, pelted the constables, not *it* pelted.

This rule is opposed to the opinion of Mr. Cobbett, who

says that "the crowd WHICH *was*," and "the crowd WHO *was*," are equally proper.

WHOSE, is employed as the possessive case of *which*.

Ex.—"In our ancient law books, a farding-deale of land means the fourth part of an acre, whose rent was in Richard the second's time so restrained, that for a farding-deale of land *they* paid no more than one penny."—HORNE TOOKE.

It may be remarked that in this example the personal pronoun *they* is used in the vague sense of the French pronoun *on*.

The relative pronouns have a less definite signification when united to the adverbs *so* and *ever*,

"Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith."

Ever united to a relative is equivalent to the definitive any, whoever, which ever, that is, any who, any which.

Ever, united to the adverb *when* has the meaning of the adverb always. This may be seen by the following example.

Ex.—*Always when* you are examining a sentence, you will take into your view the words that are left out. i. e. *Whenever* you are.

RULE VI. The demonstratives this and that, agree with their nouns in number,—as this man, these men; that nation, those nations.

The phrases—these *kind* of people, those *sort* of books, are therefore incorrect.

"It is not always easy," says Mr. Murray, "to say whether a personal pronoun or demonstrative is preferable in certain constructions."

Ex.—We are not unacquainted with the calumny of them, (or those,) who openly make use of the warmest professions.

This doubtful point, so troublesome to many writers, has been decided by Dr. Epps, whose remarks are too well supported by the principles of universal grammar to admit of contradiction.

"There is an advantage which arises from considering these words as definitives, as by so doing we shall be prevented from falling into an improper use of the pronoun 'them,' the objective case of the personal pronoun 'they.' Some writer says 'we ought to have great respect for them who are

wise and good.' This *them* should be *those*, and for this reason, that, in the sentence, no persons for whom *them* can stand have been mentioned. These persons are to be defined, and therefore we should say 'those,' or, in other words, we should use the definitive to which the noun is added; or, if not, is understood. However, we say 'some persons are wise and good; I love them. Here, them is correct, because the persons *are defined before hand*, and therefore the pronoun may stand in their place, but it cannot stand in the place of nouns which have not been mentioned. This affords a striking difference between the pronoun and the definitive." EPPS.

The demonstrative pronoun *this*, refers to a present, near, or last mentioned subject; *that*, to an absent, more distant, or first mentioned one. In the following example they are incorrectly applied.

Ex.—"That national use might be opposed to foreign scarcely needs illustration; for the introduction of extraneous words or idioms from other languages, and foreign nations, is a greater transgression than the adoption into pure English of provincial terms, and cant phrases. *This*, is the error of the learned, *that*, of the vulgar."—CAMPBELL.

"The introduction of foreign idioms," being the first mentioned subject, and the *error of the learned*, the demonstrative, *that* should have been employed, or the words learned and vulgar should have exchanged places. "This is the error of the *vulgar*, that of the *learned*."

The adjectives *former* and *latter*, and the phrases "the one" and "the other," are also used as demonstratives.

Ex.—"When a speaker addresses the understanding, he proposes the instruction of his hearers by explaining something unknown to them, or by proving some position they doubt. His purpose is to dispel ignorance, or to vanquish error. In *the one* his aim is their information, in *the other* their conviction. Accordingly, the predominant quality of the *former* is perspicuity, the *latter* argument. By *that* we are made to know, by *this* to believe."—CAMPBELL.

Ex.—"Homer was the greater genius, Virgil the better artist; in *the one* we most admire the man, in *the other* the work."—POPE.

Mr. Brenan condemns the use of these convenient demonstratives, and asserts that *the one* and *the other* are "SHEER NONSENSE;" but is Mr. Brenan's practice consistent with his criticism?

Ex.—"As the colon *retreated* its *half-brother* declined so much in importance, that we are now independent of both *one and the other*."—BRENAN.

Mr. Brenan's language is *both* redundant and defective, and at the same time inconsistent with his avowed opinion. It is redundant because the *pronoun* "both" includes *the one* and *the other*. It is defective in the omission of the article before *one*, and its inconsistency is evident from what has already been quoted respecting the author's objections to the terms he himself uses in the foregoing example.

The demonstratives, former and latter, are ambiguously employed in the following example.

Ex.—"Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man, the latter is common to all animals." CROMBIE.

The "former" refers to *articulate* and *artificial*, the "latter" to *inarticulate* and *natural;* but there are few readers, ignorant of these distinctions, would so understand the meaning of the writer. The sentence thus corrected renders the passage intelligible.

Ex.—Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate and artificial, or inarticulate and natural. The former is peculiar to man, the latter is common to all animals.

RULE VII. The adjective pronouns *each, every, either, neither, whether,* agree with nouns in the singular number.

Ex.—*Each* man *was* rewarded. *Each* of these *deserves* a certain degree of attention,

Ex.—*Every* man must account for *himself.*

Ex.—It *is either* day or night.

Ex.—*Neither* of my friends *was* there.

Ex.—*Whether is* greater, the gold or the temple?

The pronoun either, from an affectation of refinement, is sometimes used instead of each.

Ex.—And leaning from the front window with a pistol in *either* hand.

The writer meant to say the person had a pistol in *each* hand. Either refers to one object, each to several. The pronouns *either, neither,* and *whether,* are also used as conjunctions.

All is used with a noun singular when it refers to quantity, and with a plural noun when it refers to number. The construction of the following sentence, therefore, though written by a grammatist is incorrect.

Ex.—"For to *all* is a knowledge of *his* own language necessary."—KENNY.

It should be "*their* own language," or rather—For to *every one* is a knowledge of *his* own language necessary.

The former and the latter are sometimes used to denote the definitives and the subject noun, in the same manner, and by the same means, as the possessive cases of the personal pronouns *our, your,* denote their subjects by the addition of *s*. The apostrophe, or sign of the genitive, is unnecessary, and a departure from analogy.

Ex.—"The participle is distinguished from the adjective by the former's expressing the idea of time, and the latter's denoting only a quality."—MURRAY.

None, which originally signified no one, is now used as plural when it refers to number.

Ex.—*None* of them *are* varied to express the gender.

Ex.—None of them *has* attempted to show by what steps *they* proceed. It should be *have* attempted.

"*Any,* the diminutive of *ane* or *one,* involves, in common with *a* or *an,* the idea of unity; but it is used still more indefinitely, being employed to denote whatever one of a number it be." *Many, few, several, some,* denote number indefinitely: *many* is opposed to *few*.

Ex.—*Many* are called, *few* are chosen.

"*Both* signifies two persons or things taken together."

Ex. "We, Hermia, like two artificial gods,
Have, with our needle, created *both* one flower,
Both on one sampler, sitting on one cushion;
Both warbling of one song, *both* in one key,
As if our hands, our sides, voices, and minds,
Had been *incorporate.*" SHAKESPEARE.

Other is a definitive, and requires to be joined to a noun to complete the subject; it is used before singular and plural nouns.

Ex.—"Milton uses the same manner of expression in a few *other* places of his Paradise Lost, and more frequently in his poems."—LOWTH.

The pronoun *other* should also have been used before the word "poems," for the Paradise Lost was one of Milton's Poems. Dr. Lowth's construction implies that it was a prose production.

We shall conclude the syntax of pronouns with a short extract from Dr. Lowth's Introduction, on the importance of the relative and other pronouns. "The accuracy and clearness of the sentence depend very much upon the proper and determinate use of the *relative*, so that it may readily present its antecedent to the mind of the hearer or reader, without any obscurity or ambiguity. The same may be observed of the *pronoun* and the noun, which, by some, are called also the relative and antecedent."

A pronoun may be known by its being the representative of a noun, either expressed or understood.

ILLUSTRATION OF PRONOUNS.

The Closing Scene of a Worldly and Selfish Character.

"The obsequies of the dead were like the living character of the woman, cold, formal, and artificial. The sexton and *his* assistants had hardly commenced replacing the stone *which* covered the entrance of the vault, when a knot of elderly men set the example of desertion, by moving away in a body from the spot. As *they* picked *their* footsteps among the graves, and over the frozen ground of the churchyard, *they* discoursed idly together of the fortunes and age of the woman of *whom they* had now taken *their* leave for ever. The curse of selfishness appeared even to have fallen on the warning *which* so sudden an end should have given to *those who* forgot *they* tottered *themselves* on the brink of the grave. *They* spoke of the deceased, as of one *who* had failed to awaken

the charities of *our* nature; and though *several* ventured conjecture as to the manner in *which she* had disposed of *her* worldly possessions, no *one* remembered to lament that *she* had not longer continued to enjoy *them*. From *this* theme *they* soon wandered to *themselves*, and the whole party quitted the churchyard, joking *each other* on the inroads of time, *each* man attempting to ape the elastic tread of youth, in order not only to conceal from *his* companions the ravages of age, but with a vain desire to extend the artifice so far, if possible, as to deceive *himself*."—COOPER.

ACTIVE, PASSIVE AND NEUTER.

REGULAR, IRREGULAR, DEFECTIVE.

CHAPTER VII.

THE VERB.

"All those attributives which have the complex power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion make that species of words which grammarians call *verbs*."—HARRIS.

"OF the whole class of words" says Blair, "that are called attributive, indeed of all the parts of speech, the most complex, by far, is the verb. It is chiefly in this part of speech, that the subtle and profound metaphysic of language appears, and therefore in examining the nature and different variations of the verb, there might be room for ample discussion."

Mr. Cobbett thought "it impossible to give a short and precise description of this part of speech, because there are so many properties and circumstances, so many and such different powers and functions belonging to it."

Now, there is only one property or circumstance, power or function, that characterises the grammarians' verb, and this property is its *power of predicating the existence of an attribute*, for when any word ceases to have this power, it is no longer considered by grammarians to be a verb. Almost every writer, who has carefully examined the structure of language, admits that this power of affirmation is the only criterion by which a verb may be known, and that the *essence* of the verb consists in affirmation.

But it is contended that in making a verb a mere *sign* it is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of thought. In answer to this objection, it may be urged that words are not always to be valued in proportion to the extent of their meaning, for their value may arise from the importance of their use; thus, the verb, or sign of affirmation,

is as indispensable in communicating our thoughts, as is the noun which denotes the subject, or the term which denotes that which is affirmed of the subject, for without the *affirmative sign*, either expressed or understood, there can be no complete sentence or proposition; but as light would not be less valuable if it could be proved to be a mere phenomenon, so this word cannot be "degraded" even when divested of its meaning.

The verb, however, is rarely used without conveying the notion of an attribute, and this has induced grammarians in general to include the attribute in their definition of a verb, and some writers have, *in theory*, gone so far as to make the attribute the essential characteristic.

Mr. Murray says, "A verb is a word which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer." He afterwards remarks, "In our definition of the verb, as a part of speech, which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer, &c. we have included *every thing* either expressly or by necessary consequence that is essential to its nature, and nothing that is not essential to it. This definition is warranted by the authority of Dr. Lowth, and many other respectable writers on grammar."

If Mr. Murray had said that his definition was warranted by the nature of the verb, and consistent with his own instructions and *practice*, when he analyses a sentence, we should have paid more respect to his opinion; but as we consider great names of no weight when opposed to the laws of language, and as we are convinced that the rules of every science are independent of authority, we venture to controvert the propriety of this definition, for Mr. Murray has omitted the very property which alone qualifies this word to be what he himself calls it "The chief word in every sentence."

The proofs which Mr. Murray advances against the opinions of those who consider assertion as the essence of the verb are, that "The participle and infinitive, if included in it, would prove insuperable objections to their scheme, as they have, without hesitation, denied the former a place in the verb, and declared the latter to be merely a verbal noun.

Now the participles are modifications of the infinitive or verbal noun, and they are, in fact, the words which signify being, doing, and suffering (to be, to do, and to suffer,); but

although these words answer precisely to Mr. Murray's definition of a verb, Mr. Murray, notwithstanding, rejects them, and confines the term "verb" to those modifications of the attribute which *affirm*, and yet he denies assertion to be the essential characteristic of this part of speech. What consistency can be found in such a theory, or how are such instructions to be comprehended?

"A verb," says Dr. Crombie, "has been defined to be that part of speech which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer; or, more correctly, that part of speech which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech."

"The verb *to be* frequently denotes pure affirmation, as —God is good, where the verb, or copula, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the attribute denoted by the following word." Here it expresses mere affirmation. Sometimes it predicates pure and absolute existence, as—God is, that is,—God exists. In the following example it occurs in both senses.

Ex.—We believe that thou *art*, and that thou *art* the rewarder of them who diligently seek thee.

Notwithstanding Dr. Crombie's clear explanation of the nature of the verb, he still adheres to the usual definition.

"As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents or properties. The former are the names of things, and the latter *what we say concerning them.*"

This is making no distinction between the attribute and the verb, and the writer contradicts his approved definition, for when the verb denotes pure affirmation, as—God is just, the adjective "just" denotes *what we say* of the subject, but this attribute has no pretention to the character of a verb, the word *is* maintains its rank unincumbered by any other meaning than that of simple affirmation.

Mr. Tooke denies affirmation to be essential to the verb, and he also declares that no single word can imply assertion. This last opinion has already been proved by Dr. Crombie to be erroneous; and we suspect, notwithstanding Mr. Tooke's decided tone, that he knew very little of the nature of the verb. It is true he promised to explain the character of

this important part of speech, but when he arrived at the question—what is a verb? he artfully evaded the discussion. The little he has incidentally said upon the subject is neither new, nor much to the purpose.

"The infinitive, says this writer, appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itself, pure and uncompounded, with the various accidents, of mood, of number, of gender, of person, and, in English, of tense, which accidents are in some languages joined to the verb by variety of termination, and in some by an additional word, signifying the added circumstance."

The infinitive mood is an abstract noun and does not affirm; it simply denotes, or *names*, an action or state of being; it is not therefore THE WORD or *verb* of a sentence.

Mr. Lewis defines a verb to be a word which, when placed after a noun or pronoun, expresses something respecting it, and when placed before it either commands or asks a question. This does not inform the reader what a verb is, it merely directs him to the part of a sentence, where verbs are usually to be found. In another part of his grammar, Mr. Lewis alludes to the essential characteristic of a verb,—"Any number of words, says he, thrown together by accident, convey a distinct sense or meaning in themselves, or, separately, excite certain ideas in the mind, but they do not inform us of the intentions and views of the speaker in using them, for it is the proper object of speech to communicate. In short, words so thrown together want the *dictum*; they want that which marks the intention of the speaker,—the word which is emphatically called THE WORD, that is, the *verb*."

Notwithstanding these pertinent observations, it is evident that Mr. Lewis confounds this dictum or sign of affirmation with the attribute, for he says,—"The verb represents the thing or action affirmed or denied of the subject."

"Verb," says Dr. Russell, "means *said of a thing*."

This definition, it will be seen, arises from the notion that a verb is "what we say concerning the subject;" but we say of many things that they are *black* or *white*, *right* or *wrong*; and every one knows that such words are not verbs; they are not even participial adjectives. It is true, that what are called verbs may be formed from these qualities, by prefixing

the sign which gives to a word an active signification; but the ideas such words are intended to express are very different from those which we attach to the names of the simple qualities. Thus from *wrong* may be formed the verbal attribute to wrong, and when this attribute is "said of a thing," as—"he *wrongs* his friend," the word is so far a verb as it serves to express the affirmation; but that which is affirmed, "the act of *wronging*," is not the verb, but the attribute, or active participle.

"Some attributes," says Mr. Harris, (who appears to have understood the true character of the verb better than his great opponent Mr. Tooke, or any of the little critics who have echoed Mr. Tooke's opinions,) "have their essence in motion, such are—to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of motion, such are—to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation, such are the attributes of great and little, white and black, wise and foolish; and, in a word, the several quantities, and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives, those which denote motions or their privation are either verbs or participles, and these attributes having the complex power of denoting an attribute and an assertion, make that species of words which grammarians call verbs."

Mr. M'Culloch, a modern writer on grammar, professes to take an original view of this intricate part of speech; but, although he at first considers affirmation as the *sine qua non* of a verb, still, like his predecessors, he confounds that essential characteristic with the predicate, and ultimately makes "*that which is said of the subject*" to be the verb.

"Verb," says the writer, "is the name given to all words whose office is to predicate or assert, as—*strikes, walks, is.*"

"As the noun is the word in a sentence which names the thing about which we speak, so the verb is the word which asserts or declares what we say concerning it."

"The verb, in common with the adjective, expresses the quality or property of a noun; but these parts of speech are *quite distinct*, the adjective merely expresses quality, as conjoined with the noun it affirms nothing; but the verb always affirms."

"Nouns and verbs are the only indispensable parts of speech; the one to express the subject spoken of, and the other the predicate or what is affirmed of it."

This is a direct contradiction, for the author has affirmed that the adjective is a part of speech *quite distinct* from the verb, and now he repeats that the noun and verb are the only indispensable parts of speech? The fact is, the adjective differs essentially from those attributes which admit the force of affirmation, therefore adjectives are as indispensable as either the noun or the verb.

It matters not by what contrivance adjectives are supplied, whether it be by using a noun *adjectively*, as—sea water, or more awkwardly by employing a preposition, as—a man *of* wealth, instead of a more appropriate term, a wealthy man, in every instance the name of the quality *in concreto* differs both in the extent of its signification and in its application, from the correspondent abstract noun; for the adjective and its noun do not denote distinct objects of perception when thus associated, but they unite and represent a particular individual.

"A verb," says Mr. Lennie, "is a word that affirms something of its nominative, or"—

"A verb is a word which expresses being, doing, or suffering."

This author, as if conscious of the contradiction contained in his definitions, has had the former printed in a smaller type, he might however have given the approved definition the preference.

"A verb," says Mr. Walker, "is a part of speech signifying existence, or some modifications thereof, as—action, or passion."

But the verb only predicates existence, action, or passion; the word representing either of these attributes is the predicate. This definition is therefore perplexing and inaccurate.

Dr. Lowth, being the authority of most English grammarians, has the merit of the definition, that—a verb is a word which *signifies* to be, to do, and to suffer. Grammarians say truly, that the verb *signifies* being and doing, for the verb is the *sign* by which abstract names of actions and states

of being are united as attributes to other nouns, but the sense in which grammarians use the verb "to signify," is equivocal, and as regards *their* meaning misapplied. For they generally suppose that a verb *means* "to be, to do, or to suffer;" but they find it more convenient to say that verbs *signify* these attributes.

"That the participle is a mere mood of the verb," says Dr. Lowth, "is manifest if our definition of a verb be admitted, for it signifies being, and doing, and suffering, with the designation of time superadded. But if the essence of the verb be made to consist in affirmation, not only the participle will be excluded from its place in the verb, but the infinitive itself also, which certain ancient grammarians of great authority held to be alone the genuine verb, denying that title to all the other moods."

These objections by Dr. Lowth have been noticed in the preceding remarks on Mr. Murray's definition of a verb. The present participle is a mood of the abstract noun, and as such may be attributed to its subject. It denotes an *existing* action, and necessarily implies present time. The genuine verb of Dr. Lowth's great authorities is the abstract verbal noun: it will neither admit of a nominative, nor the force of affirmation, nor does the infinitive under any circumstances lose its independent character as a noun.

Dr. Ash, a grammatical follower of Dr. Lowth, varies the original definition, and calls a verb a word which signifies the action or being of a person or thing, as—the man *calls*; the city *stands*; the tree *falls*; I *am*.

Dr. Johnson has not defined the verb in his Grammar, but in his Dictionary he has quoted a rather better definition than is usually given.

VERB,—a part of speech signifying existence or some modification thereof, as—action, passion; and, withal, some disposition or intention of the mind relating thereto, as of affirming, denying, interrogating, commanding.

"Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before

it, but others also to show, or intimate, some particular action of its own, at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as—is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences, one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse."—LOCKE.

"A verb," says Dr. Blair, "is so far of the same nature with the adjective, that it expresses like it an attribute or property of some person or thing. But it does more than this: for, in all verbs, in every language, there are no less than three things implied at once:—The attribute of some substantive, an affirmation concerning that attribute, and time. Thus, when I say—the sun shineth, shining is the attribute ascribed to the sun, the present time is marked, and an affirmation is included that this property belongs to the sun; the participle *shining* is merely an adjective which denotes an attribute or property, and also expresses time, but carries no affirmation. The infinitive mood to shine, may be called the name of the verb; it carries neither time nor affirmation, but simply expresses that attribute, action, or state of things, which is to be the subject of the other moods and tenses. Hence, the infinitive often carries the resemblance of a substantive noun, and in English is sometimes constructed as such, as—to write well is difficult; to speak eloquently is still more difficult. But as through all the other tenses the affirmation runs, and is essential to them, the affirmation seems to be that which chiefly distinguishes the verb from the other parts of speech, and gives it its most conspicuous power. Hence there can be no sentence, or complete proposition, without a verb either expressed or implied: for whenever we speak we always mean to assert that something is, or is not, and the word which carries this assertion or affirmation is a verb. From this sort of eminence belonging to it, this part of speech hath received its name, verb, from the Latin verbum, or the word by way of distinction."

The preeminence ascribed by this writer to the verb arises entirely from its property of predicating, and not from the

active or passive signification of the attribute. For being, doing, or suffering, may be expressed by joining the active or past participle to a noun, as—an existing circumstance, a working man, a wounded soldier.

The difficulty hitherto felt in comprehending this intricate part of speech appears to have arisen chiefly from the manner in which it has been explained. For grammarians have made no distinction between the word or sign which affirms, and the word which denotes that which is affirmed. They have treated them as *idem et alter*, and by endeavouring to prove that the verb and the predicate are the same, they have rendered the definitions vague, and their explanations unintelligible.

As the structure of language is so connected with the verb, the following remarks on the nature of a proposition may be advantageously perused by many, as preliminary to any further observations respecting the essential characteristic of this important part of speech. The reader who has not had the advantage of a liberal education will also be enabled to understand, more accurately, the terms used by grammarians, when those writers treat of the nature of the verb; he will, at the same time, perceive the principle which regulates the construction of sentences.

A proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or negation, as—Plato was a philosopher; every angle is formed by two lines meeting; no man living on earth can be completely happy.

There are three things which go to the nature and constitution of a proposition, (viz.) the *subject*, the *predicate*, and the *copula*.

The subject of a proposition is that concerning which any thing is affirmed or denied, so—Plato, angle, man living on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions.

The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the subject; so *philosopher* is the predicate of the first proposition; *formed by two lines meeting* is the predicate of the second; *capable of being completely happy* is the proper predicate of the third.

The subject and predicate of a proposition, taken together,

are called the matter of it, for these are the materials of which it is made.

The copula is the form of a proposition; it represents the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expressed by these words—am, art, is, are, &c., or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c.

It is not a thing of importance, enough to create a dispute, whether the words no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall be called a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. Sometimes, perhaps, they may seem most naturally to be included in one, and sometimes in another of these, though a proposition is usually denominated affirmative or negative by its copula.

Where each of these parts of a proposition is not expressed distinctly in so many words, yet they are all understood, and implicitly contained therein, as—Socrates disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies—Socrates was disputing. So, I die, signifies I am dying. I can write, i.e. I I am able to write. In Latin and Greek one single word is many times a complete proposition.

These words—am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone, without any *other predicate*, signify both the act of the mind, judging which includes the copula, and signify also actual existence, which is the predicate of that proposition. So, *Rome is*, signifies Rome is existent. *There are some strange monsters*, that is, some strange monsters are existent. Carthage is no more, i.e. Carthage has no being.

The subject and predicate of a proposition are not always to be known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the sentence, but by reflecting duly on the sense of the words, and on the mind and design of the speaker or writer; as—if I say, "In Africa there are many lions," I mean, many lions are existent in Africa. Many lions is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicate. "It is proper for a philosopher to understand geometry;" here, the word proper is the predicate, and all the rest is the subject, except *is*, the copula.

The subject and predicate of a proposition ought always to be two different ideas, or two different terms, for where

both the terms and ideas are the same it is called an identical proposition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge, such as—a rule is a rule, or a good man is a good man.

But there are some propositions wherein the terms of the subject and predicate seem to be the same, yet the ideas are not the same; nor can these be called purely identical or trifling propositions, such as—home is home, that is, home is a convenient or delightful place. Socrates is Socrates still, that is, *the man* Socrates is still *a philosopher*. The hero was not a hero, that is, the hero did not show his courage. What I have written I have written, that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter it. What is done is done, that is, it cannot be undone. It may be easily observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in the subject.

"There are also some propositions wherein the terms of the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same; and these are not merely identical or trifling propositions, as—impudent is shameless, a billow is a wave, or fluctus (in Latin) is a wave, a globe is a round body. In these propositions either the words are explained by a definition of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the things, and therefore they are by no means useless when formed for this purpose."—WATTS' *Logic*, part ii. chap. 1.

Having endeavoured, in this chapter, to show the true character of that part of speech called by grammarians "the verb," and that its essential property consists in affirmation, we shall henceforth consider those words verbs that possess this property, whether such words include the attribute, or simply denote affirmation, and in doing this we shall be better able to adhere to the usual practice of grammarians.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE AUXILIARY VERBS.

THE verbs of this class have been called Auxiliaries by some grammarians, "because they help to *conjugate* other verbs."

From this we are led to believe that their use extends no further than to the tables of verbs, given by grammarians. Other writers say that these verbs, "denote the time of the verb," but they have not shown how the time of one verb can indicate the time of another verb, nor that each verb does not denote its own time. We shall endeavour to show, in this chapter, that every word which affirms necessarily, denotes present or past existence, and consequently implies present or past time, and that these verbs are called auxiliary because, having lost their original force of signification, they are used nearly in the character of adverbs.

The verb, "to be" is not only the most extensively useful, but is also the earliest of the auxiliaries, and is thus conjugated.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

PRESENT TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I am	We are
Thou art	Ye or you are
He, she, or it is	They are

PAST TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I was	We were
Thou wast	Ye or you were
He, she, or it was	They were

PRESENT PARTICIPLE.	PAST PARTICIPLE.
Being	Been

INFINITIVE MOOD.

To be.

The more regular form of the verb has been retained when a condition is implied by a conjunction, or otherwise, as—

PRESENT TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
If I be	If we be
If thou be	If ye or you be
If he, she, or it be	If they be

PAST TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
~~If I~~ were	If we were
If thou wert	If ye or you were
If he were	If they were

This is denominated the subjunctive mood. By a strange anomaly the plural of the past indicative is used both for the *singular* and the *plural* of the past subjunctive, and also for *all* the persons. This, however, proves that it is not essential to distinguish number and person by modifying the verb, and from a slight examination the distinction of mood will be found useless, because the condition is expressed either by a distinct sign, or by a change of position in the noun and verb. "If I am," and "If I be," differ not in meaning, but in their conformity or nonconformity with usage.

The irregularity of this verb is perhaps one cause why its use has been so imperfectly understood. The third person singular of the two tenses, the participles, and the infinitive mood, are the only essential parts of the verb. The modifications of an attribute, merely to denote number and person, are unnecessary, because in English the subject is expressed, or distinctly understood. The various forms of the present of this verb, *be, am, art, is, are,* have but one use, and but

one meaning, they simply *affirm* and imply the *existence* of qualities, actions, or states of nouns. But we beg the reader to understand that we do not point out these redundancies by way of suggesting any improvement which might be made in the form of this difficult part of speech, we do it merely to show what changes are essential in the modification of the verb.

"In philosophical strictness," observes Mr. Murray, "both number and person might be entirely excluded from every verb. They are in fact the properties of substantives, not a part of the essence of the verb."

The only exception to this important principle occurs in the third person singular, present tense, indicative mood. *There* a distinction is necessary, not *because* the verb should *agree* with its nominative, but to distinguish the *manner of expressing* the attribute, as—John smite*s* Charles, for without some modification, the indicative mood could not in such cases be distinguished from the imperative, and both would then be expressed, by—John smite Charles. The force of affirmation is therefore expressed by the sign *s*, and not by the mere position of the noun and the verb.

The most simple and essential attribute of a noun is its existence, and this is implied by the copula when no other attribute is predicated of a noun. Hence the origin of the substantive verb, to be; but when another attribute is predicated, that quality, and not the attribute of existence, is affirmed, for a simple proposition contains but one affirmation, and implies but one attribute.

The existence of nouns and their attributes may be actual, and the verb which thus predicates their existence *necessarily* implies present time, as—*am, is, are.*

The duration of the existence of attributes or objects may be expired, and then existence can no longer be spoken of as actual, but as past, and the verb which denotes this past existence requires a modification, and the sign necessarily denotes past time, as—*was, been;* or,

The existence of an attribute may be spoken of s contingent, and thus necessarily require a sign or modification to denote futurity, as—*to* be.

Since existence may be predicated, as either present, past,

or future, it follows, that the existence of any other attribute may be predicated in like manner, admitting, also, the various modifications implied by the auxiliary verbs, as—he is writing, he was writing, he is *to* write.

Time and manner are not attributes of the noun, but should be regarded as adjuncts of the predicate, whether expressed or implied. "Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional; in short, they may take place in a variety of ways. They may be spoken of as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accident of verbs called a mood, expressing the mode or manner of existence. In English there is only one mood—the indicative. Conditionality, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty, are denoted by auxiliary verbs."—CROMBIE.

The attempt to form a subjunctive by modifying a few of the persons in the present and past tenses is as awkward as it is useless; for if one person of a tense require a repetition of the subjunctive sign, why not give it to all, and to every tense when conditionality is implied. The only modification that the original tenses can admit of is the addition of an adverb denoting time, but this is usually accomplished by the auxiliaries and participles.

Auxiliary verbs admit of two tenses, the past and the present, for the conditionality may be spoken of as present or past; but the attribute joined to these verbs being contingent, always denotes the future action or state of being, as—I will write, i.e. I will to write, or I am willing *to write*. I may depart, i.e. I have liberty *to depart*. I can stay, i.e. I am able *to stay*.

The auxiliary verbs require to be joined to a principal attribute before a complete sentence can be formed—I may, I must, I ought, they shall, &c., or, I can have, I might have had, &c., are incomplete sentences. The auxiliaries are now chiefly used as adverbs,* to modify the past or future existence

* Numerous examples might be quoted in proof of the use of auxiliaries as adverbs.—"I *may* have stepped beyond the exact line of palatable li is equivalent to,—I *perhaps* have stepped beyond the exact line of p license.

of some principal attribute. Some are regular verbs, and consequently have the participles, and the infinitive mood.

The force of affirmation is in the auxiliary, because the will, power, liberty, &c., may exist, or may have existed, and, therefore, they can admit the predicating sign, but the *existence* of that which is probable, or even certain, cannot be predicated as existing or actual, without implying a contradiction, and, therefore, the word denoting future action or state of being will not admit the force of affirmation, as—to be,—to move, &c. This form of the verb has been denominated *the infinitive mood*, or *name* of the *verb*.

We confess that we never have well comprehended the meaning of this term, infinitive, as applied to the verb. *

We can easily conceive that the infinitive mood is a verbal noun, though modified by the preposition; for this does not alter the independent character of the word, any more than good would alter the independent character of a substantive; it only adds some quality to the word by which it may be known from another noun of the same name; we also perceive that the infinitive mood will not admit the sign of affirmation, but merely pointing out these peculiarities does not explain why the infinitive mood should be called the verb, nor does this definition show wherein the infinitive mood differs from the present participle, which is the name of the existing action, or from the abstract noun of which the infinitive is merely a modification, as—I act, or do an act; I am *acting*, or doing an act; I am *to act*, or *to do* an act. The attribute is the same, but the time of future action is denoted by a preposition, and with this modification the future action may be predicated, as—I intend *to* walk; I mean *to* ride.

What grammarians have, hitherto, called the passing or finished *time*, the imperfect or perfect *time*, is nothing else but the passing or finished *action*; the imperfect or perfect *action*, or *state*, and these when predicated necessarily denote the times pointed out by the several modifications of the attribute; hence, the adverb, denoting the precise time of the action or state of being, is seldom employed. The obscurity

* "Some are contented to call *to* a mark of the infinitive mood; but how or why it is so they are totally silent."—TOOKE.

and confusion in the explanations of this property of the verb may be ascribed to the erroneous opinion that time is *purposely* denoted by the tenses of the verb.

We shall now proceed with the conjugations of the remaining auxiliary verbs—have, do, shall, will, may, can, ought, let, and must.*

To do.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I do	We do
Thou doest or dost	Ye or you do
He, she, or it does	They do

Past Tense.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I did	We did
Thou didst	Ye or you did
He, she, or it did	They did

Present Participle.	Past Participle.
Doing	Done

INFINITIVE MOOD.

To do.

To have.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I have	We have
Thou hast	Ye or you have
He has	They have

* *Do* is a regular verb, but when used as an auxiliary it denotes emphasis or a modification of the principal attribute, as—he *does* know the truth;—*does* he confess?—he *did* not repent.

"*To do* is used for any verb to save the repetition of the word, as—I shall come, but if I do not, go away, that is, if I come not."

PAST TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I had	We had
Thou hadst	Ye or you had
He had	They had

PRESENT PARTICIPLE.	PAST PARTICIPLE.
Having	Had

INFINITIVE MOOD.

To have.

To have is also a regular verb, and signifies possession, as—he has the book; they had the property. It is used as an auxiliary to itself, as—I have had the book. They had had the property. The use of this verb will be best seen when we come to examine the properties of a regular verb.

Will.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

PRESENT TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I will	We will
Thou wilt	Ye or you will
He will	They will

PAST TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I would	We would
Thou wouldst	Ye or you would
He would	They would

There can be little doubt but the regular verb to will, was originally used instead of this auxiliary, and that the future action or state of the noun was denoted by the preposition *to*, the sign of the infinitive, as—I will to come.

That the meanings of most of these auxiliaries are obscure has been proved by the several unsuccessful attempts to fix their precise significations. When the root of any word becomes obsolete by the introduction of a synonymous term,

or by an elliptical manner of expression, the derivatives of the original term often become corrupted in meaning, and are used in a vague or indeterminate manner, either as signs, or modifications of more significant words. This appears to be the case with auxiliary verbs. They are for the most part modifications of words which no longer exist in the language.

Dr. Johnson's definitions of shall and will have been called perspicuous. Whether they explain the meaning of those words the reader can decide.

"*I shall love.* It will be so that I must love. I am resolved to love. *Shall I love.* Will it be permitted me to love? Will it be that I must love. *Thou shalt love.* I command thee to love. It is permitted thee to love. It will be that thou must love. *Shalt thou love.* Will it be that thou must love. Will it be permitted thee to love. *He shall love.* It will be that he must love. It is commanded that he love. *Shall he love?* Is it permitted him to love?"

The plural persons follow the signification of the singular.

"*I will come.* I am willing to come. I am determined to come. *Thou wilt come.* It must be that thou must come, importing necessity; or it shall be that thou shalt come, importing choice. *Wilt thou come?* Hast thou determined to come, importing choice. *He will come.* He is resolved to come, or it must be, that he must come, importing choice or necessity."

An Irish gentleman has lately published his opinions respecting the import of shall and will. One example will suffice the English Scholar:—

"Pray tell me what you mean by *I think I shall,* which you and learned men, likewise, so often say? Is it not a kind of double doubting:—something like I think of thinking? Does it not appear to you more correct to say—*I think I will?*"

In answer to this, we ask Mr. Brenan what sense there is in "*I think* I will;" for surely every one who is capable of knowing his own mind *knows* whether he *will,* though he may *doubt* whether he *shall,* do a thing. It is true, an Irishman says, I think I *will* die of this disease; but an

Englishman being, perhaps, not quite so *willing* to die, would say—I think I *shall* die of this disease, i.e. I fear the disease is such as *must*, or *ought*, to produce that consequence, —I *will* not die, but I think THE DISEASE *will* kill me.

Nearly the whole of Mr Brenan's observations on these words, "shall and will," is in opposition to their original meaning, and at variance with their application, by correct and well educated English writers. No man in his senses fears what *he wills*, though he may fear what is *willed* by another. The expression, oh assist me, I fear I *will* be drowned, is an *Irishism*, and therefore inexcusable from the lips of an Englishman. An Englishman fears that the water *will* drown him, or that he *shall* be drowned by the water.

Shall and will have, however, been so often misapplied, that considerable difficulty occurs when any one attempts to fix their precise signification. Still, perhaps, they retain a sufficient portion of their original meaning to enable the grammarian to decide when they are properly used.

Will denotes power, inclination, and determination to act, and if these exist in the agent, we say,—I will, thou wilt, he will. The inclination and resolution in the second person, and the third, are either known or presumed, as—wilt thou?—yes, I *know* thou *wilt*.

But if the power, inclination, or determination of the agent, be subject to the will of another, the agent is spoken *to*, or *of*, as being impelled to the performance of the action without any reference to his will, as—thou shalt; he shall.

Ex.—"Nature has willed that its parts shall always remain subordinate to the whole."

Here, will (used as a regular verb,) implies determination; shall, employed as an auxiliary, implies compulsion.

The same distinction obtains when we speak in the first person, as—"I shall die." Here the state or condition is supposed to be inevitable, not voluntary.

Shall and will are also used to denote intention, as—I shall go to town to-morrow, and my wife *will* accompany me:—or *shall* accompany me, if by chance the *will* of the husband predominates. Hence, shall and will, in many cases, seem to promise and foretel, as—I will assist him; they shall perish.

Shall.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I shall	We shall
Thou shalt	Ye or you shall
He, she, or it shall	They shall

Past Tense.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I should	We should
Thou shouldst	Ye or you should
He, she, or it should	They should

"This verb," says Dr. Crombie, "is unquestionably a derivative from the Saxon sceal, *I owe*, or *I ought*, and was originally of the same import. 'I shall,' denoted 'it is my duty,' and was precisely synonymous with *debeo* in Latin. Chaucer says, 'The faith I *shall* to God,' that is, 'the faith I *owe* to God.' 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'or thou oughtest not to kill.' In this sense *shall* is a present tense, and denoted present duty or obligation. But as all duties, and all commands, though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must be future in regard to their execution, so by a *natural transition*, observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty came to be a note of future time."

In the learned languages, and many of the modern, the present duty, will, or obligation, is united with the contingent attribute, and when the verbs are thus united they constitute what are called the future and conditional tenses of verbs; but in the English the obligation which exists and is present, is denoted by *shall*, and the performance of the duty, which is future, is expressed by the root of the verb, whether the verbal noun representing such performance be expressed or understood. "The faith I shall to God," is equivalent to, the faith I ought *to render* to God. The obligation is present, but the performance of the duty is to come.

Ought.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

PRESENT TENSE.

Singular.	*Plural.*
I ought	We ought
Thou oughtest	Ye or you ought
He, she, or it ought	They ought

Ought implies present duty or obligation. The past tense is denoted by the past participle of the principal attribute, as—I ought to have written.

The preposition cannot be omitted after this word, as, in those cases where the meaning of the auxiliary is less determinate, we connot say, "I ought write," I ought have written; but I ought to write, I ought to have written. On the other hand the auxiliary should, will not admit the preposition, because no definite meaning belongs to the word. I should to write, I should to have written, are as ungrammatical, as—I ought write, I ought have written.

We cannot agree with Dr. Crombie, who assigns a past tense to this verb. Past duty is denoted by the regular verb, "I owed;" but ought, though derived from owe, always denotes an existing duty or obligation, whether *the power* to discharge that duty exists or not, for that which has not been paid is still owing, though the possibility of paying be hopeless. "I ought to have been more grateful to my benefactor while he lived, and I ought now to observe his precepts." Ought, in the first member of this sentence denotes, an existing duty unperformed; in the last clause an *existing* obligation. The duty and the obligation are spoken of as still having existence, though the opportunity to be grateful is past, and the observance of the benefactor's precepts is yet to come.

Let.

Let is a perfect verb, though often used as an auxiliary in imperfect sentences, as—let me depart, that is, I desire you to let me depart.

Must.

Must implies necessity to do, or to suffer, any action or state, and always denotes the existence of such necessity; it cannot, therefore, be applied to the past or future existence of the idea the word represents.

Conjugation of Verbs.

"To conjugate, in its usual acceptation, means to join together, and, as used by grammarians, it means to place under one view all the variations in the form of the verb, beginning with the infinitive mood, and ending with the participle."—Cobbett.

The attribute usually chosen by grammarians to exemplify the modifications of the verb is "love." * Why this *desire* has been so pertinaciously adhered to would be a more difficult question if it were not well known that most English grammars are derived from the Latin, and are founded on the *plan* of Lowth's Introduction. Some writers, however, have questioned the propriety of this trite illustration, and among these is Mr. Brenan, who, in his useful little work on Composition, remarks,—"I cannot forbear saying a word upon the subject of the verb,—'to love,' of which all grammar writers, except Mr. Cobbett, are so fond. As it is of the greatest importance that things should as nearly as possible have their right names and functions, especially when we undertake instruction, this word is a most unfortunate selection, and, I am certain, that it much retards the improvement of the pupil. But grammarians too often work mechanically, not intellectually; would they but mentally consider this word, through all its moods and tenses, its inefficiency, nay, its absurdity, as an explicator, must be manifest."

Regarding affirmation as the essential characteristic of the verb, it will not be expected that we shall give what is called a *complete* conjugation. The present tense, and the past, are the only modifications admitted by grammarians to

* Love is a passion or emotion, and, therefore, *to love* is not an appropriate word to convey a distinct notion of an *active transitive* verb.

possess the verbal character,* because these alone correspond with the definition of a verb.

A verb is called regular when the past tense and the past participle are formed by adding *d*, or *ed*, to the name of the verb, as—move, moved, command, commanded.

The verb to Move.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular Number.	*Plural Number.*
I move	We move
Thou movest	Ye or you move
He moves or moveth	They move

Past Tense.

Singular Number.	*Plural Number.*
I moved	We moved
Thou movedst	Ye or you moved
He moved	They moved

Present Participle.	Past Participle.
Moving	Moved

Infinitive or Verbal Noun.
To Move.

The variation of the verb, on account of number and person, obtains only in the second and third persons of the two tenses of the indicative; but as the pronoun *thou* is seldom used, and the formal modification of the third person of the present tense is rarely attended to, this property of the verb may be considered as pertaining exclusively to the third person singular of the present tense; an exception that is scarcely worth the parade of the conjugation of persons.

The verb "to move," like many other verbs in the English language, is sometimes employed as an active and sometimes as a neuter verb.

* "As the verb essentially expresses affirmation, without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has been hence considered as the principal part of speech, and was, *therefore*, called, by the ancient grammarians, *verb*, or *the word* by way of eminence."—Crombie.

Number, person, mood, and tense, are the principal accidents of a verb. Number relates to the unity or to the plurality of the subject to which the attribute is ascribed, as—he moves; they move. The distinction of person indicates that the attribute pertains either to the speaker, to the person spoken to, or to the person or thing spoken of, as—I move; thou movest; he, she, or it moves. But as the accidents of number and person are not, strictly speaking, properties of the verbal attribute, this brief notice of them here will be sufficient. Mood and tense will require more attentive consideration.

Moods.

Mood, or mode, is a particular form of a VERBAL ATTRIBUTE, showing the manner in which the being, action, or state of being is represented in reference to its subject.

The VERBAL ATTRIBUTE is that term of the predicate which denotes some state or action pertaining to a noun; in fact, all those words which (when the *existence* of the attribute they stand for is affirmed,) are capable of admitting the force or sign of affirmation.

A verbal attribute may be variously predicated. It may be spoken of indefinitely. It may be commanded or desired. Its existence may be actual, or it may be predicated as possible or contingent. These circumstances, when included in the predicate, have given rise to the several moods, with which grammarians have encumbered the English conjugation.

The modes of a verb are generally comprehended in the five following:—the INFINITIVE, the IMPERATIVE, the INDICATIVE, the POTENTIAL, and the SUBJUNCTIVE. These, it will be necessary to examine separately, in order to understand in what respect the attribute differs in its several modifications, and how far it is entitled to retain its character as a verb.

The Infinitive Mood.

"Of all the points," says Mr. Tooke, "which grammarians endeavour to shuffle over, there is none in which they do it

more grossly than in this of the infinitive." Having made this charge, Mr. Tooke promised to explain the nature of the verb, but he afterwards thought fit to decline the task, and by this great omission in his theory has left the structure of language, which ought to have been the principal object of his investigations, incomplete. We must turn, therefore, to a less popular writer for information concerning these attributes.

"The Stoics," says Mr. Harris, "in their grammatical inquiries, had the infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine verb, a name which they denied to all the other modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the infinitive only. Thus, the infinitive 'to walk,' means simply that energy, and nothing more."

If the essence of the verb consisted in "being" and "doing," this opinion of the Stoics would be correct, for it is evident that many substantive nouns are used to denote the names of actions,* by the simple addition of the preposition "to," which, according to Mr. Tooke's derivation, means *act*, and conveys that notion when connected with a substantive noun. But the idea represented by the substantive noun, and that represented by the verbal noun, are altogether distinct ideas. Thus, "to breathe," denotes an act; but "breath" denotes that portion of the air which is *breathed*. "To plant" means to fix in the ground; "a plant" means that which is fixed in the ground.

The infinitive, then, is the name of an action or state of being. Its modifications denote that action or state of being as conjoined with a noun, and when the modifications of the attribute do not imply affirmation, they are called participles, or participial adjectives.

Whenever the infinitive mood is employed in a sentence it denotes an action or state of being indefinitely, or it implies the existence of the attribute at some future period. If the action or state of being be spoken of indefinitely,

* Mr. Tooke makes no other distinction between the verbal noun and the substantive than what is implied in the preposition. "The word *to*," says Mr. Tooke, "is merely added to distinguish the infinitive from the noun."

without any distinct reference to its existence, the infinitive represents the notion which we form of the verbal attribute, apart from any subject, as—to walk is pleasant.

In this case it is evident that the verbal abstract noun does not represent an act which has existed, or does exist, but it refers merely to the abstract notion of an action or state of being, which, from experience and recollection, is affirmed to be pleasant.

But if the infinitive be connected with the primary attribute as its *object*, the *future existence* of the attribute, denoted by the infinitive, is predicated in connection with the actual or past existence of the principal attribute.

Ex.—We are able *to predict*, with certainty, many of the changes which are *to happen* in time *to come*.

The prediction here indefinitely referred to is not an act of the mind that *has taken place*, but an act that we have the power hereafter to exercise. The other infinitives in the example clearly denote the *future* existence of the attributes or states, which they are intended to represent. For what is *to happen* has not taken place, and what is *to come* has not yet arrived.

The Imperative Mood.

The view which has been taken of the infinitive will assist to explain the nature of the imperative mood. The verb in this mood is the attribute whose existence is desired, commanded, permitted, or intreated; but the verb which desires, commands, permits, or intreats, is generally understood, as —depart ye, i.e. I *command* ye *to depart*. Listen to me, i.e. I *request* you *to listen* to me.

Those grammarians who have justly considered the imperative as part only of a declaratory sentence, would have experienced no difficulty in proving the truth of their opinions, had they considered the verbal *noun*, when employed as the *object* of an assertion, as always implying the future existence of the attribute denoted by the verbal noun. It is not what is called the imperative mood of the verb which commands or intreats, for that is what *is* commanded

or intreated, but it is the tone or emphasis which supplies the place of that verb which denotes the attribute pertaining to the nominative. Hence, the imperative mood does not always correspond with its name, for it sometimes petitions, in the most suppliant tone, as—*forgive* us our sins; *have* mercy.

Yet the imperative is a form of the verb distinguishable from the indicative. In the expressions—"Love thy neighbour as thyself," "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," the same duty is inforced, but the manner of inforcing it differs. The first form is imperative, the last contains an assertion; the sentence is therefore declaratory, and pertains to the indicative mood.

The Indicative Mood.

The indicative mood is that form of the verb, or verbal attribute, which includes the sign of affirmation:—it *declares* the attribute to belong to the subject, as—he *is* wise; she *moves;* they *stand.*

The affirmation is included in those forms only of the verbal attribute which declare the *present* or the *past* existence of the attribute, as—she weeps; they smiled.

When the *future existence* of an attribute is predicated, the force of affirmation is transferred to the auxiliary. For the will, power, or obligation, "to be," or "to do," may exist, while the attribute (which, in fact, is the *object* of the will, power, or obligation,) is necessarily contingent, and consequently pertains to future existences. Still, the auxiliary, and the object connected with it, are so closely allied, and, in general, the meaning of the former is so far obscured, that it and its object are usually considered as one attribute, and are in many languages expressed by a single term, as—*Ibo,* I will go, i.e. I will *to go.* In this declaration, "to go" is the object of the existing will or determination, and the *will* to do that, denoted by the principal verb, is the *immediate* attribute of the subject.

Mr. Harris, speaking of this property of auxiliary verbs, remarks, "The infinitive naturally coalesces with all those

verbs that denote any tendency, desire, or volition of the soul, but not readily with others. The reason is, that though different actions may unite in the same subject, and therefore be coupled together (as, when we say—he walked and discoursed), yet the actions, notwithstanding, remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to volitions and actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate that the volition is unintelligible, till the action be expressed,—I desire; I am willing; I want.—What? The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect; we must help them, then, by infinitives, which express the proper actions to which they tend,—I desire to read; I am willing to learn; I want to see. Thus, is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax."*

The indicative mood, by laying aside assertion, quits the name of indicative, and may, with propriety, be considered a distinct mood of the verb. Though the *form* of the indicative is not changed in asking a question, yet the *place* of the verbal attribute denotes that the essential characteristic of a verb is wanting, and the sentence is consequently incomplete. It may be remarked that, in many cases, position serves the purpose of modification: thus, a noun in the objective case is known by its place; and a verb derived from a substantive is distinguished from the latter by its position, in reference to the noun or pronoun that governs it.

The Potential Mood.

The potential mood is ascertained by the meaning of the auxiliaries employed in connection with the principal attribute. Thus, when any action or state of existence is considered as possible, and not contingent, the auxiliaries *may, can, might,* and *could,* denote the power implied by those words; but when the opportunity of doing or being is spoken of as past, the auxiliaries *to have* and *to be* denote the past existence of the power implied by the words *might* and *could,* and the past participle of the principal verb is employed, as

* *Hermes*, book i, chap. 8.

if the action or state of being had been completed, as—he might have *prevented* the mischief; their lives might have been *saved*. In no case, however, in this mood, is the *actual* existence of the principal attribute predicated.

It has been already observed that the auxiliaries are frequently employed to modify an assertion, and, losing the force of their original signification, they become little else than adverbs. "Those verbs," says a modern writer, "which, in course of time, are used as auxiliaries, though originally as significant as any other verbs, lose something of their distinctive character; so that if the fuller form happen to disappear from a language, the corrupted auxiliary presents anomalies which it is not easy for the philologist to explain. This difficulty is increased by the circumstance that verbs used as auxiliaries generally throw off much of the distinctive meaning which they originally possessed."

The Subjunctive Mood.

The subjunctive mood implies that the existence of the attribute is spoken of conditionally.

"When the thing expressed by the verb depends on something else going before or coming after it, whether the concessive conjunctions, if, though, unless, except, whether, &c. be used or not, the *st* or *s* of the second or third person singular is dropped at the end of the verb, that is, the verb is used in the same form as in the infinitive mood; thus, if any member absent himself he shall forfeit."

In this example, it will be observed, that something is asserted to depend upon the act of any member absenting himself; therefore the verb is employed without the usual termination, "and *the reason* of this is," says Mr. Lewis, "*that there is an auxiliary verb understood*,"—if any member shall absent himself.

The reason here assigned, by this writer, for the change of termination, to denote contingency, does not explain why the verb or attribute spoken of contingently should be of the same form as the infinitive mood; but if that mood denotes a future action, the difficulty is at once explained,

for an action or state which exists cannot be spoken of as contingent, in whatever way it may be modified by a conjunction.

In general, it may be observed, that when the thing spoken of is certain, whether the verb is preceded by a conjunction or not, the indicative form of the verb should be employed,—"though he were a son." Here there is no doubt expressed, and consequently *were* ought to have been *was*. I shall overtake him although he runs. Such assertions, though put with a concessive term, are not intended to convey doubt, the facts are considered as admitted.

Tenses.

In Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, the reader is informed, that a great man being asked what time was, answered, *Si non rogas intelligo.*

If any attempt were here made to demonstrate that there *is* such a thing as present time, it is probable that the proofs and arguments would be about as well understood as are the ingenious contrivances of those who have endeavoured to prove the contrary; but it is fortunate for the greater part of mankind that such inquiries are as useless as they are inexplicable. Man may as reasonably imagine that he has the power to stay the planets in their course, as to presume that he has a mind capable of forming an adequate conception of extension, or of the modes of duration.

But it is not with the duration of time, but with the duration of transitory beings and their attributes, that the grammarian has to do.

The tenses of verbs denote the actual or past existence of attributes, in reference to the subjects to which such attributes are said to belong.

In English there are three tenses of verbs.

The actual existence of an attribute is expressed by the forms of the present tense, and present participle.

The past existence of the attribute is signified by the past tense, and the past participle.

The future or contingent existence is implied by the infinitive mood, used in connection with a finite verb.

In order to define, more accurately, the *modes of existence* in relation to the subject, or objects connected with it, the compound *tenses* have been constructed. The auxiliaries employed for this purpose modify the assertion, in reference to the *existence* of the attribute, but time is as inseparable from existence, as form is from substance; hence, when the *existence* of an attribute is predicated or affirmed, the notion of time is necessarily implied.

Of the different kinds of Verbs.

Verbs are of three kinds—ACTIVE, PASSIVE, and NEUTER; and, as regards their modifications, they are further distinguished as either *regular* or *irregular*. Some few verbs are also called *impersonal* or *defective*, because they are not employed in all the variations of moods, tenses, numbers, and persons, incident to a regular verb.

A verb is called *active transitive* when the act of producing the attribute or state is attributed to the subject, as—the gunpowder *splits* the rock; the master *punishes* the scholar.

A verb is called *active intransitive* when the attribute itself, and not the act of producing it, is attributed to the subject, as—the horse *trots*; the man *walks*.

A verb is considered *neuter* when the attribute denotes an inactive state of being, or when no agent is referred to, as producing such state of being, as—he *stands* unmoved; they *lie* in wait.

These distinctions may be rendered more evident by a few examples.

To BUILD is an active transitive verb, and has properly no corresponding neuter in our language, "The house was building when the wall fell," is much better expressed by employing the French idiom, "The house was being built when the wall fell."

To LAY is an active transitive verb, and denotes that *act* by which the attribute or state of being implied by the word is produced in an object.

Ex.—The reader *lays* the book on the table, or *laid* the book on the table.

The passive form of the verb denotes that the subject or nominative *has been* acted upon, as—the book is *laid* on the table, or was *laid* on the table.

To LIE is a verb neuter, and merely denotes the state of the subject, without referring to an agent as the cause of that state.

Ex.—The book *lies* on the table, or the book *lay* on the table.

The past participle of "to lay," is laid; the past participle of "to lie," is lain.

The verb "to move" has an active signification when the cause of motion in an object is attributed to an agent, as the *producer* of such motion, as—"the wind moves the vessel." Here the word "moves" denotes the *act* of moving, and not the motion produced, since it is not the existence of the motion, but the existence of the act which is predicated. But the verb has a neuter signification when motion itself is attributed to the subject, as—"the vessel moves." In this case the attribute or state of existence, signified by the verb, *pertains* to the vessel, and the verb is called intransitive.

The verb is said to be passive when the object acted upon, is made the nominative or subject of assertion, as—"the vessel is moved." The attribute denoted by the past participle "moved," represents that state of being which results, or has resulted, from the agency of a power acting upon the vessel. The vessel is therefore spoken of as a *passive* subject, receiving its attribute from an external agent, and the state of being (expressed by the participle "moved,") is not regarded as simply pertaining to the vessel, and originating in itself, but as produced in the vessel by an efficient agent, either expressed or implied.

Ex.—The vessel is moved by the wind.

The verbal noun "to move," therefore, may either denote an *act* producing the *attribute* signified by the word, or it may denote the attribute itself, without referring to the agent which produced it. Lastly, the attribute resulting from the act of moving, may also be predicated as pertaining to a passive subject. Hence, the different kinds of verbs have been denominated, by grammarians, *active, passive,* and *neuter*. The passive, it is evident, cannot be said to belong

to the English language, for the phrases which constitute the passive verb differ from the neuter verb only in the manner of signification of the past participle, used in connection with the substantive verb.

Verbs are called *irregular* when the modifications of the past tense and the past participle are not formed by adding *d*, or *ed* to the infinitive, as—*am, was, been; drink, drank, drunk.*

Lists of the irregular verbs may be found in almost every grammar.

A verb is called *defective* when it is not employed through all the forms of a complete conjugation.

In concluding our observations on the verb, we shall briefly revert to the cause of the difficulty which many experience in comprehending the nature of this important part of speech, and at the same time we shall offer a few remarks on the origin of the three auxiliary verbs,—*to be, to have,* and *to do.*

It has been already observed that the difficulty experienced by the learner to comprehend the nature of a verb has arisen from making, "being and doing," it essential characteristics; and at the same time confining the character of the verb to those modifications only of the verbal noun which *predicate* "being or doing," thus contradicting in practice what had been established in theory. Nor are those who make affirmation the essential property of a verb more consistent, for they still regard the *predicate* as the verb, and make no distinction between the word which *means* "being and doing," and the SIGN which *attributes* "being and doing," to the subject.

If the essence of the verb consisted in "being and doing," and not in the power of predicating these and other attributes, then the words called verbs must, under every modification, retain their essential characteristic; but since this is not allowed to be the case, even by those grammarians who make "being and doing" the distinguishing properties of a verb, it will be necessary to consider these words as mere attributes, even in cases where affirmation is expressed by the attribute.

The verb is said to have derived its importance from the

necessity of its presence in a proposition or sentence; but whether we regard the verb as a mere sign, uniting the predicate to its subject, or as combined with the predicate, and implying "being and doing," it is not in either case more essential to the formation of a sentence, than is the subject noun, or the term employed to denote "that which is said of the noun." But admitting the verb to be the chief word in every sentence, the repetition of that fact can in no way conduce to the knowledge of the nature of the verb.

Existence is that attribute which claims precedence of all others, since it is essential to the very being of every other attribute, it is therefore either expressed or implied in every proposition:—expressed, when we say, "God is;" implied, when we say, "the sun rises;" which means, when resolved, "the sun is rising." The verb *to be* is also used simply as the sign of affirmation. In this case it does not suggest the notion of existence, but merely affirms, and by this affirmation unites the predicate to the subject, as—God is good.

Existence, considered as an attribute, gives rise to the notion of *pertaining to*, hence, the verb *to have* appears to be essentially connected with the primary attribute, and is conveniently employed as an auxiliary to complete the complex modes of existence, as— I have been, he had been.

Next in importance to the word that denotes possession is that which implies *acting* or *doing*, and its modification *to*, is employed to impart the signification, either of an act, or of a state of being to those attributes hitherto called verbs, as—TO BE, TO DO, and TO SUFFER.

SYNTAX OF VERBS.

RULE I. A verb personal must agree with its nominative case in number and person, as—I *dislike*, thou *condemnest*, he *approves*, they *judge*.

The nominative or subject of a verb may be a noun, pronoun, infinitive mood, or part of a sentence.

RULE II. When two or more subjects are connected by a copulative conjunction, the verb refers to *both*, and is therefore plural.

Ex.—"Honour and shame from no condition *rise.*"

Ex.—"The useful ARTS improved by science, and SCIENCE itself improved by philosophy, *confer* power on civilized and instructed man, and *enable* him at once to triumph over his fellows, and over nature."

RULE III. When a disjunctive conjunction connects the subjects of a sentence, the verb belongs to *one* of the subjects only, and is either singular or plural, the verb being governed by the noun or pronoun that is placed nearest to it.

Ex.—Either they or I *am* to blame;—either I or they *are* to blame.

Ex.—Neither poverty nor riches were injurious to him.

When *two* nominatives of different numbers are thus connected by a disjunctive, the *same* verb cannot agree with both. In this case the preference is commonly given to the plural, and the verb belonging to the singular is "understood," as—neither (*was*) poverty, nor *were* riches injurious to him;—either I (*am,*) or they *are* to blame.

RULE IV. A noun in the singular number, connected by a *preposition* to another noun, whether singular or plural, requires the verb to be in the singular.

Ex.—"The general *with* all his officers *has* applied for redress."

In this, and similar examples, grammarians are of opinion that the construction requires the plural form of the verb; but a noun in the objective case, governed by a preposition, cannot, consistently with the principles of grammar, become a part of the nominative, and govern the verb. If this principle were once clearly understood, there would be no difficulty in determining the construction of the following sentences:—

"The king, *with* the lords and commons, constitute, or constitutes, an excellent form of government."

The side A, *with* the sides B and C, compose, or composes, the triangle.

"My uncle, *with* his son, *was,* or *were,* in town yesterday."

In all these cases the verb should be singular, but when *the sense requires* that the nouns should be *joint subjects* to the verb, the copulative conjunction ought to be used instead of the preposition, and the difficulty would be at once removed.

The sides A, B, *and* C, form the triangle.

The king, lords, *and* commons, *constitute* an excellent form of government.

My uncle *and* his son *were* in town yesterday.

There does not appear to be any difficulty in determining whether the verb, in the preceding examples, should be singular or plural, nor is it necessary to refer to authority, "especially as our most reputable authors use sometimes the one and sometimes the other form of expression;"—a proof of the insufficiency of referring to "authority," or "reputable use," as the standard of propriety in language.

RULE V. The substantive verb "to be" requires the same case after it as before it, as—it is I; it was he; you believed it to be him. The neuter pronoun "it" means "person," as—"you believed the person to be him;" "the person was he;" "the person is I." The pronoun in this case may be transposed, and the noun person may be employed, instead of the neuter pronoun, as—I am the person; but it will be seen that the form of the *verb* is changed, because, although the cases are the same, the subjects differ in their manner of signification: this deserves attention, because the propriety of the following rule depends upon the principle which regulates the construction in this instance.

RULE VI. A verb placed between two nominatives of different numbers agrees with its *subject*, i.e. with the noun that precedes the verb.

Ex.—His meat *was* locusts and wild honey.

Ex.—Death *is* the wages of sin.

Ex.—The chief burden *is* the taxes.

In these examples the nouns that come before the verbs are the *subjects*, and those that follow the *predicates*, of the sentences.

Many of the difficulties that occur in determining the propriety of anomalous construction, would disappear, if the meaning of the word, that gave rise to the exception, were attentively examined. In the sentence, "The wages of sin *is* death," the word wages is figuratively employed, but men are not *hired* to commit sin, therefore the term wages is inappropriate. "The punishment of sin is death," "the

consequence of sin is **death,"** would be more consistent with truth and the **meaning** of the sentence.

We **cannot,** with propriety, say, "the wages of sin *are* **death,"** because the misapplication of the term "wages," is **rendered** conspicuous by the collocation, and the mind immediately perceives the disagreement, between the subject and the predicate; but we can say, "Locusts and wild honey were his food," "the taxes were the evil," because the terms "food," and "evil," are adequate expressions, and may be made the subjects, instead of being the predicates of the sentences. The verb, however, assumes the form singular, to agree with its nominatives in that number, as—his food was locusts,—the evil *was* the taxes.

RULE VII. When a noun of multitude conveys unity of idea, the verb and pronoun should be in the singular.

Ex.—The army is disbanded.

Ex.—The assembly is broken up.

Ex.—The parliament is disolved.

RULE VIII. When a noun of multitude conveys plurality of idea, the verb and pronoun should be plural,

Ex.—Why *do* the HEATHEN so furiously rage together, and why *do* the PEOPLE imagine a vain thing.

The verbs agree with the nouns ***heathen*** and ***people*** in the plural, because those words refer to the individuals, and not to the class under which the individuals are comprehended.

Some grammarians assert that it is optional whether we say, "the people *is* mad," or "the people *are* mad;"—they, however, acknowledge that the latter construction is more elegant. People is a noun, which is seldom, if ever, construed in the singular.

RULE IX. Two or more nouns representing the same person or thing require the verb to be in the singular.

Ex.—That able scholar and grammarian ***has*** been refuted.

RULE X. A verb active governs the noun that follows it, and the noun or pronoun is said to be in the objective case.

Ex.—The master punishes ***the scholar***; he corrects ***him*** for obstinacy or negligence.

RULE XI. When two verbs come together, the latter is in the infinitive mood; but the sign of the infinitive mood

is omitted after the verbs *bid, dare, need, make, see, hear, feel,* and *let,* as—he bade me do it; I heard him say it.

A verb may be known by admitting the preposition *to* before it, or by making sense with the personal pronouns, as—to come, I come, thou comest, they come.

Illustration of Verbs.

"England *is* the worst country a proud man *can exhibit* himself in. A man *may strut* in Spain, *vapour* in France, or *kick* and *cuff* the vulgar, as he *likes,* in Russia; he *may sit* erect in his palanquin in India, without dropping his eyes upon the earth he *moves* over; but if he *carries* his head in the air here, and *expects* the crowd *to make* way for him, he *will* soon *run* foul of somebody that *will make* him *repent* of his stateliness. Pride, then, it *seems,* not only *exposes* a man to contempt, but *puts* him in danger; it *is* also a very expensive frolic, if he *keeps* it up, as it *should be* kept, for what *signifies* his being proud if there *is* not somebody always present *to exercise* his pride upon? He *must,* therefore, of necessity *have* a set of humble cousins and toad-eaters about him, and as such cattle *cannot be* had for nothing in this country, he *must pay* them according to the value of their services; common trash *may be* had at a common price, but clever fellows *know* their own consequence, and *will stand* out upon terms. If Nebuchadnezzar *had* not *had* "all people, nations, and languages," at his command, he *might have* called till he was hoarse before any one *would have come to worship* his image in the plain of Dura. *Let* the proud man *take* notice, withal, that Nebuchadnezzar's image *was* made of gold, and if he *expects to be* worshipped by all people, after this fashion, and *casts* himself in the same mould, he *must* also *cast* himself in the same metal."—Cumberland.

CHAPTER IX.

ADVERBS.

"And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms, from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked how differ HONEST, HONESTLY, and HONESTY. The answer is, they are *in essence* the same; but they differ, inasmuch as HONEST is the *attributive of a substantive;* HONESTLY, *of a verb;* and HONESTY, being divested of these its attributive relations, assumes *the power of a substantive,* so as to stand by itself."—HARRIS.

AN adverb is a word or phrase added to verbs, adjectives, or adverbs, to increase or diminish the signification of those parts of speech, as—he *rides* WELL; a TRULY *benevolent mind;* a VERY *small* quantity; MORE VIRTUOUSLY inclined.

Mr. Tooke's observations on the nature of *prepositions* may be strictly applied to adverbs:—

"As the necessity of the article (or of some equivalent invention) follows from the impossibility of having in language a distinct name or particular term for each particular individual idea, so does the necessity of the preposition (or some equivalent invention) follow from the impossibility of having in language a distinct complex term for each different collection of ideas which we may have occasion to put together in discourse. The addition or subtraction of any one idea to or from a collection makes it a different collection; and (if there were degrees of impossibility) it is still more impossible to use in language a different and distinct complex term for each different and distinct collection of ideas, than it is to use a distinct particular term for each particular and individual idea. To supply, therefore, the place of the complex terms, which are wanting in a language, is the *preposition* employed; by whose aid complex terms

are prevented from being infinite or too numerous, and are used only for those collections of ideas which we have most frequently occasion to mention in discourse; and this end is obtained in the most simple manner; for having occasion, in communication, to mention a collection of ideas, for which there is no one single complex term in the language, we either take that complex term which includes the greatest number, though not all, of the ideas we would communicate, or else we take that complex term which includes all and the fewest ideas more than those we would communicate, and then by the help of the *preposition* we either make up the deficiency in the one case, or retrench the superfluity in the other."

The *use* of the *adverb* is here clearly pointed out by Mr. Tooke. The following passage from Dr. Watts will show *how* this part of speech originates, and in what respect it differs from an adjective:—

"As modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but the *modes* of other modes; for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and *directly attributed* to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body, but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or south, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man or beast, but walking *gracefully* implies a manner or mode superadded to that action."

When modes, therefore, are predicated, as subsisting in and by a substance, they are called adjectives, for they are no longer distinct objects, presented to the mind, and they thus lose their essential character as nouns, as—a *good* action; an *angry* man; *modest* behaviour.

But when a mode or quality is attributed to the mode of a noun, as—the horse runs *swiftly*, or to the *mode of a mode*, as—he writes *very correctly*, the word is called an adverb.

The difference between an adverb and an adjective is this: —the adjective modifies the noun, but the adverb modifies the adjective, or other attribute. Thus, the adverb corresponds exactly with Mr. Tooke's explanation of the use of prepositions, for when an adjective or other attributive word will not convey the exact notion of the quality or mode

predicated of a noun, the deficiency of meaning is supplied by an *adverb*, and if the word so employed be insufficient for the purpose, it may itself be modified by another adverb, to complete the signification. By this contrivance in language the want of a complex term for every complex idea is supplied.

Hence some adverbs will admit degrees of comparison, for as certain qualities, which are attributed to nouns, may be more or less, when compared with other nouns, possessing the like quality, and thus require adverbs to denote the degree, so adverbs may require other adverbs to express *more fully* the degree of the quality or circumstance represented by the principal adverb, as—often, oftener, or *more often*, oftenest or *most often*.

A preposition joined to a noun, and thus restricting its signification, does, with the noun, often supply the place of an adverb, as—in fine; by degrees; in part; &c. These phrases are equivalent in meaning to the adverbs—finally, gradually, partly.

Ex.—"We see but *in part*, and we know but *in part*, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our *partial* views."—LOCKE.

The difference between the adverbial phrase, or *extended adverb*, (if we may so call it,) and the adjective may be clearly seen in the foregoing example:—The phrase "in part," qualifies the verb; the adjective *partial* directly qualifies the noun.

Adverbs are signs of complex ideas, and may be resolved into more simple terms; but this method of explaining away the parts of speech is totally inconsistent with the science of grammar, which should teach us to understand the nature and use of words as they *exist*, and not as they *might exist*, if men thought fit to define more accurately by words their complex ideas. Many words, besides adverbs, are so contrived as to express, compendiously, in one word, what would, in a definition, have required two or more terms. This is the consequence of the composition of ideas, and very different from that kind of abbreviation, which is used merely for the sake of dispatch, for by using an adverb, instead of an equivalent phrase, ambiguity may often be prevented.

Ex.—"Somerville is the only one who has written on this subject *to be understood.*"

Who, we ask, would not prefer "written *intelligibly* on this subject?"

Again, the adverb *bravely* may be an abbreviation of bravelike, and mean in a brave manner; but the word is differently attributed in its form, as an adverb, and becomes a distinct part of speech, from its being joined to an attribute, (the verb,) as—he *fought bravely*, instead of, to a noun, as—in a brave or bravelike manner.

The termination *ly*, by which so many adverbs in English are distinguished from their corresponding adjectives, is supposed to be a corruption of *like*, but whatever might have formerly been the meaning attached to this syllable, it is now but little attended to. It seems to be used only to direct the mind to the manner in which the word is to be applied, and to show that the intention is to modify an attribute, which, by itself, would not otherwise sufficiently express the quality, action, or state, attributed to the noun, as—"a *truly* good man;" "the horse ran *swiftly*;" "the patient slept *soundly*."

The sentence in which Mr. Tooke contends for the signification of this syllable contains three adverbs, formed from adjectives by the addition of *ly*, none of which appear to have any reference to the meaning originally implied by this abbreviation.

Ex.—"All adverbs ending in *ly* are *sufficiently* understood, the termination being only the word LIKE corrupted, and the corruption so much the more *easily* and *certainly* discovered, as the termination remains more pure and distinguishable in the other sister languages."

In addition to those adverbs already noticed by italics, the word *only* occurs in the last example, and may be classed among the rest; for though Mr. Tooke has derived *only* from *one-like*, few persons now attach to the word that signification.

Hitherto we have considered adverbs as qualifying only adjectives, verbs, and other adverbs; but we have now to submit to the reader a few examples, from which it may

perhaps appear that adverbs qualify every part of speech but the noun and pronoun.

Ex.—"Let us, my dear James, get *well through* this letter."—COBBETT.

In this sentence the adverb *well* qualifies the preposition *through*, and these words combined qualify the verb "to get."

The expressions *quite through, nearly through, completely through*, sufficiently prove that the relation denoted by the word *through* will admit of various modifications; but those who still doubt the propriety of attributing an adverb to a preposition need only compare the verbs "to get well," "to grow well," "to write well," and they cannot fail to perceive that *well*, in these examples, qualifies the verb; but not so in the example from Mr. Cobbett, for to "get well through this letter," would then imply that his own and his son's recovery were to be accomplished by that means.

Ex.—"It treats *merely of* etymology and syntax."—GRANT.

The adverb, in this example, qualifies the preposition *of*,—"It treats *merely of* or *concerning* etymology and syntax."

Ex.—"We too often charge that upon the wicked contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, which arose *merely from* ignorance."—WATTS.

Here the verb is not qualified but the noun *through* a preposition. If the position of the adverb be changed it will assume the character of an adjective, and the termination *ly* will be unnecessary; the sentence will have the same meaning, though perhaps more clearly and forcibly expressed, —"That which arose from *mere* ignorance."

Ex.—"He went over sea for none other errand but to see Flanders, and to ride *out* one summer in those countries; and having one in his company that told, by the way, many strange things of the pilgrimage, he thought we would go *somewhat out of* his way," &c.

The first *out*, in this example, immediately qualifies *the verb;* the second *out* qualifies the preposition *of*, and is itself qualified by the adverb *somewhat;* these words joined to the noun and its definitive qualify, as a phrase, the verb "to go,"

i.e. he thought he would somewhat *deviate* to see these strange sights.

Ex.—"The first may be *easily* obtained from *almost* any of the common rudiments of that language, under the direction of a judicious master, but the latter can *only* be collected from conversation."—Dr. Ash.

The adverb *easily* qualifies the participle "obtained;" *almost* qualifies the definitive "any;" but the adverb *only* should stand before the preposition "from," and *through* that word qualify the noun,—"can be collected *only from* conversation," for the author did not intend to say that it could be nothing more than collected, but that conversation was the *only source* from which it could be collected.

Ex.—"I mean *only such* pleasures as arise *originally from* sight."—Addison.

The adverb *only* qualifies the definitive *such;* the adverb *originally* is perhaps redundant; as it stands it qualifies the noun, and denotes that "sight" is the *original source* whence such pleasures arise.

Ex.—"Some books are to be studied, others only to be referred to occasionally, as dictionaries, cyclopædias, &c., and others to be read *merely for* amusement."—Jennings.

If the preposition FOR be admitted to be a substitute for some more significant term, the adverb may qualify the term referred to by the preposition, as—merely *to obtain* or *derive* amusement, otherwise the noun is qualified *through* the preposition, as—other books are to be read for mere amusement; though this may not seem to convey the precise meaning of the author, it is no doubt what he intended to express, i.e. "books to be read to obtain amusement, and nothing else."

Ex.—In the present instance, *merely* for convenience, reference will be continually made to the English translation of Telemachus.

In this example the adverb qualifies the preposition *for*, and refers to the noun, "convenience," as in the second example.

Ex.—"Theism can only be opposed to polytheism."

This sentence has been corrected by Dr. Blair, who places the adverb before the preposition *to*, "only *to* polytheism."

Ex.—"This latter sound is *only tolerable* in colloquial pronunciation, and THEN *only when* used as a preposition."—WALKER.

The first *only* should stand before the preposition "*in*,"—"*only in* colloquial pronunciation." IN denotes the relation of place by referring to the *time* when the sound may be used, i.e. in or *during* colloquial pronunciation. The adverb *then* also refers to the preposition, "and THEN *only* WHEN used as a preposition." This example, if attentively considered, will convince any one that adverbs are sometimes used to qualify or restrict the meaning of prepositions.

But it does not, however, follow that an adverb placed before a preposition always belongs to it. In the following example the adverb does not qualify *the relation*, but limits *the difference* between common discourse and music.

Ex.—"Common discourse *differs* from music *only* in the number of sounds," i.e. the number of sounds is the *only difference*. The adverb obtains its place for the sake of emphasis, or to avoid ambiguity, for if the author had said "only differs," it might mean "differs, and nothing more," which is not the meaning of the writer.

Ex.—"I am *only speaking* of what they should do, who would deal fairly with their own minds."—LOCKE.

Here the adverb should be placed before the preposition, i.e. *only of*, or *concerning*, what they should do.

Ex.—Persons "who do not read *merely with* the intention of killing time."—CAMPBELL.—i.e. *merely having* that intention, or *with* the *mere* intention of killing time.

Ex.—"Such roots as have been naturalized in the form of entire or separate words, have been adopted into the language *without* ALMOST *any* change."—M'CULLOCH.

The adverb *almost* qualifies the definitive any. There are few readers perhaps who would not prefer the position of the adverb before the preposition; "almost without any change;" with *scarcely any* change, is the preferable phraseology.

Ex.—"Our inquiry is *solely about* what may be imitated by articulate sounds."—CAMPBELL.—i.e. solely concerning.

Ex.—"Though he fall, he shall not utterly be cast down."

If the verb be considered a compound active verb, which

is usually the case when the *preposition* qualifies the verb, then the adverb may be placed before the participle, as—he shall not be utterly cast down. The adverb, however, does not modify the verb "cast," but the preposition "down;" "he shall not be cast *utterly down*."

Ex.—"And this you may very consistently do, *even though* you should consider them *merely the* avant couriers, to announce the approach or entrance of a noun."—TOOKE.

The adverb *even*, in this example, qualifies the conjunction "*though*;" the adverb *merely* appears to qualify the article, but in fact it belongs to the noun, "the *mere* avant couriers."

Ex.—"We do indeed see all the outward marks of respect bestowed upon persons, *merely because* they are rich and powerful."—COBBETT.

The adverb "merely" qualifies the conjunction *because*, and the phrase, "merely because," is equivalent to "the *mere* cause being" they are rich and powerful.

Ex.—"I conceived the notion, that Peter was in the nominative, *only because* no action was mentioned at all in the sentence."—COBBETT, i.e. "The only cause being."

But we shall give one more example, in which the reader will clearly perceive the connection between the adverb and this conjunction.

Ex.—We see daily, or rather weekly, that medical writers denounce, as unprincipled, such men as —— and —— *because* they held office in the central board, *because*, and apparently, *merely because* they occupied stations which were supposed to have attached to them valuable emoluments.

It may be observed, that Dr. Johnson* appears to favour this opinion respecting the use of adverbs, before indeclinable words, and if Mr. Tooke's theory be correct, there seems to be no reason why any one should hesitate to admit the propriety of extending the application of adverbs to prepositions, conjunctions, and definitives in general.

Should our view of this subject be consistent with the principles of construction, and if the fact, that the adverb qualifies every part of speech except the noun and pronoun

* "OUT *of*—prep.—*of* seems to be the preposition, and *out* only to modify the sense of it."—JOHNSON.

has been proved by the examples quoted, it may be presumed that the difficulties so often experienced by writers in *placing* adverbs in a sentence, will be in a great measure, if not altogether, removed.

Besides those adverbs which are added to modify the attributes of a noun, there are others which denote order, time, place, distance, motion, relation, quantity, comparison, doubt, affirmation, negation, demonstration, interrogation—in fact, the diversity of words classed by grammarians as adverbs, fully justifies the "*free* translation of Servius," given by Mr. Tooke in his Diversions of Purley.

"Every word," says that sarcastic writer, "*quando desinit esse quod est*, when a grammarian knows not what to make of it, *migrat in adverbium*, he calls an ADVERB."

SYNTAX OF ADVERBS.

This part of speech has no government; the chief thing to be attended to is its position in a sentence, and it may be remarked, that no word requires more care in this respect than the adverb. Perspicuity of style, and force of expression, depend in a great measure on the use of this *necessary* part of speech.

The adverb being in its nature, so nearly allied to the adjective is in general subject to the same rule of position, it being commonly placed before the word it qualifies, as—"a *very* excellent discourse;" "*more viciously* disposed."

Ex.—"The subject has been *thoroughly* investigated, and the truth *fully* developed."

The place of the adverb may in general be ascertained by considering what word it is intended to qualify. But not unfrequently, for the sake of emphasis, from usage, or to avoid ambiguity, the adverb follows the verb to which it belongs, or is placed at a distance from it.

Ex.—"To express the degree of difference between things precisely and forcibly we must employ distinct phrases,"

In this example the adverbs qualify the infinitive mood at the beginning of the sentence.

"We would recommend," says Dr. Crombie, "that when the adverb refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed at the beginning of a sentence or clause; where it refers to a predicate, it precede the predicating term, and when it has reference to a subject, it follow its name or description."

Adverbs are often improperly used for adjectives, and adjectives for adverbs.

Ex.—"He behaved himself *conformable* to that great example."

Ex.—Their determination was conformably to the best usage.

In the first of these examples the word conformable qualifies the preterite, and requires the adverbial form, "conformably."

In the next example the word conformably *is* the predicate, and should be the adjective, "conformable."

"An adverb may be *generally* known by its answering to the question how? how much? when? or where? as in the phrase. He reads *correctly*, the answer to the question. How does he read? is correctly."—MURRAY.

ILLUSTRATION OF ADVERBS.

"Under the flattering prospects we adore
There often lurks a danger, *not* perceived;
And were we *never* thwarted in our course
Salvation must miscarry. Mercy, *then*,
Is the foundation and effectual spring
Of all events, which seem the work of chance.
The man repulsed is *but* the child refused,
The dangerous weapon which may wound himself."

The above illustration, though containing but few adverbs, is judged sufficient, since this is a part of speech of such frequent occurrence, that examples may be found in the pages of every writer.

CHAPTER X.

PREPOSITIONS.

"'Tis easy for men to write, one after another, of *cases* and *genders*, *moods* and *tenses*, *gerunds* and *supines*. In these, and the like, there has been great diligence used. But though PREPOSITIONS and CONJUNCTIONS are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions, yet he who would shew the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains; enter into his own thoughts; and observe, nicely, the several postures of his mind in discoursing." LOCKE.

CONVINCED of the importance of fixing, as nearly as possible, a determinate signification to the *indeclinable* parts of speech, we will not assert, in treating of prepositions, that "it is not so much their* *meaning* with which the grammarian is concerned, as their syntactical character, their capacity of affecting other words, or being affected by them." This would be declining a point of the utmost importance, and the neglect of investigating which has, hitherto, caused the difficulty of ascertaining the use and just application of these words.

Mr. Tooke was the first who attempted to expose the method of explaining the origin and nature of these particles. The celebrity his work on language has acquired is perhaps the best proof of the success of his investigations. That writer, with a spirit of inquiry, evincing at once the strength and independence of his mind, and his zeal for the true principles of science, disdained to adopt the opinions of

* "The grammarian says it is none of his business, but that it belongs to the philosopher, and for that reason, only, he omits giving an account of them. Whilst the philosopher avails himself of his dignity, and when he meets with a stubborn difficulty which he cannot unravel, *(and only then,)* disdains to be employed about *words*, although they are the necessary channel through which his most precious liquors must flow".—TOOKE.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF PREPOSITIONS.

1. Down.	7. Above.	13. About.	19. After.	25. Through.	31. Below.
2. To.	8. Into.	14. Against.	20. Betwixt.	26. Beyond.	32. Over.
3. From.	9. In.	15. Within.	21. Near.	27. To.	33. Before.
4. Between.	10. On.	16. Without.	22. Under.	28. From.	34. Amidst.
5. Upon.	11. Out Of.	17. Beside.	23. Along.	29. At.	35. Among.
6. Up.	12. Out.	18. Away.	24. Across.	30. Above.	36. Behind.

others, *because they were established.* He boldly ventured to question the truth of those instructions which he did not comprehend, and he has set before us an example which may serve as some excuse for freely examining the opinions of even so reputable a writer as himself.

Prepositions may be conveniently divided into two classes.

First. Those which denote the relations of place, and which, when thus employed, have always a determinate and uniform signification. These have been aptly called *local* prepositions; they are often used adverbially to modify the signification of another word, as—to walk *about;* to laugh *at;* to bear *out;* to cast *up;* to carry *off.*

The meanings of *local* prepositions are so evident, and are, in general, so clearly understood, that examples to illustrate their several significations can scarcely be considered requisite. To those, however, who are not accustomed to inquiries of this kind, the following poetical list of English prepositions may be of service; and it is hoped, (with the assistance of the spirited engraving, illustrating the relations denoted by the greater part of these words,) that their meaning will be readily imprinted on the mind of the impractised reader.

List of Prepositions.

" Along, among, above, about,
Against, amongst, concerning, out,
After, at, behind, before,
Below, beneath, beside, and for,
Besides, between, betwixt, and by,
Beyond, off, unto, over, nigh,
During, from, within, and through,
For, near, since, of, in, into,
Till, to, with, without, upon,
Until, under, toward, on."

Relations, it has been observed, are the most abstract and metaphysical ideas of any which men have occasion to form, when they are considered by themselves, and separated from the related object. It would puzzle any man to give a distinct account of what is meant by such words as *of* or

from, when it stands by itself, and to explain all that may be included under it. But this difficulty does not extend in an equal degree to all prepositions; thus, in the local prepositions *before* and *near* the relations of priority and proximity are sufficiently evident, even when the prepositions are unconnected with the objects to which they may be applied.

The second class of prepositions denote less obvious relations, and being less determinate in their signification are commonly used with greater latitude. Among this class are included many of the local prepositions employed in a figurative sense. For example, the preposition *in* was originally designed to express the circumstance of place, as—"the man was killed *in* the wood." "In progress of time," says the writer who furnishes this example, "words were wanted to express men's being connected with certain conditions of fortune, or certain situations of mind; and some resemblance or analogy being fancied between these and the place of bodies, the word *in* was employed to express men's being so circumstanced; as—one's being *in* health, or *in* sickness; *in* prosperity, or *in* adversity; *in* joy, or *in* grief; *in* doubt, or *in* danger, or *in* safety. Here we see this preposition IN plainly assuming a tropical signification, or carried off from its original meaning, to signify something else which relates to or resembles it."

In sometimes denotes the relation of time, as—*in* the mean time.

Ex.—*In* the beginning God created, i.e. *during* that period called the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

The prepositions which we purpose more particularly to examine are, by, with, without, from, to, on, off, near, at, of, and for.

BY.

BY is a modification, or, according to Mr. Tooke's theory, *a corruption* of the imperative of the verb *beon*, to be. It is a substitute for the present participle "being," and in its primary signification it connects the agent or doer to the passive form of the verb. *By* has, however, less force of

signification than the verb, and simply *unites* the agent to the object and its attribute, without suggesting the notions of affirmation, time, or existence.

Ex.—England was invaded *by* Julius Cæsar, i.e. the invader *being* Julius Cæsar. And here it may be observed that as the force of signification in the connective is increased, the union becomes less perfect. Thus, if existence, time, and affirmation be added, and the preposition be superseded by the verb, a distinct sentence is formed, and the union is destroyed.

England was invaded. The invader *was* Julius Cæsar.

That the preposition has a separate manner of signification, distinct from the participle, is obvious, from the fact that it is often used in connection with it.

Ex.—"How can a thing be said to rest or stop *by being* in one place for one instant only".—HARRIS.

By is sometimes used for during, as—by day, and by night, i.e. during day, and during night.

WITH and WITHOUT.

Mr. Tooke derives with from "withan" *to join*, as—a house *with* a party wall, i.e. a house *join* a party wall.

We do not dispute the correctness of this derivation, we merely question its utility. For no one now applies that meaning to the preposition, neither does any one attribute to it the *imperative* manner of signification which it formerly possessed. *With* has generally the power of a present participle, as—a house *with*, or *having*, a party wall; a man *with* a clear conscience, or *having* a clear conscience; a soldier *with* a musket, or *having* a musket; I wrote these sentences *with* a pen, or *having* a pen.

Without, when it does not denote the relation of place, is equivalent to *not having*, as—a house without a party wall, i.e. not having a party wall; a picture without a frame, not having a frame; an assemblage of words without a verb, i.e. not having a verb.

Much of the intricacy of composition is connected with this indeclinable part of speech. When a writer or speaker

wishes to include under one affirmation any object or circumstance not immediately connected with the principal subject and its attribute, he in general has recourse to this kind of abbreviation.

Ex.—"The sale *of* twelve very large impressions, *within* a few years, *of* the Eton Latin Grammar, *with* notes, *for* the use *of* schools, is the best evidence *of* the continued approbation *of* the public."—MAVOR.

The connection of the foregoing sentence, in which several nouns are introduced, is chiefly maintained by prepositions.

When we form a sentence, says Mr. Harris, the substantive, without difficulty, coincides with the verb, from the natural coincidence of substance and energy—*the sun warmeth.* So likewise the energy with the subject on which it operates—*warmeth the earth.* So likewise both substance and energy with their proper attributes,—*the splendid sun genially warmeth the fertile earth.* But suppose we were desirous to add other substantives, as, for instance, *air* and *beams.* How would these coincide, or under what character could they be introduced? Not as nominatives or accusatives, for those places are already filled; the nominative by the substance *sun,* the accusative by the substance *earth.* Not as attributes to these last, or to any other thing, for attributes, by nature, they neither are nor can be made. Here, then, we perceive the rise and use of *prepositions.* By these we connect those substantives to sentences which, at the time, are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume, for instance, a pair of these connectives, *through* and *with,* and mark their effect upon the substances here mentioned. "*The splendid sun,* WITH *his beams, genially warmeth* THROUGH *the air the fertile earth.* The sentence, as before, remains intire and one; the substantives required are both introduced, and not a word which was there before is detruded from its proper place."

With is often used for *by* to connect the means or instrument by which a state of being or an effect is produced; as in the above example, the sun is the agent, and *his* beams are the instrument *by* means of which the fertile earth is warmed. Had *by* been used instead of *with,* the direct agency of the sun would have been less forcibly expressed.

This nice distinction between *by* and *with* has been noticed by Blair in his Lectures on Rhetoric. "Both these particles express the connection between some instrument, or means of effecting an end, and the agent who employs it; but *with* expresses *a more close* and *immediate* connection; *by* a more remote one."

Ex.—The criminal is bound *with* ropes *by* the executioner.

We have shown under the preposition *by* that the force of signification is increased, and the connection diminished, by employing the participle, or the verb, instead of the preposition. We will now endeavour to shew that when the signification in the connecting parts of a sentence is diminished, the union is rendered more compact:—

A house *that has not* a chimney is incomplete.

A house *not having* a chimney is incomplete.

A house *without* a chimney is incomplete.

There is no difference in the meaning of these sentences, but the first contains *two assertions*, and the connection is maintained by the relative pronoun *that*; in the last the object is connected by the preposition, and included with the subject and predicate under *one* assertion. The same connection is effected by using the participles instead of equivalent prepositions.

Ex.—The fears of my printer do not permit me to expose the circumstances, *producing*, *preceding*, *accompanying*, and *following* my strange trial of six days for high treason; that is, the circumstances *of*, and those which occurred *before*, *at*, and *after* my strange trial of six days for high treason.

From and To.

From denotes the relation which a nominative bears to an object, from which it has been separated, or has a tendency to leave; it also directs the mind to the object with which the nominative was formerly associated, and refers to it as the *source* whence the nominative originally proceeded, as—rain comes *from* the clouds; the bird flies *from* the nest.

"*From* relates to every thing to which beginning relates, and therefore is referable to time as well as to motion, without which, indeed, there can be no time."

Ex.—From morn till night th' eternal larum rang.

To denotes the relation which the nominative bears to an object towards which it is directed, or has a tendency to approach, as—the king is travelling *to* Brighton; the bird is flying *to* its nest.

Ex.—He went *from* London *to* York.

These prepositions are opposed to each other, and have a general reference to past and future. *From* denotes that the relation of possession or co-existence between the nominative and its source is *past*. *To* denotes that the approach of the nominative and its object is *to come*.

Since.

Since refers to an event or circumstance, and denotes the lapse of an era as yet incomplete, and from which period, to the present moment, the existence or non-existence of some event or circumstance is affirmed, as—corn has been cheaper *since* the peace.

On and Off.

On denotes contact and support, as—*on* the ceiling; *on* the ground. Off implies separation, as—*off* the shoulders.

These prepositions are opposed to each other. For example, the statue is *off* the pedestal, and *on* the ground. Are spirituous liquors to be drunk *on* the premises, or *off* the premises?

Off is more commonly used as an adverb than as a preposition; but whether used alone, or in composition, it means, either literally or figuratively, disjunction, absence, privation, or distance.

NEAR and AT.

NEAR denotes the relation of proximity, and the propriety of its use depends on the objects compared. Thus, the sun is *near* the earth if its distance be compared with that of some of the fixed stars. But the sun is not *near* the earth if we compare the earth's distance from the sun with that which separates terrestial objects. A person may, perhaps, be said to be *near* home when within a hundred yards of his habitation, but if he be terminating a long journey, he would probably consider himself *near* home, though distant some miles from the place of his abode. Hence, this preposition admits degrees of comparison, as—near, nearer, nearest, and is therefore considered by some grammarians to be an adjective.

Ex.—Turnham Green is *near* London, Kensington is *nearer*, but Knightsbridge is *nearest*.

Near is sometimes used for the adverb nearly.

AT denotes the *place* which terminates the approach or approximation of one body to another. It denotes the presence of the subject in the immediate vicinity of its object; thus, we arrive *at* a town before we enter.

Ex.—He arrived *at* the door, and entered the house.

AT also denotes the boundaries which include a period of time, as—he came *at* nine, and left *at* four.

AT is frequently used instead of a more significant term, as—he is *at* the play, i.e. seeing or hearing the play; at supper, i.e. eating his supper.

This preposition is likewise used adverbially to restrict the signification of the verb, as—the plaintiff was *struck at*, but not *struck* by the defendant; the bird was *shot at*, but not *shot* by the sportsman.

Ex.—"Colloquial pronunciation, which is perfect, is so much the language of solemn speaking, that, perhaps, there is no more difference than between the same picture painted to be viewed *near* and *at* a distance."—WALKER.

The prepositions *near* and *at* in this example, denote the relation of place, and may, with propriety, be denominated local prepositions.

OF.

OF, in its primary signification denotes the relation of property or possession, as—the crown of the king of England; that is, the crown *belonging to*, or *possessed by*, the king.

When the *names* of *two* objects are used to designate *one* individual, the noun, governed by the preposition, becomes, a definitive to the principal term, and thus loses its independent character as a noun, as—the letters *of* Cicero. The preposition *of* is here equivalent to that sign by which the English genitive is expressed; for, instead of—the letters *of* Cicero, we may, with equal propriety, say—Cicero's letters."

But if a property or quality be inherent, or supposed to be inherent, in the noun, the noun itself is the possessor, and the definitive cannot, with propriety, be put in the possessive case, for the quality *pertains* to the noun. This relation, therefore, is more correctly expressed by an adjective. Thus, instead of—a man *of* virtue, we say—*a virtuous man;* a mind of activity—*an active mind.* That is, a man *possessing* virtue, and not *possessed by*, or *belonging to*, virtue. For we cannot say—virtue's man; activity's mind. This *figurative* mode of expressing these qualities would NOW scarcely be tolerated.

OF has a variety of less determinate significations than that which implies property or possession, as—a glass *of* wine; a cup *of* coffee; a hogshead *of* sugar. Here the nouns *containing* denote the *quantities* of the substances which they contain. The name of the substance is joined by the preposition, to show to what class of substances the *quantity* belongs. The wine-glass, the coffee-cup, and the hogshead, are not the subjects spoken of, but the *quantities* of wine, of coffee, and of sugar, which those vessels contain. We cannot, therefore, say—the wine's glass, the coffee's cup, the sugar's hogshead; since wine, coffee, and sugar, are not used as the definitives of the nouns to which they are united.

In the following example *of* is used strictly as a connective, for in no instance can it, with propriety, be turned into the English genitive.

Ex.—" *Of* some *of* the books *of* each *of* these classes *of* literature, a catalogue will be given at the end *of* the work."

OF sometimes means producing, or which produced.

Ex.—"The causes *of* great events are often regarded with more intense interest than the events themselves;" i.e. the causes producing, or which produced, great events are often, &c.

OF sometimes means concerning.

"OF man's first disobedience, and the fruit of that forbidden tree." The first *of* means *concerning*, the second *belonging to*.

"OF is so vague in its signification that it may be used for many of the other prepositions. Thus, we can say—a descendant of or from; a friend of or to; hatred of or for; an associate of or with; beloved of or by, &c. But possession is probably its original signification, in common with that of the termination of the possessive case, to which it is equivalent."—M'CULLOCH.

FOR.

Mr. Tooke has pointed out an error committed by some grammarians who have attempted to explain the meaning of prepositions. These writers either attribute to the preposition the signification expressed by the verb which accompanies it, or they transfer to the preposition the meaning of some other word in the sentence.

"If," says Mr. Harris, "we say—that lamp hangs from the ceiling, the preposition *from* assumes a character of quiescence; but if we say that lamp is falling from the ceiling, the preposition in such cases assumes a character of motion. So in Milton.—

> 'To support uneasy steps
> *Over* the burning marle'.

Here *over* denotes motion. Again.—

> 'He, with looks of cordial love,
> Hung *over* her enamoured.'

Here *over* denotes rest."

The reader will perceive that *over* refers simply to the relation of place, and that *motion* is suggested in the first

example by the noun *steps*, and that, in the last instance, *rest* is implied in the verb hung. But Mr. Tooke seems to have committed as great an error respecting the true character of these words, when he ascribed one and the same meaning as invariably denoted by the same preposition.

The word FOR, says Mr. Tooke, means cause, and among other examples, taken from Johnson and Greenwood, he adduces the following:—

"Christ died *for* us (i.e. cause us or we being the cause of his dying.")

"To fight *for* the public good, (i.e. cause the public, or the public good being the cause of fighting.")

"I cannot *for* my life, (i.e. my life being the cause,) or to save my life being the cause why I should do it, i.e. though my life were at stake."

"Chelsea hospital was built *for* disabled soldiers, i.e. disabled soldiers being the cause of its being built."

"The soldier fights *for* the king, i.e. the king being the cause of his fighting."

> "O *for* a muse of fire that would ascend,
> The brightest heaven of invention."

"That is, O! I wish for a muse of fire &c., i.e. a muse of fire being the cause of my wishing."

"Some of the philosophers have run so far back *for* arguments of comfort against pain, as to doubt whether there were any such thing, (i.e. arguments of comfort against pain the cause of running so far back.")

> "It were not *for* your quiet nor your good,
> Nor *for* my manhood, honesty, and widom,
> To let you know my thoughts."

"That is, your quiet is a cause, your good is a cause, my manhood, my honesty, my wisdom, each is a cause, why it is not fit or proper to let you know my thoughts."

We shall content ourselves with the foregoing examples, although Mr. Tooke has occupied nearly *fifty pages* of his first volume with extracts and remarks on this single preposition.

For is a preposition which has in itself no fixed meaning. It resembles a pronoun, and is put in the place of another word. It is generally employed to suggest an infinitive or

verbal noun, as—"Christ died *for* us," i.e. "*to save*," or "*to redeem*" us. Here, the preposition *for* does not mean *cause*, but refers to the *object* to be attained by the sacrifice of Christ, viz., the *salvation* of mankind.

To fight *for* the public good, i.e. "*to protect*," "*to promote*," or "*to preserve*" the public good. The *preservation* of the public good being the *object* which induces honourable men to fight.

I cannot *for* my life, i.e. if it were "*to save*" my life; but "*my life*" is not the *cause* why I cannot; nor does *for* in this example indicate, in the remotest degree, *the cause* of the impossibility.

Chelsea hospital was built *for* disabled soldiers, i.e. "*to contain*," "*to shelter*," or "*to succour*" disabled soldiers.

The soldier fights *for* the king, i.e. "*to protect*," or "*to support*" the king.

> "O *for* a muse of fire that would ascend
> The brightest heaven of invention."

That is, O! "*to obtain*," or "*to possess*" a muse of fire.

"Some of the philosophers have run so far back *for* arguments of comfort against pain, as to doubt whether there were any such thing," i.e. "*to obtain*," or "*to procure*" arguments against pain.

> "It were not *for* your quiet nor your good,
> Nor *for* my manhood, honesty, and wisdom,
> To let you know my thoughts."

That is, "*to secure*," "*to restore*," or "*to ensure*" your quiet nor your good; nor "*to prove*," or "*to evince*" my manhood, honesty, and wisdom, TO LET you know my thoughts.

In this example, the infinitive "*to let*," may be represented by the preposition *for*, as—"*for* you *to know* my thoughts." The emphasis is now removed to the subsequent verb, and the sign of the infinitive becomes necessary,—"for you *to know* my thoughts."

We shall add a few more examples in disproof of what has been advanced by Mr. Tooke, respecting the primary signification of this preposition.

Ex.—"A motion was made *for* an order *for* a writ *for* the election of a burgess *for* to serve in parliament *for* the borough of Old Sarum."

However plausibly the several *objects* might be assigned in this example as *causes*, it is evident that the preposition *for* is not intended to express that relation. The motion was "*to obtain*" an order; the order "*to procure*" a writ; the writ "*to authorise*" an election; the election "*to enable*" a burgess to serve in parliament, "*to represent*" the borough of Old Sarum.

Ex.—"The prepositions were originally, and *for* a long time, classed with the conjunctions."—TOOKE.

Ex.—He has every thing he wishes *for*, and still he is not satisfied.

For, in these sentences, cannot mean cause; in the latter it is used to avoid the repetition of the verb. He *has* every thing he wishes *to have*, and still he is not satisfied.

FOR, when used as a conjunction, means *because*, and it was this signification, probably, that induced Mr. Tooke to attribute the meaning of *cause* to the preposition.

When we say that prepositions supply the place of more significant terms, we do not intend to assert that the more significant terms are present in the mind of the speaker, or are suggested to the hearer by the use of prepositions. So vivid a representation of the significant term would be inconsistent with the character assigned to this part of speech. It is the peculiar property of "words, used for other words," to express the idea less distinctly; they are, therefore, used with greater latitude, and have commonly a variety of significations.

SYNTAX OF PREPOSITIONS.

RULE I. Prepositions retain the power they originally possessed as participles, and, like active verbs, require the noun or pronoun to be in the objective case, as—"between you and me;" "before him or her;" "after them."

RULE II. Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to the words they govern. By not attending to this

rule, the construction is often rendered obscure and inelegant.

Ex.—The ignorance of the age, in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow of this new invention.

It should be, "rendered the progress of this new invention very slow."

In some cases, however, the preposition *follows* the word it governs, and is placed at the end of the clause or sentence; but this construction is commonly avoided by accurate writers.

Ex.—This is the subject which they differed *on*, i e. on which they differed.

Prepositions often serve to modify verbs, and when thus employed, they may be classed among adverbs, as—*to smile on, to laugh at.*

"Verbs," says Mr. Murray, "are often compounded of a verb and a preposition, as—to uphold, to invest, to overlook; and this composition sometimes gives a new sense to the verb, as—to understand, to withdraw, to forgive;* but, in English, the preposition is more frequently placed after the verb, and separately from it, like an adverb, in which situation it is not less apt to affect the sense of it, and to give it a new meaning, and may still be considered as belonging to the verb, and as a part of it."

The obscure signification attached to the indeclinable parts of speech, renders them very liable to misapplication; and the want of uniformity, among good writers, in the use of some of these words, furnishes the grammarian with a pretence to refer to authority in cases of doubtful construction, and to consider reputable use as the only standard of propriety in language.

The utility of prepositions, and the inconvenience of omitting them, has been humorously exemplified by Shakespeare, and the passage may not be considered an inappropriate ILLUSTRATION OF PREPOSITIONS—

* Compare this sentence with the example from Dr. Lowth, page 87.

PETRUCHIO AND GRUMIO.

PET.—Verona, *for* a while, I take my leave,
To see my friends *in* Padua; but of all
My best beloved and approved friend
Hortensio; and I trow, this is the house;
Here, sirrah Grumio; knock, I say.

GRU.—Knock, sir? whom should I knock? is there any man has rebused your worship?

PET.—Villian, I say, *knock me* here soundly.

GRU.—*Knock you* here, sir? why, sir, what am I, sir, I should *knock you* here, sir?

PET.—Villian, I say, *knock me at* this gate,
And *rap me* well, or I'll knock your knave's pate.
* * * * * * * *
A senseless villian!—Good Hortensio,
I bade the rascal knock *upon* your gate,
And could not get him *from* my heart *to* do it.

GRU.—Knock *at* the gate? O heavens! Spake you not these words plain.—*Sirrah, knock me here, rap me here, knock me well, and knock me soundly?*

Taming of the Shrew, Act I. sc. 2.

In this illustration, the reader will perceive that the omission of the preposition *for*, causes the ambiguity complained of by Grumio,—"Knock *for* me *at* the gate."

CHAPTER XI.

CONJUNCTIONS.

"The words, whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called *particles*,* and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style."—LOCKE.

THE character of conjunctions is taken from their power to connect the phrases or members of a compound sentence. Their primitive forms were the present and past participles, and the infinitive and imperative moods of verbs. Some of these parts of the verb are still employed in connecting words and phrases to the affirmative clause of a sentence.

Ex.—I think myself happy, King Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee, *touching* all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews.

It has been shown that many of these participial conjunctions, divested of their verbal character by modification, have been retained in the language after the verb, in its primitive form, ceased to be employed. These are the indeclinable conjunctions, and they, for the most part, admit a variety of significations.

Mr. Tooke, however, denies that conjunctions are a separate sort of words or part of speech, for, says he, "they have not a separate *manner* of signification, although they are not devoid of signification."

That conjunctions have a separate manner of signification (however nearly they may be allied to their primitives in

* Most grammarians content themselves with calling the indeclinable parts of speech *particles*,—"A good convenient name," says Mr. Tooke, "for all words which we do not understand; for, as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no description, it will equally suit any short word we may please to refer thither."

meaning,) we think it will not be difficult to prove, and though it be admitted they are not entirely devoid of signification, still we agree with Mr. Harris, that many of these, and other indeclinable words, have, at best, but an "obscure signification." Those who echo Mr. Tooke's assertions, and contend that an *obscure* signification is no signification at all, would do well, first, to show the precise meanings of these words. If they are unable to do this, we may conclude that Mr. Harris had at least some foundation for his opinion respecting these particles.

Having briefly stated the opinions of Mr. Tooke and Mr. Harris, we shall proceed to notice the greater part of those words which have been classed by grammarians as indeclinable conjunctions.

AND.

The use of the conjunction *and* corresponds more nearly with the name given to this part of speech, than does any other of its class. It serves to connect words and sentences, and is equivalent to the verb *add*. The reader will, however, observe that it has not the same *force* of signification.

Ex.—"A sentence is an assemblage of words expressed in proper form, *and* ranged in proper order, *and* concurring to make a complete sense."

By substituting the more significant term *add*, in the foregoing example, the members or clauses will be rendered less connected, and the repetition of the *imperative conjunction* becomes displeasing, *add* ranged in proper order, *add* concurring &c.

Ex.—In the beginning God created the heaven *add* the earth, *add* the earth was without form *add* void, *add* darkness was upon the face of the deep.

The tautology in this example is not perceived in the original, because the mind is not called upon to supply the force of signification to the conjunction. The principal ideas are also more readily united by the conjunction, than they would have been, if the verb had been used. "*And* the earth was without form *and* void, *and* darkness was upon

the face of the deep." But if the emphasis or meaning of the conjunction were rendered more conspicuous, it would necessarily detract from that rapid enunciation of ideas which is so desirable in the communication of our thoughts. One example more will, perhaps, sufficiently prove the inconvenience of using a more significant term, in place of the conjunction.

Ex.—*Add* we have greatly benefitted by those languages, *add* have improved our own language by borrowing from them a more abbreviated *add* compact method of speech; *add* had our earlier or later authors known the benefits we were receiving, we might have benefitted much more.

This example will, perhaps, be sufficient to satisfy the reader that conjunctions are almost, if not altogether, indispensable in the communication of our thoughts.

The conjunction *and* joins words as well as sentences.

Ex.—Two and two are four.

Ex.—A B, and B C, and C D, form a triangle.

The power of *and*, as a conjunction, is, perhaps, more clearly seen in the foregoing examples, (adduced by Mr. Tooke, to disprove its separate manner of signification,) than when the word is employed to connect sentences.

If and An.

"The conjunctions *if* and *an*," says Dr. Darwin," are shown by Mr. Tooke, to be derived from the imperative mood of the verbs, "to give," and "to grant;" but both these conjunctions, by long use, appear to have become the name of a more abstract idea, than the words *give* and *grant* suggest, as they do not now express any ideas of person, or of number, or of time, all which are generally attendant upon the meaning of a verb; and, perhaps, all the words of this class, are the names of ideas much abstracted, which has caused the difficulty of explaining them."

These few remarks contain, perhaps, more of the philosophy of language, than will be found in many of the best attested derivations of the author, who has attempted to affix to these indeclinable words determinate ideas. For, when

the force of indeclinable words is increased, the application of such terms becomes restricted, and it may well be doubted whether it would be advantageous, or tend to promote the freedom of discourse, if the primitive signification of these indeclinable words were again more generally and clearly understood.

The particle *an* being now obsolete, or nearly so,* we shall confine our remarks to the conjunction *if*.

"IF," says Mr. Tooke, "is merely the imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb *gifan*, and accordingly our corrupted *if* has always the signification of the English imperative *give*, and no other." Mr. Tooke quotes the following example,—

> My largesse
> Hath lotted her to be your brother's mistresse.
> *Gif* she can be reclained; *gif* not his prey.

"And here," says Mr. Tooke, "as an additional proof, we may observe, that whenever the datum upon which any conclusion depends is a sentence, the article *that*, if not expressed, is always understood, and may be inserted after *if*, as in the instance produced above; the poet might have said —gif that she can be reclaimed, &c."

"For the resolution is—she can be reclaimed, 'Give that my largesse hath lotted her to be your brothers's mistresse, she cannot be reclaimed.'—*Give that* my largesse hath lotted her to be your brother's prey."

The reader will perceive that Mr. Tooke, by his method of resolution, has taken away the manner of signification from the conjunction; and by giving it the force of an imperative, he has altered the construction of the poet's sentences. There is no one can doubt but the derivation of *if* from *gifen* is correct, but the manner of signification is not the same, for the conjunction ceases to be a verb when it is no longer used *imperatively*. It has also received a modification which so far *obliterates* its primitive meaning as to render it fit for the purpose it now serves.

IF qualifies an assertion, and renders it conditional. It also connects the condition on which the assertion depends.

* "An for *if*, is still retained in our address to royalty—'An't please your majesty:' and in Scotland is in general use."—CROMBIE.

Ex.—I will go to-morrow, if it do not rain.

Ex.—If we say we have no sin, the truth is not in us.

In the last example the condition is first expressed, and then followed by the assertion it modifies; but the first member of the sentence is not affirmative, being modified by the conjunction *if*, and the last is only conditionally negative, depending on the contingence, that "we say we have no sin.."

The conjunction *if* is often used improperly for conjunctions which qualify and connect the tenses of the indicative mood, as—if it rains, I shall not go, instead of *since* it rains I shall not go, or *seeing* it rains I shall not go.

In the following examples, from Mr. Harris and Blair, the conjunction *if* seems incorrectly employed.

"*If* men *are* by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the laws of their country;" it should be,—*since* men are by nature social, &c.

Ex.—"And if this was the case, as they have shown."—BLAIR.

The *if* should be *as*, or some other affirmative conjunction;—"and *as* this was the case, &c."

UNLESS.—LEST.

Mr. Tooke attributes the same meaning to *lest* as he does to *unless*, yet any one, with an ordinary knowledge of the nature of prefixes, may perceive that *unless* has a negative signification, which *lest* has not.

In two of the three examples quoted by Mr. Tooke from G. Douglas, the word *les* is followed by the negative *than;* and in the first example *les* has the affirmative signification of *still*. If Mr. Tooke had perceived the force of the particle *than*, and its connection with *les*, he would probably have given a different interpretation to the verb *lesan*, which has no prefix to entitle it to the same signification as *on*lesan or *dis*miss.

Unless has nearly the same meaning as the conjunction *if*, with the adverb *not*.

Ex.—I will go unless I be ill, i.e. I will go *if* I be *not* ill.

Ex.—Ye shall die unless ye repent, i.e. ye shall die *if* ye do *not repent*, or ye shall die, but *not if* ye repent. The conjunction *but* is necessary when the adverb is put before the conditional conjunction, for the negative then obtains its full force as an adverb, and is rendered unfit to connect the conditional clause of the compound sentence. "Ye shall die not if ye repent" would be abrupt, though the meaning would be precisely the same as "ye shall die unless ye repent."

LEST is affirmative, and connects the cause, or anticipated contingency, with the prior member of a compound sentence, but it does not, like *unless*, render the prior assertion contingent or conditional.

Ex.—"There is danger *lest* it be new without novelty."—JOHNSON.

Ex.—Ye shall die *lest* ye be polluted.

Ex.—Yea speedily was he taken away *lest* that wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul.

The reader has only to vary the conjunctions in the foregoing examples, and he will find that they have not an equivalent signification. For "ye shall die *unless* ye be polluted," would signify that ye shall *not* die, if that contingency exist; whereas, in the example, the assertion is peremptory, notwithstanding the cause itself is spoken of indefinitely, as a probability, and not as a circumstance actually existing, but as one that *may* exist, therefore "ye shall die *lest* ye be polluted.

Less may formerly have been used as an abbreviation of *unless*, in the same manner as *till* is now used for *until*, but the signification of *less*, when thus employed, is not equivalent to *lest*.

Ex.—"But will not bide there *less* yourself do bring him."

Unless is also said to be used sometimes as a preposition.

Ex.—The commendation of adversaries is the greatest triumph of a writer, because it never comes *unless* extorted.

THAN.

"Than," says Dr. Crombie, "which Mr. Tooke does not seem to have noticed, is supposed to be a compound of the

definitive *tha*, and the *additive* termination *en*; thus, *tha en, thænne, then*, are now spelled *than*." And this is all we have been able to learn respecting the character of this word.

The conjunction *than* generally denotes comparison, and is put before the *negative* clause of a compound sentence. When correctly used, it has the power of a negative, and is equivalent to *not*, or *and not*.

Ex.—The latter marks the object more emphatically *than* the former, i.e. the latter, *and not* the former, marks the object more emphatically.

Ex.—I like him better *than* you, i.e. *not* you better.

Ex.—It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employments of life to be rather driven by the fear of evil *than* attracted by the prospect of good, i.e. *and not* attracted by the prospect of good.

Ex.—"More men fall, generally, in a battle *than* (not) in an engagement, because a greater number are opposed to each other in the former *than* (not) in the latter."

As a proof that *than* has a negative signification, we may quote an example in which another negative has been used in the compound sentence; here it will be seen that the two negatives are equivalent to an affirmative:—

Ex.—"The positive has been thought by some writers to be improperly termed a degree of comparison, as it seems to be NOTHING *more* THAN the simple form of an adjective." "As it seems to be *only*" would have expressed the writer's meaning. The phrase "nothing more than" is adverbial and *affirmative*, and equivalent in meaning to the adverb *merely*.

The phrase "no sooner than" is equivalent to "as soon as."

Ex.—"The play no sooner opens than every auditor knows how it will conclude," i.e. *as soon as* the play opens, &c.

The use of the double negative, however, often varies the expression, and denotes a shade of difference when opposed to the affirmative sign of comparison.

Ex.—John will arrive *no* sooner *than* Charles.

Ex.—John will arrive *as soon as* Charles.

The mind perceives a difference between these sentences,

though they both express the simultaneous arrival of the persons.

Than is often employed as a mere disjunctive, and does not denote comparison; in these cases it loses its negative signification.

Ex.—"Who, under the pretence of reform, have really no other object *but* the subversion of our happy constitution." "Here," says Mr. Cobbett, "we have 'no other object *but*,' instead of 'no other object *than*.'"

Now, as there is no comparison implied in the foregoing sentence, (the word *other* being a definitive,) we see no reason why the disjunctive *but* should not be employed. If authority shall decide when usage is at variance, we may safely affirm that many of our best and most correct writers will be found to favour the phraseology which modern grammarians have thought proper to condemn.

Ex.—"If men do find a difficulty to see the agreement or disagreement of two angles which lie before their eyes unalterably in a diagram, how utterly impossible will it be to perceive it in ideas that have *no other* sensible objects to represent them to the mind *but* sounds," i.e. except sounds. —LOCKE.

Ex.—"What now is the cure?—No other *but* this,—that every man should let alone other's prejudices, and examine his own."—LOCKE.

Ex.—"And that for *no other* reason *but* because it has pleased our grammarians."—HORNE TOOKE.

The phrases, "no other but," "no other than," are synonymous and equivalent to the adverb "merely."

Ex.—"The grammar of any language is *no other than* a collection of general observations."—CAMPBELL.

That is, *merely* a collection of general observations.

NOR.

Nor is a substitute for *not*, and serves as a conjunction when placed between words or sentences. Like the demonstrative *that*, it loses its force of signification from its position.

Ex.—There is not a word in any language which has not a complete signification. It is *not* possible there should be.

Here are two distinct sentences; but, if it be desirable to unite them, the position of the last sentence must be changed, and the adverb, being modified, becomes a conjunction.

Ex.—There is not, *nor* is it possible there should be, a word in any language which has not a complete signification.

The reader will observe that whenever *nor* is used to connect the subsequent or second member of a compound sentence, the nominative is placed *after* the verb, in order that the verb may stand as near as possible to the conjunction which continues (though less forcibly) to modify it. "It is not, *nor is* IT possible."

The definitive no (not any) is sometimes changed into the conjunction nor, and by that means sentences, otherwise unconnected, become united.

Ex.—None could exceed him in candour. His benevolence was equally remarkable. He had *no* affectation whatever.

In this example there are three distinct sentences; but by separating the adverb from the definitive, and by using in its stead the conjunction *nor*, the last two sentences may be united thus—

None could exceed him in candour; his benevolence was equally remarkable; *nor* had he *any* affectation whatever.

OR.

OR is a substitute for either, (and supposed to be a contraction of other) having less force of signification, and therefore better adapted to join either words or sentences.

Ex. A fleece
To match *or* those of Sicily *or* Greece.

Ex.—Manners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost.

"Here," says Mr. Harris, "the conjunction *or*, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet, with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, and some disjunctive; and hence it is that we derive their different species."

The disjunctive power of this conjunction may be traced to its original signification as a definitive. It indefinitely implies election or choice, and consequently denotes separation. The attribute or verb, therefore, refers only to one subject, and is required to be of the singular number,—as, negligence or ignorance *has* caused this mischief.

Or denotes diversity either of name or subject, and sometimes connects the definition only, as may be seen in the following examples, adduced by Mr. Harris:—

"It may be observed through all the species of disjunctives that the *same* disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *less* force, according as the subjects which it disjoins are more or less disjoined by nature. For example, if we say—*every number is even* OR *odd; every proposition is true* OR *false*,—nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the disjunctive, because no things are in nature more incompatible than the subjects. But if we say—*that object is a triangle*, OR *figure contained under three right lines*,—the OR in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more than distinctly to express the thing first by its NAME, and then by its DEFINITION. So if we say—*that figure is a sphere*, OR *a globe*, OR *a ball*,—the disjunctive in this case tends no farther to disjoin than as it distinguishes the *several names* which belong to the *same thing*."

NEITHER.

The conjunction neither is a modification of *not* and *either*; by the union of which words the force of signification is diminished, and the adverb and definitive, when united, serve to connect the members of a sentence, which would otherwise require a conjunction.

Ex.—He desires *neither* poverty *nor* affluence.

Without the conjunctive form of the negatives this sentence would be abrupt; and although the force of the words would be increased, the sentence would not be equally perspicuous.—He desires not affluence, not poverty either.

The negatives are disjunctive, in as much as they separate the predicate from the subject. This property of the adverb

has not been sufficiently attended to by those who dispute the propriety of *disjunctive conjunctions*. The verb *unites*, while the adverb *disjoins*, the parts of such sentences.

Ex.—"Neither you nor I *are* in fault."

This idiom is pronounced correct, because it corresponds with the Latin—"id neque ego neque tu fecimus." But we, who do not feel the necessity of referring to a dead language in order to decide the propriety of modern phraseology, give the preference to the following;—

Neither are you nor am I in fault.

This is an English idiom, and not only better adapted to our manner of expression, but it is more correct than the Latinized construction. The negatives nor and neither qualify the verb in different persons, and the conjunction, being disjunctive, requires the verb to be expressed or understood when the nominatives are of different persons. The construction—neither you nor I am in fault—is preferable to the one commonly recommended.

For.

For, used as a conjunction, signifies *cause*, or rather *because*, i.e. the cause being.

Ex.—"They are delighted with the stories that are told, and perhaps can tell them again, for they make all they read nothing but history to themselves."—Locke.

Ex.—"Perhaps man may be more properly distinguished as an idle animal, *for* there is no man who is not sometimes idle. It is, at least, a definition from which none that shall find it in this paper can be excepted, *for* who can be more idle than the reader of the Idler?"—Johnson.

For is sometimes rendered emphatic by the addition of the conjunction *that*, and it may be observed that the latter conjunction is often employed for a similar purpose with other conjunctions.

Ex.—"My Essays, of all my other works, have been most current, *for that*, as it seems, they come home to men's business and bosoms."—Bacon.

The difference of signification between *for*, used as a con-

junction, and the preposition *for*, has already been shown. Additional examples can, therefore, scarcely be considered necessary to prove the uniform meaning of this word when employed as a conjunction.

BECAUSE.

The meaning of this conjunction is evident from the words of which it is compounded. Its power to connect sentences may be seen in the following example;—

Ex.—Rome was enslaved. Cæsar was ambitious.

Here is no connection between the sentences: they are both independent assertions; but if the latter be attributed to the former as the *cause*, then the sentences become united, as—

Rome was enslaved *because* Cæsar was ambitious, i.e, the cause *being*, Cæsar was ambitious. The conjunction is, however, preferable to the present participle, because it is less emphatic, and does not suggest the notion of time.

THEREFORE.

THEREFORE, though classed by Dr. Johnson among adverbs, is commonly used as a conjunction. It refers to the premises, and at the same time connects the deduction or inference.

Ex.—"Riches are for spending, and spending for honour and good actions, *therefore* extraordinary expence must be limited by the worth of the occasion."—BACON.

"A nice distinction of the sense," says Mr. Murray, "is sometimes made by the use or omission of the article *a*. If I say—he behaved with *a* little reverence—my meaning is positive; if I say—he behaved with little reverence—my meaning is negative; *and* these two are by no means the same, or to be used in the same cases; by the former I rather praise a person; by the latter I dispraise him."

The copulative conjunction in this sentence should be *therefore*. We have given this example at length, because it contains a useful remark on the indefinite article.

THOUGH.

The signification attributed to this conjunction by Mr. Tooke appears to coincide with its general meaning, viz.—*allow, grant, permit, yield, assent.*

Ex.—Troy will be taken, although Hector defend it.

This conjunction does not necessarily require the subjunctive mood after it.

Ex.—You still carry with you your old humour in politics, *though* your subject *is* different.

Here the conjunction is followed by the indicative, but in the preceding example the verb is conditional.

SAVE.

SAVE is generally classed among adverbs, though it may perhaps more properly be considered a conjunction. Mr. Tooke considers it the imperative of the verb "to save;" but he is compelled to admit that it sometimes has a different manner of signification: his illustration proves this,—"God save you all, *save* this friar."

SINCE.

"SINCE, in modern English," says Mr. Tooke, "is used four ways; two as a preposition connecting, or rather *affecting*, words; and two as a conjunction *affecting* sentences."

"When used as a preposition it has always the signification either of the past participle *seen* joined to thence (that is, *seen and thenceforward)*, or else it has the signification of the past participle *seen* only."

"When used as a conjunction it has sometimes the signification of the present participle *seeing*, or *seeing that*, and sometimes the signification of the past participle *seen*, or *seen that*."

Since, used as a conjunction, has *generally*, if not *always*,

the same signification as the present participle, whence it is derived.

Ex.—"*Since* speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties, being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction as men, those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how speech may be naturally resolved, or how, when resolved, it may be again combined," i.e. *seeing* speech is, &c. Seeing is here used to denote a mental perception.

But the present participle *seeing* will not always admit of being exchanged for the conjunction.

Ex.—Seeing an unclaimed spot, which is a thing not to be found every day, I have taken possession. Here we cannot say, *since*, &c., without altering the construction.

When *since* is used to denote an era from a given epoch to the present or current time, it is usually called a preposition, and shows the relation there is between an event and the action, state of being, or circumstance, connected with that event. It serves to point out the time which has already elapsed from a given period, as—*since* the creation; *since* the birth of Christ; *since* yesterday.

Ex.—"The range of useful literature has been considerably enlarged *since* that selection was made."—MAVOR.

Ex.—"What follow are only such as have *since* presented themselves to my recollection."—BRENAN.

In these examples the preposition may, with propriety, be called an adverb. It is significant of time, and does not govern the subsequent noun.

When a definite era is expressed by referring to two events as marking the commencement and termination of the era, the prepositions *from* and *to* are used to shew the relation, and denote the duration, of the period.

Ex.—"*From* morn *to* night th' eternal larum rung."

BUT.

BUT generally implies contrast or opposition in the clauses or sentences which it connects.

Ex.—He is rich, *but* he is not generous.

Ex.—And lead us not into temptation, *but* deliver us from evil.

This conjunction has a variety of significations. The following have been noticed by Mr. Locke.

First.—" BUT, to say no more,—." Here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly.—" I saw BUT two plants." Here it shews that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly.—" You pray, BUT it is not that God would bring you to the true religion;

Fourthly.—*But* that he would confirm you in your own." The first of these *buts* intimates a supposition of the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before.

Fifthly.—" All animals have sense, *but* a dog is an animal." Here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism.

Mr. Tooke controverts the opinion of Mr. Locke, and would reduce the signification of *but* to the meaning of the two verbs *botan*, "to boot," and *beon-utan*, "to be out." The distinction between these verbs being lost, the same particle now serves to denote both meanings.

Ex.—" *But*, as we are talking of Greek, I will tell you one thing more."—RUSSELL.

In some few phrases *but* may signify to boot; yet, in the majority of its uses, BUT has neither the signification "to boot," nor the exceptive meaning of the verb beon-utan.

When BUT connects a clause qualified by "not only," it will bear the interpretation of *botan*, "to boot."

Ex.—" This word is constantly used *not only* at the beginning and between *but* (to boot) at the end of sentences."

If we compare the signification of but in the following examples with but in the foregoing, the conjunction will be found to have a very different meaning.

Ex.—" It is not evidence of truth, *but* some lazy anticipation, some beloved presumption, that he desires to rest undisturbed in."—LOCKE.

In this sentence "but" denotes opposition or contrariety, and does not correspond to either of the significations given by Mr. Tooke.

Ex.—"Of these two we shall consider the conjunction first, because it connects *not* words, *but* sentences."—HARRIS. Here *but* cannot mean "to boot," for sentences are the *only* things said to be connected.

But is used after a digression to denote the mind has stopped from the course of argument it was pursuing, and is about to resume the former subject;—"but to proceed;" "but to go fairly through the matter;" "but not to stop." This last example would be nonsense if there had not been a stop or digression.

In common with other conjunctions *but* denotes that something is to follow, and so far it implies *more*. It does not, however, always indicate that what follows is either to be added (to boot) to what went immediately before; nor, on the other hand, to be taken out from the preceding clause which it connects. It has, as Mr. Locke observes, a great variety of significations.

Ex.—"*But* to pursue our subject."—HARRIS. Here *but* is used distinctly as a disjunctive conjunction. It denotes a *stop* to one subject, and connects the *sequel* of another.

But is sometimes used as an adverb.

Ex.—"If it be in a dispute where every little straw is laid hold on, and every thing that can *but* be drawn in any way to give colour to the argument is advanced with ostentation."—LOCKE.

Ex.—"'On the sixth day God made man of the dust of the earth after his own image.' This is a simple sentence in the sense of rhetoricians and critics, as it has BUT one verb, *but* less simple than the former."—CAMPBELL.

The first BUT in this example is an adverb, equivalent to *only*; the second *but* is a conjunction.

That the signification of many indeclinable words depends upon the connection and association such terms have with other words is perhaps already too apparent to require further proof. A remarkable instance, however, of the latitude in which even a single letter may be used is mentioned by Mr. Locke.

"In the Hebrew tongue there is *a particle*, consisting *but* of one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, *seventy*, I am sure above *fifty*, several significations."

Now, what but the position or association of this letter can impart its various significations? and how can its meaning be distinctly ascertained, except in connection with more significant terms?

WHO, WHICH, AND THAT.

These pronouns differ from the personal pronouns more in their power to *connect* sentences than in the reference which they bear to the antecedent noun; for the personal pronouns, in general, refer to some noun going before, and are so far relative pronouns.

Ex.—Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries: mankind have considered *him* not as the pupil, but the slave, of science.

Ex.—Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries, *whom* mankind have considered not as the pupil, but the slave, of science.

Here the two simple sentences in the *first* example are united in the *second* by changing the *place* and *form* of the personal pronoun.

"It is in the united powers of a connective and another pronoun," says Mr. Harris, "that we may see the force and character of the pronouns here treated."

Ex.—Light is a body; it moves with great celerity.

Ex.—Light is a body, *and it* moves with great celerity.

If in the place of *and it* we substitute *that* or *which*, saying—light is a body *which* moves with great celerity—the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes, if possible, more compact than before.

Dr. Crombie, however, thinks that the relative pronoun is not always thus resolvable, but only in those examples in which the relative clause does not limit or modify the meaning of the antecedent. "If I say—'man *who* is born of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble,' the relative clause

is not restrictive; I may therefore resolve the pronoun, and say—man is of few days, *and he* is born of a woman.'" "Light is a body *which* moves with great velocity" is resolvable into "light is a body, *and it* moves with great velocity." But when the relative clause limits the meaning of the antecedent, the relative is clearly not thus resolvable. "'Virgil was the only epic poet among the Romans *who* can be compared to Homer.' The signification of the antecedent is here restricted by the relative clause; we cannot, therefore, by resolution say—Virgil was the only epic poet among the Romans, *and he* can be compared to Homer;—for the former of these propositions is not true, nor is the sentiment which it conveys accordant with the meaning of the author."

The exception by Dr. Crombie does not affect the conjunctive power of the relative. If the pronoun *who* had not the *power* of *the copulative* conjunction, the sentence would be equally incorrect. May not the difficulty arise from the construction? The adverb "only" is equivocally employed, and the word "Romans" may be taken in its widest sense, instead of being confined to the epic poets of that nation. The meaning of the sentence is this,—Virgil was *the* or *that* epic poet *who only* (among the Romans) can be compared with Homer—i.e. *and only he* among the Roman epic poets can be compared with Homer. The proper place of the adverb is between the conjunction and the personal pronoun; but when the relative is used, it cannot always be so placed, so as to avoid ambiguity.

THAT.

We do not think Mr. Tooke has proved this conjunction "to have always merely the same force and manner of signification, which 'that' has when called an article or pronoun." Mr. Tooke's derivation, and his method of resolution, will, perhaps, be sufficient to convince the reader, that when this definitive is used as a conjunction, it loses its original force and signification, and cannot, *as long as it is thus situated*, be considered either an article or a pronoun. All that Mr.

Tooke does in his method of analysis, is to remove the conjunction, and place it where it can with propriety be construed in its original signification. Our modern grammarians indeed seem much captivated with this singular method of proving a word to be no conjunction; but the reader will judge from the *example*, and its *resolution*, whether the word 'that' has the same force and signification in both, or whether the example be not a *united* sentence, and the resolution two distinct *unconnected* assertions.

Ex.—Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats.

Res.—Thieves may cut men's throats, *(for)* THAT *(purpose)* they rise by night.

Mr. Tooke here attempts to supply the connection he has destroyed, by inserting *a preposition*; but the reader will perceive that not only is a conjunction still wanting ("*and* for that purpose"), but the meaning of the sentence is very different. The assertion in the first clause is unqualified,—"thieves may cut men's throats," instead of, *that* thieves may cut men's throats, they rise by night,—"*Ut* jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones."

Ex.—I wish you to believe, *that* I would not wilfully hurt a fly.

Res.—I would not wilfully hurt a fly, I wish you to believe *that* assertion.

Now Mr. Tooke derives the word *that* from the Anglo-Saxon participle *theat*, taken or assumed, and grammarians say the demonstrative or relative "that," should always refer (if used as a definitive,) to some subject taken or assumed, or spoken of *before;* but in the example, the subject *follows* the supposed demonstrative, and if the force of an article or definitive were necessary, the corresponding pronoun should have been employed thus:—

"I wish you to believe *this* (assertion;) I would not wilfully hurt a fly."

As all Mr. Tooke's examples of this word are selections of similarly constructed sentences, those we have quoted will be sufficient to show in what manner the writer has *explained* the nature of this conjunction.

We shall now add a few examples, in which it would be difficult to apply Mr Tooke's method of resolution.

Ex.—"The pleasures of the imagination have *this* advantage above *those* of the understanding, *that* they are more obvious and easy to be acquired."

Ex.—"*It* is true *that this* is a very great blessing."

Ex.—My lords, with humble submission, *that that* I say is this,—*that that that* gentleman has offered, is not *that*, *that* he should have proved to your lordships.

In this whimsical example, the word *that* is used in its three distinct manners of signification—as a demonstrative, as a conjunction, and as a relative pronoun.

Ex.—"Do you not think *that what* you now advance will bear a dispute, and *that* some better arguments than your bare assertion are necessary to make us adopt your opinion."

The first *that* in the last example is redundant, the relative *what* being equivalent to *that which*. "Do you not think that which you now advance,"—the second *that* is a pronoun, and put to avoid the repetition of the phrase, "do you not think."

Ex.—"Who *that* hath the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus disgraced."—CROMBIE.

This example, according to Mr. Tooke's *infallible* method of resolution, would read thus;—

Who would suffer himself to be thus disgraced? that (man) hath the spirit of a man.

We do not ask the reader if this conveys the sense of Dr. Crombie's example. The conjunction *that*, with the verb *hath*, is equivalent to the present participle *having*.

Who *having* the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus disgraced.

However useful an acquaintance with the literal derivation of indeclinable words may be, there are other points which we consider of much greater importance to those who would acquire a practical knowledge of the theory of language. Few writers on the subject of grammar attempt to explain *how* indeclinable words originate, or *why* they are so necessary to obviate the tediousness and prolixity of an unpolished and barbarous phraseology. Dr. Campbell is the only author we have read, who has attempted to show the true character of these words; for though Mr. Tooke has traced

the origin and proved that the indeclinable parts of speech are in general reliques of words once significant in the language; he has, nevertheless, in his zeal to establish their primitive meaning, overlooked the advantages which we derive from their very obscurity.

"Connectives," says Dr. Campbell, "are of all parts of speech the most unfriendly to vivacity, for in themselves they are but the *taches* which serve to unite the constituent parts of a sentence or a paragraph. Consequently *the less conspicuous they are*, the more perfect will the union of the parts be, and the more easily will the hearer glide, as it were, from one word, clause, or member of a period to another, *the more observable they are*, the less perfect is the union."

It has been already shown that by merely changing the position of a word in a sentence its force of signification may be modified, or so far *obscured*, that it will serve to connect the members of a sentence, without awakening those ideas which would tend to destroy that connection.

The mind, like the eye, can view only one object *distinctly* at a time, for if it endeavour to contemplate, with equal attention, several impressions simultaneously, the whole will become more or less obscure, in proportion to the number of individuals it tries to particularise at one view. Hence, the necessity of connecting relative ideas by terms less significant than those which denote the principal objects of discourse, and hence, too, we are able to understand Dr. Campbell's apparent paradox, that—"THE LESS TIME THE MIND BESTOWS ON THE INSIGNIFICANT PARTS OF A SENTENCE, THE MORE SIGNIFICANT WILL THE WHOLE APPEAR."

We shall endeavour to illustrate this analogy, between the power of vision, and that of mental perception, by a diagram.



The figure in the margin represents the eye at a common reading distance, viewing a row of letters, but fixed with the most attention to the middle letter A.

Now, as we read, a ray may be supposed to be drawn from the centre of the eye to that letter it looks at first, and to move successively with it from letter to letter

the whole length of the line; but if the eye stops at any particular letter A, to observe it more than the rest, these other letters will grow more and more imperfect to the sight, the farther they are situated on either side of A, as is expressed in the figure, and when we endeavour to see all the letters in a line equally perfect at one view, as it were, this imaginary ray must course it to and fro with great celerity. Thus, though the eye strictly speaking can only pay due attention to these letters in succession; yet the amazing ease and swiftness with which it performs this task, enables us to see considerable spaces with sufficient satisfaction at one sudden view.*

And thus it is with the mind in viewing objects in connection with each other. It is rarely necessary that we should recall the abstract ideas, that we may be able to form of their several relations. A vague and imperfect notion is all that is required. Now, language furnishes, in these indeclinable words, the means whereby we may be enabled to express the connection of our thoughts with greater energy and propriety than we could possibly do if the meaning of all the words in a sentence were equally perspicuous. But this great improvement in language Mr. Tooke would destroy, by restoring to indeclinable words a force of signification which it is not desirable they should at all times possess.

Syntax of Conjunctions.

The simplest method of connecting clauses to sentences is to omit the verb or sign of affirmation, for by thus rendering a clause *dependent*, it necessarily unites and forms a part of the proposition.

Ex.—The comparative, while it retains its own distinctive character *denoting* simple excess, partakes also of the nature of the superlative; the objects compared *being referred.*

This is the CASE ABSOLUTE of the learned, concerning which so much has been said, and of which, apparently, so little is understood. The following is "*the rule*" given by Dr. Crombie:—

* HOGARTH.—*Analysis of Beauty*

RULE.—"A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative."

"This rule," says Dr. Crombie, "will be perfectly understood by the classical scholar, when we say that the absolute case in English is the nominative. Thus, 'we being exceedingly tossed, the next day they lightened the ship;' the pronoun of the first person, joined to the participle 'being,' is *neither the nominative* to any verb, nor is it connected with any word of which it can be the regimen. It is *therefore* put in the nominative case."

Now, if we understand this writer, the pronoun is put in the nominative case *because* it is *not the nominative* of any verb. This, it must be confessed, is a singular assertion, and directly at variance with the character of the nominative, whose office it is to denote the subject. The truth is, the pronoun belongs to the verb *suppressed*, and denotes the subject as distinguished from the rest of the clause. The verb being absent, the present participle assumes the character of a conjunction, and obviates the necessity of a connecting particle: this may be seen by supplying the verb.

Ex.—We *were* exceedingly tossed the next day, *(therefore)* they lightened the ship.

The *incipient* indeclinable conjunction may be perceived in this use of the participles and infinitive mood, for they have a different manner of signification when put *absolutely* than when they are employed as attributes predicated of nouns. They represent more abstract ideas, and are therefore more indefinite, obscure, and difficult to be explained.

Ex.—*To confess* the truth, I have no interest in the question.

Ex.—Shame *being* lost, all virtue is lost.

Ex.—*Admired* and *applauded*, he became vain.

It has been shewn that the imperative, whence Mr. Tooke has derived so many of his conjunctions, is the same mood, and denotes the same time as the infinitive, and that the infinitive and present participle are often used to denote the same idea, the notion of time and affirmation being excluded.

RULE I. Two or more subjects in the singular, united by

a copulative conjunction, are equivalent to a plural subject, and require the verb to agree with them in the plural, as—Socrates and Plato *were* wise.

The copulative conjunction is sometimes omitted, as—"the sun that rolls over our heads, the food that we receive, the rest that we enjoy, daily *admonish* us of a superior and superintending power." Here the three subjects are sufficiently apparent, and do not require the connecting particle.

The conjunction *and* is sometimes used to join two or more nouns to denote a *compound*, and the verb agrees with the nouns in the singular, as—"wine and water *is* a pleasant beverage;" but "wine and water *are* not often mingled." In the first example the conjunction unites two nouns which constitute an indivisible subject, but in the last the conjunction connects the nouns as distinct subjects, and they are referred to individually by the verb. Thus, we say, "why *is* dust and ashes proud;" for the nouns *dust* and *ashes* are figuratively used for the general term man.

In like manner, two or more facts are sometimes united by this conjunction, and, from their close alliance, are considered as one.

Ex.—That such a misfortune should befall your house, and mar your prospects, *grieves* me exceedingly.

In this sentence, "misfortune" is considered the nominative.

The example quoted by Mr. Murray and Mr. Lewis in favour of this construction does not appear to be founded in the principles of grammar, or within the limits of the exception to the general rule.

Ex.—That warm climates *accelerate* the growth of the human body, and *shorten* its duration, *is* very reasonable to believe."

Here are, evidently, *two* consequences ascribed to warm climates, and the verb should be plural.

Mr. Murray, in his remarks on this exception, admits that it is contrary to the first principles of grammar to consider two distinct ideas as one, however nice may be their difference; and if there be no difference, one of them must be superfluous, and ought to be rejected.

"To support the above construction, it is said that the

verb may be understood as applied to each of the preceding terms, as in the following example—"sand, and salt, and a mass of iron, *is* easier to bear than a man without understanding." But besides the confusion and the latitude of application which such a construction would introduce, it appears to be more proper and analogical, in cases where the verb is intended to be applied to any one of the terms, to make use of the disjunctive conjunction, which grammatically refers the verb to one or other of the preceding terms in a separate view. To preserve the distinctive uses of the copulative and disjunctive conjunctions, would render the rules precise, consistent, and intelligible. Dr. Blair very justly observes that "two or more substantives, joined by a copulative, must *always* require the verb or pronoun to which they refer to be placed in the plural number."

RULE II.—If nouns and pronouns, of different persons, are joined by a copulative conjunction, the pronoun plural of the second person takes the place of the third person, and the pronoun plural of the first person of both.

Ex.—Thou and he shared it between *you*.

Ex.—James, and thou, and I, *are* attached to *our* country, i.e. *we* are attached to *our* country.

The propriety of this agreement has been already shewn. It has its origin from the principles of construction, and is not referable to "authority," or the capricious decision of "reputable use."

RULE III.—The conjunction disjunctive has an effect contrary to that of the conjunction copulative; for, as the verb, noun, or pronoun, is referred to separately, the verb must be in the singular.

Ex.—Death, or some worse misfortune, soon *divides* them.

RULE IV. When pronouns singular of different persons are disjunctively connected, the verb must agree with that person which is placed nearest to it.

Ex.—Thou or I *am* in fault.

Ex.—I or thou *art* to blame.

The verb cannot agree with both, it is therefore "understood" before the first pronoun, as—thou *art*, or I *am*, in fault; I *am*, or thou *art*, to blame; but, as Mr. Murray

remarks, it would be more accurate to say, either I am in fault, or thou art; either thou art to blame, or I am.

Conjunctions may be distinguished from prepositions, by their wanting the property to govern a noun in the objective case. Dr. Crombie asserts that "conjunctions have no government," and his opinion appears to be corroborated, both by the practice of writers, and by the fundamental principles of composition.

In giving this rule, says Dr. Crombie," I differ from all other grammarians who have erroneously, as I concieve, assigned them a regimen. Some conjunctions, says Lowth, govern the indicative, and some the subjunctive mood. This I affirm without hesitation to be a mistake; for not a single example, I venture to assert, can be produced in which the verb is divested of its indicative form, in consequence of its being subjoined to any conjunction.—*Etymology and Syntax*, p. 303.

Illustration of Conjunctions.

The use, or rather the abuse of conjunctions, is pretty clearly exhibited in the following illustration taken from a grammar of the Hebrew and English language.

"*Being* greatly desirous to promote the study of Hebrew in America; I have drawn up this short English *and* Hebrew grammar together, *because* those languages appear to me to be the simplest *and* easiest; *and (as* to the grammatical structure of them,) the most like one another of any *that* I know, *and* also from a persuasion, *that* as soon as a lad has learned to spell *and* read English well, it is much best to begin a learned education with the Hebrew, *both because* it is the first *and* easiest of all languages, *and*, indeed, the mother of all language *and* eloquence; *but* chiefly *because* in it were written the most ancient original oracles of God, *and that* the Holy Scriptures contain the most excellent the most useful *and* important of all knowledge *relating* to things *both* human *and* divine, *and* they are, most of them, older, *and* the first of them near a thousand years older, *than* any other writings *that* are now extant, *and* exhibit an admirable picture of the ancient world."

CHAPTER XII.

INTERJECTIONS.

"The dominion of speech is erected upon the downfall of interjections."—TOOKE.

"Those exclamations which by grammarians are called interjections, uttered in a strong and impassioned manner, were beyond doubt the first elements or beginnings of speech."—BLAIR.

AN interjection is a word which expresses any sudden emotion of the mind, as—*oh! alas! heigh ho!*

"Interjections are employed only when the suddenness or vehemence of some affection or passion returns men to their natural state, and makes them for a moment forget the use of speech; or when from some circumstance the shortness of time will not permit them to exercise it."

Interjections do not interfere with the construction nor with the modification of words in a sentence; they neither agree with, nor do they govern other words; they are strictly parenthetic, and may be omitted without breaking the connection of ideas intended to be expressed. Interjections are not therefore essentially necessary in written discourse, although they may be sometimes advantageously employed to give energy, pathos, or fervour, to certain compositions. The poets would feel great inconvenience, if interjections were altogether prohibited in artificial language.

Those who pretend to prove that interjections are merely abbreviated sentences, have either confounded imperfect sentences wherein affirmation was intended, or they have mistaken the *interpretation** of an interjection for the sign

* Mr. Cobbett, and his imitator, Mr. Lewis, in their interpretation of "sir," i. e. "you who are a sir," seem to have fallen into a similar error respecting the vocative case. A noun in the vocative case resembles an interjection, and is neither connected with the concord nor the government of words in a sentence. It *names* the object spoken to, either to arrest the attention, or to denote respect.

itself. Thus—welcome, adieu, hark! lo! are not interjections, but imperfect sentences.

The word *heigh ho!* is an interjection, indicating langour, and may be *interpreted* into, "I am weary;" but the person uttering the exclamation is perhaps scarcely conscious of doing so, and certainly has no intention to *affirm* his state of weariness. Such words are therefore properly denominated interjections.

As long as interjections are tolerated in written language, so long must they be classed among the distinct parts of speech. They are signs of emotions, and when artificially used, are designed to awaken corresponding sensations in the person to whom they are addressed.

Illustration of Interjections.

Ah! who can tell how hard it is to climb
The steep where Fame's proud temple shines afar!
Ah! who can tell how many a soul sublime
Has felt the influence of malignant star,
And waged with Fortune an eternal war;
Checked by the scoff of Pride, and Envy's frown,
In life's low vale, remote, has pined alone,
And dropt into the grave unpitied and unknown!

The above stanza contains all the parts of speech; and we strongly recommend those who may be yet unacquainted with the distinctions which have given rise to the classification of words, to copy the whole into columns, either seriatim, or under the several heads of articles, nouns, pronouns, &c., and at the same time to observe the modifications that occur, and the construction, government, and concord, of the several members of the sentence. It is by such exercises, that almost any one, even unassisted by an instructor, may make himself master of the rules of grammar.

We shall conclude this part of our subject with Dr. Darwin's account of the origin of language, and of the different parts of speech.

Thus the first language, when we frowned or smiled,
Rose from the cradle Imitation's child;

Next to each thought, associate sound accords,
And forms the dulcet symphony of words:
The tongue the lips articulate,—the throat,
With soft vibration, modulates the note.
Love, pity, war, the shout, the song, the prayer,
Form quick concussions of elastic air.
Hence, the first accents bear in airy rings
The vocal symbols of ideal things;
Name each nice change appulsive powers supply
To the quick sense of touch, or ear, or eye;
Or in fine traits, abstracted forms suggest,
Of beauty, wisdom, number, motion, rest;
Or as within reflex ideas move,
Trace the light steps of reason, rage, and love;
The next new sounds, adjunctive thoughts accite
As hard, odorous, tuneful, sweet, or white;
The next, the fleeting images select,
Of action, suffering, causes, and effect;
Or mark existence, with the march sublime,
O'er earth and ocean of recording time;
Last, steps abbreviation, bold and strong,
And leads the volant trains of words along;
With sweet loquacity, to Hermes springs,
And decks his forehead and his feet with wings.

CHAPTER XIV.

DERIVATION.

"As in the woods the leaves change with each revolving year, and the most early fall the first, so words perish as they grow old, and those of more modern date succeed and flourish for a time, like men in their youth."

THE history of a nation affords the best, if not the only, means of tracing the origin of a particular tongue. The elements of modern languages appear to have been borrowed from other languages more remote, and in a great measure extinct. To trace the progress of a particular tongue, if such a task were practicable, could be considered as a labour of only very limited utility. The present state of the English language, and how far established modes of speech will admit of improvement, are subjects most deserving the attention of the scholar and grammarian.

The following concise account of the origin and formation of the English language is taken from Rapin's History of England, vol. ii. p. 209 :—

"The language of the Anglo-Saxons before the Conquest was a mixture of the following dialects. 1. Of British or Celtic, from whence, no doubt, the Saxons borrowed some words and phrases. 2. Of Latin, which was common in Great Britain when the Saxons arrived. 3. Of the ancient English or Danish. 4. Of the modern Danish. 5. Of pure Saxon. 6. Of Norman mixed with Danish and French."

"They who have carefully studied this matter distinguish three principal dialects in the Anglo-Saxon language. The first was compounded of British, Latin, and Saxon, but in such a manner that the Saxon was predominant ; the second dialect, which may be termed Dano-Saxon, was used

in the northern parts from the first invasions of the Danes to the Norman Conquest; the third dialect was made up of the other two and the Norman. This dialect, which was introduced chiefly in the reigns of Edward the Confessor and William the Conqueror, has admitted of great alterations by the addition of abundance of French words, particularly after Henry the Second's accession to the crown of England. They who are ignorant of the English tongue will not easily be made to believe that a mixture of so many languages can have any extraordinary beauties: but the English assert that their tongue should for that very reason be the more beautiful and expressive, since they have adopted only the more refined part of other tongues, and rejected what is rude and unpolished. Be this as it will, they have a great value for their own language, and if a foreigner may be allowed to give his opinion, I think very justly."

"If we should suppose," says Blair, in his lecture on the rise and progress of language, "a period before any words were invented or known, it is clear that men could have no other method of communicating to others what they felt than by the cries of passion, accompanied with such motions and gestures as were further expressive of passion."

"When more enlarged communication became necessary, and names began to be assigned to objects, in what manner can we suppose men to have proceeded in this assignation of names or invention of words?—undoubtedly by imitating as much as they could the nature of the object which they named by the sound of the name which they gave to it. As a painter who would represent grass must employ a green colour, so, in the beginnings of language, one giving name to any thing harsh and boisterous would of course employ a harsh and boisterous sound. He could not do otherwise if he meant to excite in the hearer the idea of that thing which he sought to name. To suppose words invented, or names given to things, in a manner purely arbitrary, without any ground or reason, is to suppose an effect without a cause. There must have always been some motive which led to the assignation of one name rather than another; and we can conceive no motive which would more generally operate upon men in their first efforts towards language than a desire

to paint by speech the objects which they named in a manner more or less complete, according as the vocal organs had it in their power to effect this imitation."

"Wherever objects were to be named in which sound, noise, or motion, were concerned, the imitation by words was abundantly obvious: nothing was more natural than to imitate by the sound of the voice the quality of the sound or noise which any external object made, and to form its name accordingly. Thus, in all languages, we find a multitude of words that are evidently constructed upon this principle. A certain bird is termed a cuckoo from the sound which it emits. When one sort of wind is said to *whistle*, and another to *roar*, when a serpent is said to *hiss*, a fly to *buzz*, and falling timber to *crash*, when a stream is said to *flow*, and hail to *rattle*, the analogy between the word and the thing signified is plainly discernible."

"This principle, however, of a natural relation between words and objects can only be applied to language in its most simple and primitive state. Though in every tongue some remains of it can be traced, it were utterly in vain to search for it throughout the whole construction of any modern language. As the multitude of terms increase in every nation, and the immense field of language is filled up, words, by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods of derivation and composition, come to deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and to lose all analogy or resemblance in sound to the thing signified. In this state we now find language. Words, as we now employ them, taken in the general, may be considered as symbols, not as imitations; as arbitrary or instituted, not natural signs of ideas: but there can be no doubt, I think, that language, the nearer we remount to its rise among men, will be found to partake more of a natural expression. As it could be originally formed on nothing but imitation, it would in its primitive state be more picturesque, much more barren, indeed, and narrow, in the circle of its terms, than now; but, as far as it went, more expressive by sound of the thing signified. This, then, may be assumed as the character of the first state or beginnings of language, among every savage tribe."

Having given this brief outline of the origin of language,

we shall proceed to make a few remarks on the subject of derivation.

The knowledge of the derivation of words can be only so far useful as it may enable any one to understand and retain the true and precise meaning of words. But when a language has been so far changed, that words derived from obsolete roots can no longer be recognised as belonging to such roots, having assumed another form, or to which another meaning has been attached, they, in fact, have become new words, and it is an idle abuse of time to trace their original construction or primitive signification. One example will shew how far the *meaning* of a word may be changed, though all the parts of such word continue to be used.

To improve, according to the meaning now attached to it, is "to advance any thing nearer to perfection," to raise from good to better. Compare this with the word in its original signification, and it will be found to have acquired a new meaning. To improve formerly signified to censure, to impeach, to blame, to reprove.

"Whereas he hath spoken it by his own mouth, that it is not good for man to be alone, they have *improved* that doctrine, and taught the *contrary*."

"There did they worship it in their scarlet gowns, with cap in hand; and here they *improve* it with scorns and with mocks, grinning upon her like termagants in a play."

Philologists imagine that they render an essential service to the illiterate by publishing their speculations on the origin of words; but are we better acquainted with established modes of speech from perusing works on derivation? Do we, for instance, acquire a more correct notion of the title of "Lady" because it formerly signified a person who distributed *bread* to the poor; or do we understand the meaning of the word "bread" because we are informed it originally implied corn *brayed* in a mortar.

What should we think of the wisdom of a philosopher who pretended to examine more accurately the quality of a tolerably clear spring by first stirring the *mud* which once floated on its surface. Etymologists do little else when they bring forward obsolete words to prove the meaning of terms used

in modern discourse. Such analysis may please and amuse the black-lettered antiquary or the pedant, but few will be able to appreciate its practical utility.*

Let not, however, our views upon this point be misunderstood. We speak only of those terms which have either changed their primitive significations, or have become obsolete. But as long as the meaning of any word can be traced by comparing the derivative with its root, it is of the utmost importance to acquire a knowledge of the *circumstances* upon which such word depends for its signification: for, "whilst on the one hand we recognise a derivative word by the identity of sound with the radical sound, we, on the other hand, appreciate its meaning by comparing the derivative with the radical notion."

Nouns may be considered the legitimate roots of all attributes, for the modification of an idea necessarily requires a change or distinction in the term which represents the radical notion, but it does not follow that language must supply a distinct term for every idea before a derivative notion can be expressed, for there are many nouns which are said to be derived from adjectives and verbs, as—goodness, from good; reader, from to read: yet we shall find that the signification of these attributes depended at first on the notions the mind had formed of "goodness" and "the act of reading," and that, in fact, "to read" is an abstract noun, from which the noun "reader" derives its signification. It is the *circumstance of reading* which gives the meaning we apply to the noun "reader" in the same manner as the circumstances which accompany the perpetration of a murder induces us to call one man an assassin,† and another a burker or burkite.

In proportion, then, as the circumstances which gave rise

* "With regard to etymology, about which grammarians make so much useless bustle, if every one hath a privilege of altering words according to his own opinion of their origin, the opinions of the learned being on this subject so various, nothing but a general chaos can ensue."—CAMPBELL.

† "The word assassin is said to be derived from a sect of Mahometans, called Chassins, dwelling in six cities near Antaradus, in Syria, being about forty thousand in number. They were ready to stab any prince whom the old man of the mountains should appoint them, or to go upon any dangerous attempt."—RAPIN.

to the names of things are remembered, we shall form our notions of the modifications of the radical noun. But the particular circumstances which gave to many words now in use their form and origin, are no longer identified with the subject, nor can those circumstances assist to impart a meaning to the terms with which they were originally associated. This is the case with the words we have already quoted; for *bread* is not made of corn brayed in a mortar, nor is the idea any one forms of the title of *Lady* ever associated with the duty of distributing bread to the poor. In addition to these words, we may notice the following as still more objectionable in their obsolete derivations;—*stern—ster-er, ster'n,* i.e. stirred. "It is the same word," says Mr. Tooke, "and has the same meaning, whether we say—a stern countenance, i.e. a moved countenance, moved by some passion, or—the stern of a ship, i.e. the moved part of a ship, or that part by which it is moved. It is the past participle of the verb stiren *movere,* which we now in English write differently, according to its different applications—to stir, to steer."

The meaning here ascribed to *stern* is nearly in direct opposition to the one usually applied to it, for a stern countenance is *immoveable* in its expression of severity.

Ex. "When that the poor have cried, Cæsar hath wept;
Ambition should be made of *sterner* stuff."
SHAKESPEARE.

That is, stuff not easily moved by the calamities of the poor.

Ex. "Women are soft, mild, pitiful, and *flexible,*
Thou *stern,* obdurate, flinty, rough, remorseless."
SHAKESPEARE.

In this example, *stern* is opposed to *flexible.*

Ex. "The judge supreme soon cast a *stedfast* eye,
Stern, yet tempered with benignity."
HARTE.

Stern, in this last example, means *severe,* and not moved or moveable.

Mr. Tooke's attempt to attribute the signification of *ordered*, or *commanded*, to the word *right*, is another proof of the futility of these derivations. For although a right line may be defined a line that is well ordered in its direction between two points, yet that direction cannot be said to be commanded. The sense in which right is used as an abstract noun, is the same in which it is applied to the Almighty when we acknowledge he has a *right* to control his creatures, it is his privilege as their Creator; and his creatures have a *right* to obey, for their obedience is a duty which they owe to him, their Creator.

Right, then, according to its acceptation in this sense, is that which *ought* to be, that which is *owed*, and a person may be said to obtain his *right* when he gets his *due*—his *own*. But what is ordered and commanded is not always what is *right*; for a villain may receive a reward for treason, fraud, or treachery, but every honest man will allow that if he got his *right* he *ought* to be hanged.

Ex.—"Persons of noble blood are less envied in their rising, for it seemeth but *right* done to their birth."—BACON. That is, their due, what was *owing* to them.

Ex.—The Roman citizens were by the sword taught to acknowledge the pope their lord, though they knew not by what *right*.

Here the *order* or *command* was enforced, but it was not admitted to be *right*.

The important word TRUTH has, in a similar manner, been misinterpreted, by tracing the noun to its verbal root.

"*True*," says Mr. Tooke, "is the past participle of the verb to think, to believe firmly, to be thoroughly persuaded of, to trow; and

"*Truth* is what men *think*; and if two persons speak what they think, though they contradict each other, they may yet *both* speak truth."

The fallacy of this opinion needs little more to refute it than the usual definition of the word truth.

Truth is the contrary to falsehood; the just conformity of notions to things; reality; fact. For so far only as ideas, represented by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is truth real.

The notion that the sun rises every day in the east is *false;* and the affirmation which asserts the phenomenon to be true is a falsehood. On the other hand, the affirmation that the earth revolving on its axis causes this phenomenon, is true; for the truth of this notion has been proved by well known facts, ascertained from observation. Men think truly when their thoughts are in conformity with the nature of the subject which engages their attention; they speak truly when the fact is as they represent it; but the fact itself is the truth, and not the notions which men entertain concerning the subject of their thoughts; for however various and imperfect the opinions of men may be, truth is still immutable. The principles upon which it rests can never change. From truth nothing can really follow but what is *true;* and many may think that the author who could mistake the *opinions of men* for *truth* was little qualified to be a critic, and altogether undeserving the character of a philosopher. We shall conclude these remarks on truth by quoting a passage from Mr. Locke's Essay on Association.

"Many men firmly embrace *falsehood* for *truth*, not only because they never *thought* otherwise, but also because, thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think otherwise, at least without a vigour of mind able to contest the empire of habit, and look into its own principles, a freedom which few men have the notion of in themselves, and fewer are allowed the practice of by others, it being the great art and business of the teachers and guides in most sects to suppress as much as they can this fundamental duty which every man owes himself, and is the first ready step towards *right* and *truth* in the whole train of his actions and opinions; this would give one reason to suspect that such teachers are conscious to themselves of the *falsehood* or weakness of the tenets they profess, since they will not suffer the grounds whereon they are built to be examined, when, as those who seek *truth* only, and desire to own and propagate nothing else, freely expose their principles to the test, and are pleased to have them examined; give men leave to reject them if they can, and if there be any thing weak and unsound in them, are willing to have it detected, that they themselves, as well as others, may not

lay any stress upon any received proposition, beyond what the evidence of its *truth* will warrant and allow."

PERSON is another instance of the original meaning of a word being no assistance in ascertaining its precise signification. *Person* is now a general term applied to mankind, without referring to the sex or character of the individual; and *personage* denotes an individual of higher rank than *persons* in general. But *person*, we are informed, originally signified the *mask* worn by actors on the Roman stage, and *through* which the voice was sounded; the word was afterwards used to denote an individual represented on the stage. If we were now to associate these circumstances, in using the word *person*, and consider the individual thus designated as representing a fictitious character, and speaking through a mask, the term might be justly considered one of reproach, and synonymous with hypocrite. *Personage*, also, which is now an honourable distinction, would then signify that the *person* so distinguished was a greater hypocrite than *persons* in general. This derivation, therefore, may amuse, but it cannot serve to determine the meaning of the word *person*.

"Some are of opinion that the word Sterling comes from the town Striveling or Sterling in Scotland, where they pretend, without any authority, that the best and purest money was formerly coined. Others say, with much greater probability, that Sterling is derived from the Saxon word Steore, which signifies rule or standard, that according to this opinion, sterling money means no more than money made according to a settled standard. Camden and some others believed this word was of a much more modern date, and taken from certain Flemish workmen, who, in the reign of King John, were called into England to reduce the money to its due fineness, in which they were more expert than the English. As the people of that country were termed Easterlings, because they lived eastward of England, 'tis pretended that the money they coined was called easterling or sterling, that is, made by the Easterlings or Flemish, and consequently purer than what had been coined before. Others have imagined that sterling is derived from the Star or Starling, supposed to have been formerly stamped on the coin."

Of these suppositions, the second is preferable, because it

attaches to sterling a circumstance that leads to the precise meaning of the word, and by thus attributing to the term a well defined signification, it tends to perpetuate its use.

Those who affirm that all roots are verbs, appear to have but a very superficial knowledge of the origin and formation of speech, for upon what principle can we trace the words virtue, pride, man, sun, and a great number of substantive nouns, to verbal roots, or how can the notions expressed by those words, be derived from "notions of activity transformed into notions of existence."

"The first words," says Dr. Russell, "which Adam is recorded to have spoken, are the *names* of animals;" and if Adam had never had occasion *to communicate* his thoughts, he would not have experienced the want of other signs than those which represented distinct ideas, and these could have been only necessary to record his own thoughts. For this purpose Mr. Locke observes, "any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself, and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea, for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language."

Every significant word, however modified or combined in its application, is referable to some noun as its root, and from which it derives its primary signification; but it does not necessarily follow that the name of a thing is always the most simple word of its class existing in the language. As far as the formation of words is concerned, the noun goodness is derived from the adjective good; but the restricted meaning of the adjective is derived from the abstract notion afterwards expressed by the term goodness.

"Adjectives seem originally to have been derived from nouns substantive, of which they express a quality, as—a *musky* rose; a *beautiful* lady; a *stormy* day. Some of them are formed from the correspondent substantive, by adding the syllable ly or like, as—a *lovely* child; a *warlike* countenance; and in our language it is frequently only necessary to put a hyphen between two nouns substantive, for the purpose of converting the former one into an adjective, as—an eagle-eye;

a May-day. And many of our adjectives are substantives unchanged, and only known by their situation in a sentence, as—a German, or a German gentleman."

"We do not mean to assert that all verbs are literally derived from nouns in any language; because all languages have in process of time undergone such great variation; many nouns having become obsolete or have perished, and new words have been imported from foreign languages, or transplanted from ancient ones; but that this has originally been the construction of all verbs."

"Thus there may appear some difficulty in analyzing from what noun substantive were formed the verbs *to stand* or *to lie;* because we have not properly the name of the abstract ideas from which these words arose, except we use the same word for the participle and the noun substantive, as—standing, lying. But the verbs to sit, and to walk, are less difficult to trace their origin, as we have names for the nouns substantive, a seat, and a walk."—DARWIN. *Theory of Language.*

The verbal noun, "to walk," derives its signification from the abstract noun, a walk, and the *names* of both these nouns are probably derived from the substantive noun, a walk or path.

Mr. Cobbett, however, makes no distinction between the abstract noun and the substantive noun, as the reader will perceive from the following erroneous criticism.

"Mr. Murray, in an address to his students, tells them that 'he is about to offer them some advice with regard to their future *walks* in the *paths* of literature.' Now, says Mr. Cobbett, though a man may take a walk along a path, a walk means also the ground laid out in a certain shape, and such a walk is wider than a path."

And this is all Mr Cobbett offers in proof that Mr. Murray's language is inaccurate. Need we say that the sentence, though figurative, is strictly correct, and that the writer did not mean *garden* walks nor *gravelled* walks, nor any walks of *that* kind, but such walks as the mind conceives to have been performed by the *act* of walking.

It may appear presumptuous to offer any remarks on the application and meaning of words from the learned languages;

but, unfortunately, English grammar has been so confounded with the rules of other languages, and its professors so often illustrate the idioms of our tongue by comparing them with foreign idioms, that we are constrained to learn the rudiments of the Greek and Latin languages before we can pretend to understand the established rules of our own.

The verbal noun, to read, is not a mood of the verb reading, but the name of that action. To read and reading, when used as nouns, have so far the same meaning, that they represent the action without affirmation, and thus lose their manner of signification as verbs or attributes. To read is easy, and reading is easy, are equivalent expressions; Dr. Crombie has attempted to prove this fact:—

"When I say *legere est facile*, 'to read is easy,' it is obvious there is only one sentence in each of these expressions: but if *legere* (to read) were a verb as well as *est* (is), then there would be two verbs, and also two affirmations, for affirmation is inseparable from a verb. I remark, also, that the verbal noun *lectio* reading, substituted for legere (to read), would precisely express the same sentiment."

Now, if lectio and legere have the same meaning as legens and legere, Dr. Crombie's conclusion is correct; but if lectio means the lesson read, and legere the reading of it, then Dr. Crombie has done mischief, because he has obscured the truth of his former proposition. In Latin, perhaps, lectio has no more claim to be classed with verbal nouns than liber has; but in English we know it has not, and that a lesson, a reading, are nouns of very different signification from the verbal nouns, to read, reading.

These observations lead us to notice, in conclusion, the different kinds of nouns. First, names of real and permanent existences, as—water, earth, house, book. Second, abstract nouns, which have only an ideal existence when abstractedly considered, as—the *clearness* of water, the *fertility* of the earth, the *size* of a house, the *value* of a book. Third, nouns which have a real, but transitory existence, depending on some agent for their being; such nouns may be denominated verbal nouns: they comprehend all those names of actions or states of existence denoted by the infinitives and participles of that class of attributives called verbs.

We shall conclude in the words of Mr. Tooke. "Though etymology, like the microscope, is sometimes useful to discover the minute parts of language, which would otherwise escape our sight, yet it is not necessary to have it always in our hands, nor proper to apply it to every object."

THE INDEX,

COMPRISING

A DICTIONARY OF THE TECHNICAL WORDS

COMMONLY USED BY WRITERS ON

LANGUAGE AND ELOCUTION,

WITH

NOTES AND ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF GRAMMAR.

"The terms of grammar, it is exceedingly lamented, appear, and indeed are particularly to the young mind, difficult and often unintelligible."—JENNINGS.

THE INDEX.

A.

A, the character that represents the first sound of the human voice. It has the precedence in most alphabets.

The indefinite article *a* is a modification of the Saxon numeral adjective *ane* or *an*, and is used before nouns beginning with consonants, and, in some cases, before a noun beginning with a vowel or *h* aspirated, p. 34.

The French who have not learned the English language grammatically confound the article *a* with the numeral adjective *one*, and say *one man* where they should say *a* man.

AB, a Latin prefix and preposition, as *abscond*. It denotes from, separating, departure, as *absolve, abstract, absent.*

ABBREVIATION, in grammar, is two-fold, abbreviation of terms and abbreviation in the manner of signification; and "Upon these two points," says Mr. Tooke, "the respective excellence of every language depends. All their other comparative advantages are trifling."

"Cæsar came, saw, and conquered," is an abbreviation of the first kind, and is employed for the sake of dispatch.

The sign of the possessive case, and most of the indeclinable parts of speech, are instances of abbreviation in the manner of signification. It may be remarked, that all subordinate words possess this character and are used instead of the more significant terms *to lessen the force of signification*. This important property of words, it is hoped, has been clearly developed in the etymology of the several parts of speech.

ABBREVIATURE, a shortening; a letter or letters put for a word, as R for Recipe, "take;" MSS. for manuscripta, manuscripts. Lists of abbreviations of this kind, with their explanations, may be found in most elementary works on grammar. The reader should be well acquainted with their meaning, but sparing in the use of them. The too frequent adoption of abbreviations for the sake of dispatch betrays a want of good taste, and is an indication of vulgar pedantry in a writer.

The apostrophe may be considered an abbreviature when it is employed to denote that a letter is omitted, as *o'er, ne'er*, for *over* and *never*.

ABECEDARIAN, a teacher of the A B C, or alphabet.

ABLATIVE, the sixth case of Latin nouns. The declensions of nouns in Latin have six cases, both in the singular and in the plural; the nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, vocative, and ablative.

ABLATIVE ABSOLUTE, that construction in which the participle is employed instead of the finite verb. p. 186.

ABSTRACT, to separate ideas.

ABSTRACT NOUNS. The idea formed by abstracting any mode or quality from its noun, and contemplating the mode as having a distinct existence, is called an abstract idea, and the words that represent these abstract ideas are properly denominated abstract nouns, as goodness, anger, modesty, temperance. From abstract nouns are derived adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. Mr. Tooke denies the existence of abstract ideas, and for no other apparent reason but because "The words not referring to any sensible objects are sometimes very difficult to define or explain;" but it may be presumed that Mr. Tooke would not have denied that mankind *imagine* they have such ideas, and (however erroneous the opinion may be) the same ideas are generally *supposed* to represent real existences. "To convince people," says Mr. Locke, "of what moment it is to their under-

standings to be furnished with such abstract ideas, steady and settled in it, give me leave to ask, how any one shall be able to know whether he be obliged to be just if he has not established ideas in his mind of obligation and of justice, since knowledge consists in nothing but the perceived agreement or disagreement of those ideas."

ABUSE *of words*. "It is in the double or incomplete sense of words that we must look for the origin of a very large portion of the errors into which we fall." *Herschal.*

Abuse of words may originate either from affectation or ignorance, but the former is the more dangerous source of innovation. Figurative writers are not always satisfied with using appropriate terms, but, in order to give an appearance of novelty to what would otherwise appear trite, they too often pervert the original meaning of words, and thus sacrifice propriety to ornament. A writer of this kind, not contented with saying that "a word is no longer *used* by good writers," will declare it to be "*repudiated* by good writers;" another will speak of the "*meretricious* allurements of sophistry;" and a third startles the illiterate with "*canons*," instead of *rules*, for deciding the propriety of discordant phraseologies.

ACATALECTIC, a verse which has the complete number of syllables.

ACCENT, as regards the English Language, means a certain stress of the voice upon a particular *letter* of a syllable, which distinguishes the syllable from others of which the word may be composed, and also the letter from the rest. The great distinction of our accent depends upon the seat, which may be either upon a vowel or a consonant. When the accent is on the vowel the syllable is long, because the accent is made by dwelling upon the vowel, as *vócal*. When it is upon the consonant the syllable is short, because the accent is made by passing rapidly over the vowel and giving a smart stroke of the voice to the following consonant, as *vol'ume*. Accent regulates the pronunciation of the English language; those persons, therefore, who countenance unnecessary changes in the accentuation of words are destroying the harmony of our best writers. The dry and harsh style of many authors may be owing, in a great degree, to the affectation of changing the accent of words that have been long established in the language.

A native of Ireland or Scotland is distinguished from an Englishman more by his utterance than by his accent, but a well-educated Englishman is distinguished from ordinary English speakers by the propriety of his accentuation, and the absense of provincialisms and a provincial tone.

ACCIDENCE, a little book containing the first rudiments of grammar.

ACCIDENT, in grammar, the property of a word. It is the property of a noun and of a pronoun to assume different forms to denote the relations they bear to other words in a sentence, and it is the property of a verb to vary its form to denote the person to whom the attribute expressed by the verb is said to belong, as *write, writest, writes*.

ACCUSATIVE, the fourth case of a Latin noun, corresponding with the objective case of English grammarians. The accusative, which in Latin is known any where from its variation, is in English known only from its position or place; it follows the verb.

ACROSTIC, a poem in which the first letter and sometimes the last letter of every line is taken to form a name.

ACROTELEUTIC, words added to the end of a psalm or hymn as a doxology.

ACTIVE *voice of a verb*, that form of the verbal attribute in which doing or acting is implied, as *I take, I carry, they assist*. Active transitive verbs necessarily require an object on which the very existence of the act and the attribute depend. The verb active, "to turn," is the putting an object into circular motion; the verb neuter, "to turn," implies the state of being in circular motion, pp. 132—135.

ACUTE, a term applied to the accent when it falls on a consonant, as up'roar.

ACYROLOGY, careless or improper diction.

ADAGE, a proverb or trite saying. A copious and judicious selection of English proverbs has been published by Mr. Maunder, in his TREASURY OF KNOWLEDGE.

ADDENDUM, (pl. Addenda,) an appendix to a work.

Some nouns taken from the Greek and other languages, instead of adding *s* to the singular, retain the original form of the plural.

ADJECTIVE. Etymólgy of, p. 65. Syntax of, p. 72.

There are two ways in which an adjective can stand in a proposition; we can say "The horse is bad," or "A bad horse." In the first example *horse* is called the subject, *is* the copula or connecting link, and *bad* the predicate or qualifying term.

But we cannot (as the author of the foregoing illustration supposes) say with propriety, "The man walks *slow*, he rides *quick*, he talks *loud*," for the words slow, quick, and loud qualify their respective verbs, and being used as adverbs, require the termination *ly* to denote their manner of signification. There are, it is true, some words that are used both as adjectives and adverbs, but this use of the adjective is to be considered rather as a defect in the language than as consonant with the English idiom, or as conformable to the true principles of construction. It is because the mind perceives the impropriety, and feels the want of the necessary distinction, that usage is now beginning to be opposed to this mode of expression. Instead of saying, "He speaks low," it would be more correct to say, "He speaks in a low voice." The reason that the adverbial phrase appears necessary here is, that the word lowly is an adjective, and suggests the meaning of meek, humble, mild. Lowlily is an adverb derived from the adjective lowly, and of the same signification; therefore the adverb lowly, as opposed to loudly, appears inadmissible, and from some cause of this kind the difficulty of forming some adverbs in *ly* may be traced.

ADJECTIVELY, a word used in the manner of an adjective to denote some property or quality of a noun. Many substantive nouns are thus employed, as *house* agent, *land* surveyor, p. 65.

ADNOUN, a term synonymous with adjective, p. 65.

Some grammarians have endeavoured to introduce the term adnoun instead of adjective, but it has been justly observed, that though the word *adjective* is not a very good name, *adnoun* is no better.

ADVERB. Etymology of, p. 140. Syntax of, p. 148.

ÆCLOGUE, a pastoral poem.

AGENT, that which acts. The subject of an active verb.

AGREEMENT, see Concord, p. 55.

ALEXANDRINE, a verse consisting of twelve syllables.

ALLEGORY, a figurative discourse, in which something is intended that is not contained in the words literally taken.

ALLITERATION is the beginning two or more words with the same letter, "as soft sleep, profoundly pleasing power."

ALLOCUTION, the act of speaking to another.

ALPHABET, the characters representing the elementary sounds of a language. "It is much to be lamented," says Dr. Darwin, "that the alphabet, which has produced and preserved almost all the improvements in other arts and sciences, should have itself received no improvement in modern times, which have added so much elucidation to almost every branch of knowledge that can meliorate the condition of humanity; thus, in our present alphabets, many letters are redundant, others are wanting: some simple articulate sounds have two letters to suggest them, and in other instances two articulate sounds are suggested by one letter."

ALTILOQUENCE, pompous language.

ALTISONANT, high sounding; pompous in sound.

AMANUENSIS, one who writes what another dictates, or copies what has been written.

AMBAGES, a circuit of words, a multiplicity of words.

AMBIGUITY, doubtfulness of meaning, uncertainty of signification.

AMBILOGY, talk of ambiguous signification.

AMPHIBOLOGY, discourse of uncertain meaning.

AMPHIBRACH, a foot of three syllables, having the middle one long and the others short, as *hăbērĕ*.

AMPLIFICATION, exaggerated representation.

AN, the indefinite article put before nouns beginning with a vowel or a silent *h*, pp. 24—39.

AN, conjunction, p. 167.

ANAGRAM, a conceit arising from the letters of a name transposed so as to form some other word or sentence.

ANADIPLOSIS, reduplication, a figure in rhetoric.

ANALOGY is used by grammarians to signify the agreement of several words in one common mode.

"The English grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its participles of the past, that they all terminate in *d*, *t*, or *n*. This *analogy* is perhaps liable to as few exceptions as any. Considering, therefore, how little *analogy* of any kind we have in our language, it seems wrong to an-

nihilate the few traces that may be found. It would be well, therefore, if all writers who endeavour to be accurate would be careful to avoid a corruption at present so prevalent, of saying *it was wrote* for *it was written*, *he was drove* for *he was driven*, *I have went* for *I have gone*, &c.; in all which instances a verb is absurdly used to supply the proper participle without any necessity from the want of such a word."

ANAMNESIS, a figure in rhetoric; it calls to mind what has been omitted.

ANAPEST, a foot consisting of three syllables, two short and one long, the reverse of the dactyle.

ANAPHORA, a figure when several clauses of a sentence are begun with the same word.

ANASTROPHE, a figure whereby words which should have been precedent are postponed.

AND, conj. p. 166.

ANECDOTE, something yet unpublished.

ANGLICISE, to make English.

ANGLICISM, an English idiom; a mode of speech peculiar to the English.

ANNALS, history digested in the order of years.

ANNOTATION, a note, an explication.

ANNOTATOR, a writer of notes, a commentator.

ANOMALY, a deviation from common rule.

ANTANACLASIS, a figure in rhetoric when the same word is repeated in a different but not in a contrary signification.

ANTANAGOGE, a figure which consists in replying to an adversary by way of recrimination, as when the accusation of one party is unanswerable, the accused person charges him with the same or another crime.

ANTE, a Latin preposition, signifying *before*, frequently used in composition, as antemeridian.

ANTECEDENT, in grammar, the noun to which the relative refers.

ANTEPENULT, the last syllable but two.

ANTEPOSITION, in grammar, the placing of one word before another.

ANTHORISM, in rhetoric, a description or definition contrary to that which is given by the adverse party.

ANTHYPOPHORA, a figure in rhetoric, which signifies a contrary illation or inference.

ANTI, a particle much used in composition, and signifies contrary to.

ANTICLIMAX, a sentence in which the last part expresses something lower than the first. See CLIMAX.

ANTIHYPOPHORA, a figure which consists in refuting an objection by the opposition of a contrary sentence.

ANTILOGY, a contradiction between words.

ANTILOQUY, a word denoting preface, proem, or peroration.

ANTIMETRICAL, contrary to the rules of metre or verse.

ANTIPHRASIS, the use of words in a sense opposite to their proper meaning.

ANTIPTOSIS, a figure in grammar by which one case is put for another.

ANTISTROPHE. In an ode sung in parts is the second stanza of every three and sometimes every second stanza.

ANTISTROPHON, a figure which repeats a word often.

ANTITHESIS, a figure in rhetoric which illustrates by the introduction of contraries.

"By honour, and dishonour; by evil report, and good report; as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and behold we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, yet possessing all things."

AORIST, indefinite; a term applied to certain tenses of the verb in Greek. It is stated that an ancient Greek verb, with its participles, consists of eleven hundred terminations; a modern Greek verb has no more than an Italian one.

APARITHMESIS, a figure in rhetoric; enumeration.

APHŒRESIS, a figure in grammar that takes away a letter or syllable from the beginning of a word.

APHORISM, a short select sentence, a general maxim or rule in any art or science.

APOCOPE, a figure in grammar, whereby the last syllable or letter is cut off, as, as *th'* for *the*.

APOCRYPHAL, of uncertain authority.

APODIOXIS, a figure in rhetoric, whereby an argument is with indignation rejected as absurd.

APODIXIS, a plain proof or evident demonstration.

APODOSIS, in rhetoric, is called reddition, which is the application or latter part of a similitude.

APOLOGUE, a fable or story inculcating some moral truth.

APOPEMPTIC, denoting a song or hymn among the ancients, sung or addressed to a stranger on his departure from a place.

APOPHASIS, a figure by which the orator

seems to wave what he would plainly insinuate, as

"I might speak concerning your youth, which you have spent in the most abandoned profligacy, if I apprehended this to be a proper season, but I now purposely wave it."

APOPHTHEGM, a short instructive sentence.

APORIA, a figure by which the speaker doubts where to begin.

APOSIOPESIS, a form of speech by which the speaker, through some affection or vehemency, breaks off his speech, as "she is—but I will forbear."

The aposiopesis gives that energy which words cannot express, and hence it is that silence in some cases will have greater power than a diffusive eloquence.

APOSTROPHE, in grammar, is a mark expressed thus ' shewing that there is a letter omitted, as ne'er for never, lov'd for loved. It is also employed as the sign of the possessive case.

APOSTROPHE, in rhetoric, is a figure in which the speaker breaks off to address some person or object, and is judged most proper when applied to absent persons or inanimate beings.

APOTHEGM, see APOPHTHEGM.

APORIME, a figure in rhetoric, when one is at a loss what to say.

APPELLATIVE, a name common to all of the same species, as *city, house, river, flower.*

APPENDIX, (pl. *Appendixes,*) a supplement to a treatise by way of addition or illustration.

APPOSITION, the putting of two nouns in the same case.

APTOTON, a noun that is not declined with cases.

ARCHAIOLOGY, a discourse of antiquity.

ARCHAISM, an ancient phrase.

ARCHETYPE, the original of which any resemblance is made.

ARGUMENT, the subject of any discourse or writing; the contents of any work summed up by way of abstract

ARTICLE. Etymology of, p. 24. Syntax of, p. 31.

ARTICULATION, the act of forming words.

"What is called articulation is performed, not by the lungs, windpipe, or larynx, but by the action of the throat, palate, teeth, tongue, lips, and nostrils. Articulation begins not till the breath or voice has passed through the larynx."

ASPERATE, to roughen.

ASPIRATE, the mark to denote an aspirated pronunciation.

ASPIRATED, uttered by the breath. The letter *h* in most words is said to be aspirated, as *a horse*, a *high place*, not a *norse*, a *nigh* place.

ASSOCIATION, that faculty of the mind on which memory chiefly depends.

"Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain,
Our thoughts are linked by many a hidden chain.
Awake but one, and lo! what myriads rise;
Each stamps its image as the other flies;
Each thrills the seat of sense, that sacred source,
Whence the fine nerves direct their mazy course."

ASTEKISK, * a mark used in printing, usually referring to a marginal note.

ASYNDETON, a figure in grammar, when a conjunction copulative is omitted. The asyndeton leaves out the connecting particles to represent the celerity of an action, or the haste and eagerness of the speaker.

ATTICISM, an imitation of the attic style, a concise and elegant mode of expression.

AUTHORITY, in grammar, a passage quoted from a classical writer to show the propriety of a word or phrase, p. 9.

"No authority, however respectble, can sanction inconsistency; and great names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent reader either for demonstration or argument."—CROMBIE.

AUTOGRAPH, one's own writing. Autographs of eminent characters are frequently collected by the curious; they are certainly more valuable than specimens of moths and butterflies.

AUXESIS, amplification; a rhetorical figure, when any thing is magnified too much.

AUXILIARY VERBS, p. 112. Remarks on, p. 115.

AXIOM, a self-evident principle, which is so clear in itself that it is not capable of being made clearer by any kind of proof. It is an old *maxim*, that nothing is more difficult than to PROVE the truth of a self-evident *axiom*, or that which is obvious to the sense of all mankind.

B.

B, the second letter of the alphabet, said to be "neither a *perfect* mute nor a *perfect* consonant, but something between both." See p. 8.

BACCHIUS, in ancient poetry, a foot composed of a short syllable and two long ones, as *hŏnēstās.*

BALLAD, a popular song, a ditty.
BARBARA, a technical word, each of whose syllables prefixed before the propositions of a syllogism in the first mood and first figure, denote the universal affirmation of the propositions.
BARALIPTON, in logic, an imperfect syllogism of two universals and a particular affirmative.
BARBARISM, "an impropriety of speech, any term or expression totally unsupported by the present usage of good writers. Ex. 'I rode in a one horse *chay*.' It ought to be 'a one horse chaise:' there is no such word as *chay*. "*Ungrate* is a barbarism. *Ingrate* is to be found in some of our English poets as an adjective, and synonymous with 'ungrateful;' but ungrate, as a substantive, is truly barbarous."—*Crombie*.
BAROCO, a syllogistic mood in logic.
BARYTONE, a word with the grave accent on the last syllable. "If the inspector does not know what is meant by the grave accent, it may be necessary to inform him, that writers on the Greek accent tell us that every syllable which has not the acute accent has the grave, and as there could be but one syllable acuted in that language, the rest must necessarily be grave. What these accents are has puzzled the learned so much that they seem neither to understand each other nor themselves; but it were to be wished they had kept this distinction into acute and grave out of our own language, as it is impossible to annex any clear ideas to it, except we consider the grave accent merely as the absence of the acute, which renders it no accent at all. If we divide the voice into its two leading inflections, the rising and falling, and call the former the acute and the latter the grave, we can annex distinct ideas to these words, and perhaps it is an ignorance of this distinction of speaking sounds, and confounding them with high and low, or loud and soft, that occasions the confusion we meet with in writers on this subject."—*Walker*.
BATHOS, sinking in poetry. The author of the "Treatise of the Art of Sinking in Poetry," observes, "That to excel in the bathos, a genius is requisite; yet the rules of art must be allowed to be so far useful as to add *weight*, or, as I may say, hang on, *lead* to facilitate and enforce our *descent*; to guide us to the most advantageous declivities, and habituate our imagination to a *depth* of thinking."
BATTOLOGIST, one who repeats the same thing in speaking or writing.
BATTOLOGY, vain repetition of the same words, babbling
BE, the substantive verb, p. 112.
BECAUSE, conj. p. 176.
BEING, existence, p. 134.
BELLES LETTRES, polite literature.
BIBLE, emphatically called *the* Book.
It is gratifying to reflect, that while the excellent translation of THE BIBLE remains unpoluted by the hand of the fastidious critic, there will exist a standard of propriety in the English language, affording the best security for the stability of our mother tongue.
There is one proof of the divine origin of the Bible, which appears too obvious to have escaped notice, that, while the language of contemporary authors has gradually lost its freshness, and partially become obsolete, this BOOK has retained its vigour of expression and its power of conviction in every state of human society, and in every condition of human life.
BIBLIOMANIA, the rage of possessing scarce or curious books.
BIBLIOPOLIST, a bookseller.
BIOGRAPHER, a writer of lives.
BIOGRAPHY, a writing the lives of men.
BLANK *verse*, verses without rhymes.
BLAIR, Dr., on the rise and progress of the English language, p. 195.
BRACHYGRAPHY, the art of writing short hand.
BRACHYLOGY, in rhetoric, the expressing anything in the most concise manner.
BREVILOQUENCE, a short and apt mode of speaking.
BREVITY, shortness, conciseness.
BROGUE, corrupt accent and intonation.
BUCOLICS, pastoral songs or poems, in which country swains are represented as discoursing together.
BURLESQUE, that kind of writing which tends to excite laughter.
BUT, conj. p. 178.
BY, prep. p. 152.

C.

C has two sounds, one like *k*, which is called its hard sound, as in *cat*, the other like *s*, called its soft sound, as in *city*, *celestial*, *cypress*. C sounds like *k* before a consonant, and before the vowels *a*, *o*, *u*, and like *s* before the vowels *e*, *i*, and *y*.
CACOGRAPHY, incorrect spelling.
CACOLOGY, corrupt pronunciation, as Lunnun for London.
CACOPHONY, or a harsh sound of words.

CADENCE, the fall of the voice; the flow of verses or periods.

CÆSURA, a figure in poetry, by which a short syllable after a complete foot is made long; a pause in verse.

CANT, to talk in the jargon of thieves and blackguards.

CANTO, a book or section of a poem.

CARDINAL *Numbers* are such as express the number of things, as one, two, three, &c.

CARET, a mark placed between words to show that something has been

am
omitted, as "I very sorry." This
A

sign has been named by Mr. Cobbett the *blunder mark*.

CASE, the variation of a noun or pronoun, p. 52.

CATACHRESIS, the abuse of a trope, when the words are too far wrested from their original signification, as a *beautiful* apple, a *sweet* girl, instead of a *sweet apple*, a *beautiful girl*.

CATALECTIC, wanting a syllable in versification.

CATASTROPHE, the final event of a dramatic piece.

CATEGORY, an order of ideas, a predicament.

CAUSE, that which produces any thing.

CEDILLA, a mark placed under the *ç* in French to denote that it is to be sounded like *s*.

CHARADE, a species of riddle.

CIRCUMFLEX [^], a mark employed to denote the union of the grave and the acute accent

"All our prosodiests tell us that the circumflex accent is a composition of the grave and the acute, or that it is a raising and falling of the voice upon the same syllable. If they are desired to exemplify this by actual pronunciation, we find they cannot do it, and only pay us with words. This accent, therefore, in the ancient as well as modern languages, with respect to sound, has no specific utility." *Walker*.

CIRCUMLOCUTION, the use of many words, or of indirect expressions.

CLASSIC, an author of the first rank.

CLAUSE, a part of a compound sentence or period. "The ox knoweth his owner,—and the ass his master's crib; —but Israel doth not know,—my people do not consider." This sentence consists of two compounded members, each of which is subdivided into two simple members, which are properly called clauses.

CLIMAX, a figure in rhetoric, by which the force of expression in a sentence rises gradually in strength and dignity, as "The boy despises the infant, the man the boy, the philosopher both, and the Christian all."

Mr. Cobbett, in his excellent introductory letter to his English Grammar, furnishes an example of the climax: "To ignorant pretenders to surgery and medicine we *award* our CONTEMPT and SCORN; on time-serving and treacherous counsellors, and on cruel judges, we *inflict* our DETESTATION and ABHORRENCE; while on rapacious, corrupt, perfidious, or tyrannical statesmen and legislators, the voice of human nature *cries aloud* for EXECRATION and VENGEANCE."

The ANTICLIMAX, as the term implies, is opposed to the climax, as

"Not only London echoes with thy fame,
But also Islington has heard the same."

COLLECTIVE *nouns* are such as denote objects composed of a number of individuals, as an army, the parliament, a mob.

COLLOQUIAL, relating to common conversation.

COLON, a point or stop in grammar marked thus [:], distinguishing the principal division of a compound sentence.

COMMA, a point denoting a less division of a compound sentence than those separated by a semicolon or colon.

COMMENT, an exposition, remark, or observation.

COMMON *nouns*, those that represent a class or species, p. 41.

COMPARATIVE *degree* expresses the increase of a quality as compared with the same quality in another object, p. 69.

COMPLEX, not simple.

COMPOUND *sentence* is that which has more than one proposition expressed, and in which the simple sentences are joined by one or more connecting words.

COMPOSITION, in grammar, is the act of joining words or sentences.

CON, an inseparable preposition, which at the beginning of words signifies union or association.

CONCORD, the agreement of words in construction, p. 55.

CONCRETE, in logic, is any quality considered with its subject; thus, when we say, snow is *white*, we speak of whiteness in the concrete, and in this respect it is contra-distinguished from

the abstract, when the quality is considered separately, as whiteness.

CONDITIONAL *mood*, see subjunctive mood, p. 130.

CONJUGATE, to vary a verb according to its several moods, tenses and persons.

CONJUGATION, the inflection of verbs, p. 123.

CONJUNCTION. Etymology of, p. 165. Syntax of, p. 186.

CONNECTIVES, such words as serve to unite the members or clauses of a sentence.

CONSONANTS are those letters of the alphabet which cannot be fully sounded without the aid of vowels. They are divided into mutes; *b, d, k, p, t,* and *c* and *g* hard; semivowels, *l, f, m, n, r, s, v, x, z,* and *c* and *g* soft. Four of the semivowels, *l, m, n, r,* are also called liquids, from their readily uniting with other consonants.

It has been remarked, "that the consonants are the nerves and sinews of a language. Nothing contributes more to clearness, distinctness, and force in the delivery of a public reader or speaker than his perfecting the articulation of every consonant which custom will allow to be sounded in the common pronunciation of every word in the language."

CONSTRUCTION is the arrangement of words in a sentence, so as to convey the precise meaning of the speaker or writer.

Under this term we select as an example a phrase of very frequent occurrence, but the propriety of which still appears undecided by grammarians: Ex. "It was then that the *two first* chapters of the *first* book were composed." This construction is sanctioned by some grammarians solely because "usage is decidedly in favour of the phraseology;" nay, it has been asserted that the *first two* is equally objectionable. In defence of the last phraseology, we remark, that the mind *at once* perceives that there cannot be two *first* chapters to *one* book, and that the phrase, "the two first," is evidently incorrect. It is true, every one knows that the first and second chapters are alluded to; but since there is a choice of expression, and the phrase, "the first two," is equally intelligible, why is not that idiom which is irreconcilable with truth superseded by one which may be tolerated, and which, although perhaps not in every case strictly correct, is sufficiently so to define the numbers of a series thus distributively considered, for we may, and often do, for convenience sake, suppose the individuals of a series arranged into pairs, &c., though no such arrangement actually exists; and thus we are enabled to compare the *first two* chapters of a book with the *second two*, or in any other combination which we may think proper. But it is not true that the "first two" and the "two first" are equivalent expressions, and this may be seen by comparing the following example with the preceding.

"The *three first tenses*," says Mr. Harris, in his Hermes, "we call the inceptive present, the inceptive past, and the inceptive future; *the three next*, the middle present, the middle past, and the middle future; and the three last, the completive present, the completive past, and the completive future." The author, in this example, refers to *three firsts* as the leading individuals of three series. The expression, "the first three," in *this* instance, would have been incorrect, and would have misled the reader, by implying that the three individuals of the *first* series had been referred to, whereas, the author refers every time to three individuals belonging to separate series; *the three first, the three next, the three last*

"The order of the letters," says Dr. Russell, "are called alphabet from the *first two* Greek letters."

Will any one contend, that "the two first" in this example would have been equally proper? Beta is not a first letter, though alpha and beta are the first two.

These remarks will, perhaps, appear trifling; but it should be remembered that every *disputed* point in grammar presents a *difficulty* to the learner, and that no pains should be spared to remove any *doubt* as to the propriety of giving a preference to one construction rather than to another.

CONSTRUE, to interpret, to explain.

"It is a scandal to seminaries of learning that the pronunciation *construe* for construe should prevail there. Those who ought to be the guardians of propriety are often the perverters of it."—*Walker.*

COPULA, the third person singular of the verb to be; the word that simply affirms and unites the subject and predicate of a proposition, p. 110.

CORRIGENDA, words to be altered or corrected by the reader.

D.

D, the sound of this letter in English is uniform; it is never mute.

DACTYLE, a poetical foot, consisting of one long syllable and two short.

DACTYLOGY, the art of conversing by the hands.

DARWIN, on the origin of language, p. 192.

DASH (—), a mark used in writing.

DATA, truths admitted.

DATIVE, in grammar the case that signifies the person to whom any thing is given.

DATUM, a truth granted and admitted.

DECLAMATION, a discourse addressed to the passions.

DECLAMATORY, appealing to the passions.

DECLARATORY, affirmative.

DECLENSION, the inflection of a noun. The only variation that a *noun* admits of in English, (except the modification to denote the plural number) is that which denotes possession, as *my father's* house. The pronoun admits of two variations, one denoting the relation of property, as *my*, in the preceding example; the other denoting that the object is connected with the the principal noun, and is governed by a verb or preposition, as, "He accuses *me*."

DEFECTIVE *nouns*, such as are indeclinable.

DEFECTIVE *verbs*, which want some of their moods, persons, or tenses.

DEFINE, to explain any thing by its qualities, or otherwise.

DEFINITE ARTICLE, p. 34.

DEFINITIVE, that which defines.

DEGREES *of comparison*, p. 69.

DELE, blot out; erase.

DEMONSTRATIVE pronouns, p. 85.

DENOMINATE, to name.

DEPONENT *verbs* are those that have no active voice.

DERIVATION. The tracing a word from its original, p. 194. Dr. Darwin observes "that the word *sack* is said to mean a bag in all European countries, as *σακκον* in Greek, *saccus* in Latin, *sacco* in Italian, *sac* in French, and *sack* in English and German." But the author might have traced this word still farther, for it originates from the Hebrew. Yet, of what utility is a knowledge of this fact? As far as language is concerned, the result of the inquiry is of little importance. The term *sack* is independent of derivation, and cannot well be misapplied. Nor would the meaning of the word *in this instance* be better understood, if it were possible to ascertain under what circumstances the thing called a sack acquired its name. It would be only going still farther beyond the point that separates what is useful from what is curious or amusing. It has been observed that as far as the exact meaning of any word *depends* on the circumstances that gave rise to the term, it is of great importance to trace the origin of the word, and to refer to its original application in order to determine its signification. In proof of this, we quote one example from the many that might be adduced, shewing the necessity of attending to the origin of words, when the meaning to be attached to them is to be found only in the original application. The term *Laconic* has its origin from the people of Laconia, who were remarkable for conciseness of expression; a person acquainted with this circumstance would hardly misapply the term; but one not very well read in ancient history observed, that a certain celebrated orator had made a very laconic speech, which lasted nearly four hours.—Here the term laconic was used instead of sarcastic.

DERIVATIVE, a word formed from another word, and participating in the signification expressed by its primitive.

Most words, in every language, are found to be derivatives. If those who are learning a language were to direct their attention to the primitives, and endeavour to ascertain the precise signification attached by correct writers to those words, the labour of acquiring the meaning of the derivatives would be greatly abridged; besides it should be remembered that any defect in our knowledge of the meaning of the primitive must necessarily obscure our conception of the signification to be attached to the derivative; hence the importance of attending to the circumstances that gave to words their primary meaning; but it is not always practicable, nor is it absolutely necessary, to trace a word to its origin; thus a person having acquired the meaning of the verb to derivate or derive, would immediately become acquainted with the several parts of speech springing from that verb; it would be found that the word *derivative* was formed to mark the *property* of a word *derivated* or *derived* from another word, and though

used at first as an *adjective*, at length became the *name* of that *class of words*; that *deriver* was one who draws from the source; that *derivation* was the *act of drawing* from the source, and, as applied to language, means the tracing a word from its original; and that *derivatively* was a term differing from its corresponding adjective only in its *manner* of signification.

DESCANT, a song or tune composed in parts; also to discourse at large.

DETERMINATE, settled, fixed, definite, conclusive.

DIÆRESIS, a mark placed over a vowel to shew that it is to be pronounced as a distinct syllable, as *aërial*.

DIALOGUE, a conversation between two persons.

DIALYSIS, a figure in rhetoric by which syllables or words are divided.

DIAPORESIS, in rhetoric, wherein the orator seems to doubt which subject should have the preference.

DIASYRMUS, a figure in rhetoric, by which a person or thing is commended by way of derision.

DIATRIBE, a continued discourse or disputation.

DIATYPOSIS, a description wherein things are represented in so lively a manner that they seem as it were before our eyes.

DICACIOUS, talkative.

DICTAMEN, a thing written by another's instruction.

DICTATE, to direct another what to write.

DICTION, style, language, expression.

DICTIONARY, a collection of the words of any language in alphabetical order.

DIDACTIC, instructive.

DEFINITIVE, determinate.

DIMINUTIVE, a word formed to express littleness, as—devil*kin*, a *little* devil.

DIPHTHONG, the union of two vowels pronounced by a single impulse of the voice, as *pain, laugh, laudable*.

Diphthongs are called *proper* when both the vowel sounds are heard, as in *pain, laudable*; they are called *improper* when only one of the vowel sounds is uttered, as in *laugh*. "The coalition *oi*" says Dr. Johnson, "approaches more nearly than any combination in our tongue to the notion of a diphthong." In the vulgar pronunciation of this diphthong the sound of *i* only is distinctly uttered, as tile, bile, nisome, for toil, boil, noisome."

The following are the diphthongs in the English language, which, from being thus arranged, may be easily committed to memory.

aa	æ	ai	ao	au	aw	ay
ea	ee	ei	eo	eu	ew	ey
oa	œ	oi	oo	ou	ow	oy
		ie	ue	ui		

DIPTOTE, a noun consisting of two cases only.

DISJUNCTIVE *conjunctions* are such as denote an opposition in the meaning of the clauses of a compound sentence.

DISSYLABLE, a word of two syllables.

DISTICH, two verses.

DISTRIBUTIVE; the pronouns *each, every, either*, are called by some grammarians distributives.

DITHYRAMBIC, a song in honour of Bacchus, wild, enthusiastic.

Do, irr. verb, p. 117.

DOING, applicable to verbs active transitive. The distinction between "being" as implied by a neuter verb, and "doing" as implied by an active transitive verb, may be perceived in the following awkward attempt to form a new verb. "The originals of the Poem Watty and Meg were a worthy couple of Wilson's acquaintance. When the good dame read the poem she exclaimed to her husband 'D'ye ken what Sandy Wilson has done? he has *poemed* us!'"

DOGGEREL, a term applicable to mean contemptible poetry.

DRAMA, a poem accommodated to action; a poem in which the action is not related but represented, and in which, therefore, such rules are to be observed as make the representation probable.

DUNCE, a person incapable of instruction.

DURATION, remarks on, p. 131.

E.

E is the most frequent vowel in the English language, for it not only is used like the rest, but it has the peculiar quality of lengthening the foregoing vowel, as *can, cane, pin, pine*.

EDITED, published, corrected, prepared for publication.

EDITOR, one that revises any work for publication.

EDUCATE, to instruct youth; to nurture or bring up.

EGOTISM, the fault committed in writing, or in conversation, by the too frequent repetition of the personal pronoun *I*.

ELEGY, a mournful poem, a funeral song.

ELEMENTS, the letters of any language

are called its elements, because they are the constituent parts of artificial speech.

ELENCHUS, a sophistical argument.

ELLIPSIS, a figure in rhetoric, in which something is left out, and in grammar, the omission of words for the sake of dispatch, or to avoid prolixity and useless repetitions.

Grammatical ellipsis is altogether different from the figurative. In conversation and familiar writing the former is to be found in almost every sentence, and is no indication of emotion. Its end is mere brevity. We have a fine example of figurative ellipsis in the words of Isaac, on discovering that he was deceived in conferring the blessing.

Ex. "Who? where is he that hath taken venison and brought it me?"—(Gen. ch. xxvii. v. 33.)

ELOQUENCE, the power of speaking with fluency and elegance.

EMPHASIS, the peculiar stress of the voice on the important *words* of a sentence. If the reader, or speaker, attend to the *sense* of what he is reading or saying, rather than to the manner of expressing himself, he will not err greatly in the delivering of his own sentiments or those of another.

EMPHATIC *words* are frequently printed in a different type, lest the weight to be attached to them should be overlooked by the reader.

EN, an inseparable particle borrowed from the French, and by the French formed from the Latin *in*. Many words are written *en* or *in*, as entire, intire. *En* is changed into *em* before some letters for more easy pronunciation.

ENALLAGE, a figure of grammar whereby some change is made of the common modes of speech, as when one mood or tense of a verb is put for another, as "I *go* to town to-morrow."

ENCLITIC, a word added to the end of another word, as que, ne, ve, in Latin.

ENCYCLOPEDIA, the whole circle or compass of learning which comprehends all the liberal arts and sciences.

ENDORSED, registered on the back of a writing, superscribed.

ENIGMA, a riddle; an obscure question.

ENTHYMEME, in logic, a syllogism where the major proposition is wanting, and only the minor and consequence is expressed in words.

ENUNCIATION, manner of utterance; also a declaration.

EP *epi*, in composition usually signifies *on*.

EPENTHESIS, the addition of a vowel or consonant in the middle of a word.

EPICENE, the common gender of Latin nouns.

EPIC, a poem not acted, but rehearsed, usually heroic.

EPIGRAM, a short witty poem.

EPILOGUE, the poem or speech at the end of a play.

EPIPHONEMA, a figure in rhetoric; an exclamation; a conclusive sentence not closely connected with the words foregoing.

EPIPLOCE, a figure in rhetoric, by which one aggravation or circumstance is added to another.

EPISODE, a digression in a poem separable from the main subject, yet arising naturally from it.

EPISTOLARY, relating to letters.

EPISTROPHE, a rhetorical figure which concludes each member of a sentence with the same word.

EPITAPH, an inscription upon a tomb.

EPITASIS, the progress of a plot in a drama.

EPITHET, a word added to a noun to express some quality, as a *noble* person.

EPITOME, an abridgment or summary.

EPITROPE, a rhetorical figure in which a concession is made with a view to obtain an advantage.

EQUIVOCAL, uncertain, doubtful.

"An equivocal expression is one which has one sense open, and designed to be understood, another sense, concealed, and understood only by the person who uses it. An ambiguous expression is one which has apparently two senses, and leaves us at a loss which of them to give it. An equivocal expression is used with an intention to deceive; an ambiguous one, when it is used with design, is with intention not to give full information. An honest man will never employ an equivocal expression, a confused man may often utter ambiguous ones without any design."

Mr. Tooke complained that he had been made the miserable victim of the conjunction *that*, and the prepositions *of* and *concerning*. "Mankind in general," says that writer, "are not sufficiently aware that words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning, are the everlasting engines of fraud and injustice, and that the *grimgribber* of Westminster Hall is a more fertile and a much more formidable source of imposture than the *abracadabra* of magicians."

ERRATA, faults or omissions which have escaped correction in printing.

ETYMOLOGY in its primitive acceptation means the tracing of a word from its original. The part of grammar which treats of the inflections of the declinable parts of speech, p. 12.

ETYMON, the primitive word.

EUPHEMISM, a figure whereby a harsh or indelicate word is changed into one that is inoffensive.

EUPHONY, agreeable sound.

EXISTENCE, remarks on, p. 114.

EXORDIUM, the commencement of a discourse, by which the orator prepares the minds of his auditors for that which is to follow.

EXPLETIVE, filling up.

"Expletives are all those words which pass for empty sounds, and are of no other use than to fill a verse, or to modulate a period."

Expletives are distinguishable from emphatic words, for the expressions "I *do* write," "he *does* work," "they *did* run," are objectionable only when the simple forms "I write," "he works," "they ran," would be sufficient; but when these simple propositions are questioned, then the auxiliaries may be properly employed, since they give force to a declaration, and *affirm* that which before was only *asserted*.

Nearly allied to this kind of words are those terms which seem intended to express an idea, but are not understood even by those who invent them, such as the *absolute* case of a noun.

F.

F has, in English, an invariable sound, produced by applying the middle of the under lip to the teeth.

FABLE, a story devised for the sake of instruction; also a feigned tale, or mere falsehood.

FACETIÆ, humourous compositions.

FALLACY, a deceitful argument.

FEMININE, see gender, p. 42.

FIGURATIVE, not literal.

FIGURES in rhetoric are words wrested from their literal meanings.

"Figures are the language of nature, not an invention of art, and however bold, or even apparently absurd, they originate in the principles of our constitutions. In the use of them the vulgar are often more correct than the learned, the former speaking as nature prompts, the latter, attempting to forge them by study from an affectation of ornament."

FINITE VERBS are those to which number and person belong.

FOLIO, a book of which the pages are formed by a sheet of paper once doubled.

FOOT, a certain number of syllables constituting a distinct part of a verse.

FOR, *prep.* p. 150; *conj.* p. 175.

FORCE of SIGNIFICATION, clearness of meaning. The force of a word is said to depend upon the *number* of ideas of which that word is the sign.

FREQUENTATIVE, a grammatical term applied to verbs, signifying the frequent repetition of an action.

FROM, *prep.* p. 155.

G.

G has two sounds, one called *hard*, as in *gate, give;* the other, *soft*, as in *gentle.*

GAELIC, a dialect of the Celtic tongue.

GALLICISM, a French idiom, or mode of speech peculiar to the French.

GENDER, the distinction of sex, p. 42.

GENERAL TERMS, comprehending many species, or individuals. Words of this kind are called by grammarians appellative or common nouns. The *necessity* of general terms is shewn by Mr. Locke in his Essay, b. iii. ch. 3.

GENITIVE, that case of a noun by which property or possession is chiefly implied. The genitive corresponds with the possessive case of English grammarians.

GEORGICS, rural poems relating to husbandry.

GERUND, a Latin verbal noun. It governs the case of its verb, and in respect to signification supplies the place of the infinitive mood. It appears to partake more of the nature of a participle than of the infinitive. In English its place is supplied by the present and the past participles of verbs preceded by a preposition.

GIF, *conj.* p. 167.

GLOSSARY, a dictionary of obscure or obsolete words in any language.

GNOMONOLOGY, a collection of maxims and reflections.

GOVERNMENT, the power one word has over another, p. 55.

GRAMMAR, that science by which the correct use of words is ascertained; also the art of speaking and writing correctly.

"Grammar is the last thing that should be placed in the hands of children, as containing the most abstract and metaphysical propositions utterly beyond their power of comprehension, putting them to unnecessary torture, giving them the habit of taking

words for things, and exercising their memory at the expence of their judgment."

The grammar of any language is said to be no other than a collection of general observations methodically digested, and comprising all the modes previously and independently established, by which the significations and combinations of words in that language are ascertained. "A knowledge of grammar," Mr. Cobbett has justly observed, "is the foundation of all literature, because, without this knowledge, opportunities for writing and speaking are only occasions for men to display their unfitness to write and speak."

GRAMMARIAN, one that is skilled in or teaches grammar.

GRANDILOQUENCE, high, lofty speaking.

GRECISM, an idiom of the Greek language.

H.

H, the letter that notes aspiration, as hand, not to be pronounced "and," as it too commonly is, but with a distinct aspiration before the vowel. There are but few words in English in which the *h* is not aspirated by correct speakers.

HARANGUE, a popular oration.

HARMONY, just proportion of sound. Metre is not confined to verse; there is a tune in all good prose.

HAVE, auxiliary verb, p. 117.

HEBRAISM, a Hebrew idiom.

HELENISM, a Greek idiom.

HEMISTICH, half a verse.

HERMENEUTICS, the art of finding the meaning of an author's words and phrases, and explaining it to others.

HEROIC VERSE in English poetry consists of ten feet.

HETEROCLITES, such nouns as vary from the common forms of declension.

HEXAMETER, a verse of six feet.

HIATUS, a difficulty of utterance occasioned by the meeting of vowels at the ending of one word and the beginning of another.

HIBERNICISM, a phrase peculiar to the natives of Ireland.

HIEROGLYPHICK, an emblem or figure by which a word is implied; used before the alphabet was invented.

"To resort to supernatural causes to account for the production of any rare or striking event is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful soever the art of alphabetic writing may appear, there can be no necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration if the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task. Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest mode of recording events, or communicating information by permanent signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters. How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through negligence, or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form and lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may be easily conceived. Hence that association which existed between the sign and the thing signified being found in resemblance would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted into mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of things."—CROMBIE.

HIM, the objective case of the pronoun he.

HYPALLAGE, a figure by which words change their cases with each other.

HYPERBATON, a figure in writing when the words are transposed from the plain grammatical order.

HYPERBOLE, a figure in rhetoric, by which any thing is increased or diminished beyond the truth.

HYPERCRITICAL, critical beyond use.—"It is," says Campbell, "by attending to such reflections as to a superficial observer would appear minute and hypercritical, that language must be improved and eloquence perfected."

HYPHEN, a note of conjunction used to connect syllables or compound words, as sea-water, p. 19.

HYSTERON-PROTERON, is the putting that first which should be last, as "to write and read" instead of "to read and write," "he was bred and born" for "he was born and bred."

In this last example it may be urged that "bred" does not in general mean "brought up," but that which is anterior to being *born*, and in that case the first construction is correct.

I.

I, the personal pronoun representing the speaker; the subject of the verb in the first person singular.

There are three words in English consisting of only one letter, the in-

definite article *a*, the pronoun *I*, and the interjection *O*; the last two are always represented by capital letters, as "O, I have alienated my friend," not, o i have alienated my friend.

IAMBICK, a foot in metre having the first syllable short and the other long, as *sălūs*, also a kind of verse so called consisting usually of four feet or of six.

This kind of verse is said to have been first invented by Archilochus, a Greek poet, and was applied by the ancients to invectives.

ICONISM, a true and lively description.

IDEA, the image or representation of any thing conceived in the mind.

"An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in the mind; it is a representation of something that we have *seen, felt, heard,* &c., or been conscious of. That notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is called the *idea* of a horse, tree, or a man."—WATTS.

IDIOM, a mode of speaking peculiar to a language or dialect. "The idioms of every language are in general the most valuable part of it, because they represent ideas which cannot so well be expressed in any other way. And the reason of this is, that they are either abbreviated methods of expressing things of constant recurrence, or have been invented to supply the general defects of language. To decide on the propriety of every phrase, from a principle of abstract reasoning, would be to restrict and mutilate the language, and render it unfit for the real purposes of life."—HASLETT.

How far a vague and inaccurate phraseology may injure the mind and retard its improvement, must be left to others to determine, but the inconvenience of being compelled to adopt any form of expression that is contrary to the principles of grammar, is too often felt by those who have to express their thoughts in writing.

IDIOTISM, a form of speech used by the vulgar; it also means folly, natural imbecility of mind. This word does not appear to be derived from idiom, nor to have the same signification.

IDYL, a short pastoral poem.

IF, a conj. p. 167.

ILLATION, inference; conclusion drawn from premises, hence some conjunctions have been denominated *illative* conjunctions, as *therefore, wherefore, then.*

ILLEGIBLE, what cannot be read.

ILLITERATE, unlearned.

ILLOGICALLY, in manner contrary to the laws of argument.

ILLUSTRATE, to explain, to clear, to elucidate.

ILLUSTRATION of the use of the *Articles*, p. 38; of the *Noun*, p. 63; *Adjective*, p. 75; *Pronoun*, p. 99; *Verb*, p. 139; *Adverb*, p. 149; *Preposition*, p. 164; *Conjunction*, p. 190; *Interjection*, p. 192.

IMAGINATION, the power of forming ideal pictures; the power of representing things absent to one's self or others.

IMPARASYLLABIC, not consisting of an equal number of syllables.

IMPERATIVE *Mood*, p. 127.

IMPERFECT, that tense of the verb which denotes past existence.

IMPERSONALS, those verbs are strictly called impersonal of which only the third person singular is found, and which do not admit a personal subject, (*I, thou, he,*) but a preposition, or a neuter noun understood.

IMPROMPTU, a short extemporaneous composition.

IMPROVE, derivation of, p. 197.

IN, *prep.* p. 152.

INDECLINABLE word, not varied by change of termination.

INDEFINITE, not limited, not determined.

INDEX, the table of contents to a book; also a mark of reference.

INDICATIVE, a mood in grammar expressing affirmation, p. 128.

INDIVIDUALITY, separate existence.

INFINITIVE mood, p. 125.

INFLECTION is the name given to those changes of termination which words undergo to express their various relations. Thus *s* in *boys*, *er* in *harder*, *se* in *whose*, *ed* in *killed*, are inflections of *boy*, *hard*, *who*, and *kill*.

Inflections, though now so incorporated with words as not to be used apart from them, were originally separate words significant of the circumstances intended.

The parts of speech which admit of inflection are the noun, the adjective, the pronoun, and the verb.

Mr. Cobbett, in his grammar, p. 16, has made no distinction between *inflection* and *derivation*. The reader is told that "walks, walked, and walking, are *derivatives* of walk." These words are merely inflections of the verb "to walk;" but *walker* is a *derivative*, a distinct part of speech derived from the verb to walk.

INITIALS, letters at the beginning of words or of names.
INTERJECTION, p. 191.
It is a melancholy reflection that mankind announce their entrance into life by an interjection expressive of grief, and it not unfrequently happens that their last respiration is spent in giving utterance to an exclamation denoting pain and suffering. Thus interjections may be considered the *A*lpha and *O*mega of human speech.
INTERROGATIVE, a pronoun used in asking questions, as, who? what? which?
INTRANSITIVE, a verb which signifies an action not conceived, as having an effect upon any object, as to *run*.
IRONY, a figure of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the words.
IRREGULAR VERBS, are those that do not form the past tense and the past participle by the addition of *d* or *ed*.
IRREGULARITY of the verb to be, p. 113.

J.

J, a consonant, it has invariably the same sound as *g* in giant.
JABBERER, one who talks unintelligibly.
JACULATORY, uttering in short sentences.
JARGON, unintelligible talk.
JOURNAL, a diary; any paper published daily.
JUDGMENT, the power of discerning the relations between one term or proposition and another.
JUXTA-POSITION, the act of placing together; opposition.

K.

K, a letter borrowed from the Greek, has before all the vowels one unvaried sound, as kail, keep, kin.
KICKSYWICKSEY, a word used in ridicule and disdain of a wife.
In the absence of technical words beginning with this letter, we have given one of those terms that originate in caprice and are retained in the language perhaps from a supposed fitness to the object represented.
It must be confessed that there is something in the very sound of the words "kicksy wicksey" that would deter most men from applying it to an irritable wife, but words of this class can scarcely be considered a part of the English language, and might with great propriety have a place assigned to them in modern dictionaries, or be discountenanced as vulgarisms by omitting them altogether.
KINDS OF VERBS, p. 132.
KNOWLEDGE, certain perception; skill in any thing.
"There is far more satisfaction in a little sound knowledge than in a great quantity of superficial. The distinction between information and knowledge is, that the first is only a mass of facts unexamined, the second, a system of truths understood. Now any one who possesses memory may possess information, but none can possess knowledge who do not possess mind."

L.

L, a consonant classed among the semivowels; it is also called a liquid, from readily uniting with other consonants.
LABDACISM is when the letter *l* is pronounced with too much force.
LABIAL, uttered by the lips, as *b*, *m*, *p*.
LABIODENTAL, sounds formed by the co-operation of the lips and teeth, as *f*, *v*.
LACONISM, a concise style, a short pithy expression after the manner of the Lacedemonians.
LADY, derivation of, p. 197.
LANGUAGE, human speech. "Language in general signifies the expression of our ideas by certain articulate sounds which are used as the signs of those ideas. By articulate sounds, are meant those modulations of simple voice, or of sound, emitted from the thorax, which are formed by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, and the palate."
"The connection between words and ideas may in general be considered as arbitrary and conventional, owing to the agreement of men among themselves, the clear proof of which is, that different nations have different languages, or a different set of articulate sounds, which they have chosen for communicating their ideas."
That the voice is the *natural* means for communicating ideas, is evident from the general practice of every nation, though some writers seem to imply that mankind at first *agreed* to make use of articulate sounds because they appeared to be the readiest means to express the thoughts and sentiments of the mind of man; but it would be just as rational to suppose that men *agreed* to make use of their legs in walking, because they discovered them to be the most expeditious means in a state of nature to

escape from danger, or to seek for their subsistence.

It is unquestionable that language had its origin from our first parent. Oral speech was *suggested* to Adam by God himself, but it does not appear that any thing further was requisite towards the establishment of human speech than the naming of the objects of creation by Adam, as recorded in the ii. ch. Gen. v. 19.

LATINISM, a Latin idiom.

LAY, a verb active, p. 133.

LEARN, to *receive* instruction. To teach is to *impart* knowledge. The verb to learn is often improperly used instead of the verb to teach. "In the first and best prayer children are taught," says a writer in the Spectator, "they are *learnt* to misuse the relative pronoun." It should be, they are taught, or, they learn to misuse.

LECTURE, a discourse pronounced upon any subject.

LEST, conj. p. 169.

LET, p. 122.

LETTERS, characters representing the elementary sounds of a language.

LEXICOGRAPHER, a writer of dictionaries.

LEXICON, a dictionary.

LIE, a verb neuter, p. 133.

LINGUIST, one skilful in languages.

It is reported that the Emperor Charles V. held the acquirement of languages in so high estimation, that when speaking of the beauties of different tongues, he was accustomed to declare (according to the opinion of the Turks) that the more languages a man knows, so much the more is he a man.

LIQUID. Those letters that flow readily with other consonants, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, are, from this property, called by grammarians, liquids.

LITERAL, according to the primitive meaning, not figurative.

LITERATE, learned.

LITERATI, the learned.

LITERATURE, learning.

LITHOGRAPHY, the art of engraving upon stone.

LOGIC, the art of using reason well in our inquiries after truth, and in the communication of it to others. Logic is (like rhetoric) an art, not a science. It relates to something which is to be done, not to any thing which is merely to be known,—to practice, not to theory.

LOGOMACHY, a contention about words.

LOQUACITY, too much talk.

LOVE, *verb active*, remarks on, p. 123.

LUCUBRATION, any writing or work performed by candlelight.

LYRIC, an ode or song adapted to the harp.

M.

M, one of the liquid consonants, it has one unvaried sound.

MACROLOGY, long talk without matter.

MAGNILOQUENCE, a lofty manner of speaking.

MAJOR, the first proposition of a syllogism containing some generality.

MASCULINE, the gender of nouns denoting animals of the male kind.

MAY, auxiliary verb, preterite might.

MEANS, plural of *mean*, p. 49.

MEMBER, as applied to a sentence, is synonymous with clause.

MEMOIR, an account of transactions familiarly written.

MEMORANDUM, a note of something to be remembered. The plural may be formed regularly by adding *s*.

METAGRAMMATISM, a dissolution of a name into its letters as its elements, and a new connection of it by artificial transposition, making some perfect sense applicable to the person named.

METALEPSIS, a continuation of a trope in one word through a succession of significations.

METAPHOR, a simile comprised in a word, as, I am the *vine*, ye are the *branches*. It is a figure founded entirely on the resemblance which one object bears to another. Though the metaphor be chosen on account of similitude, yet it is not properly a comparison or simile. A simile introduces a comparison or likeness, but the metaphor stands for the thing itself. When we say, The man acted *like a lion*, we speak comparatively, but when we say, The man *is a lion*, we speak metaphorically.

METAPHORICAL, not literal, figurative.

METAPHRASE, a mere verbal translation from one language to another.

METAPHYSICS, are said to comprise "the doctrine of the general *affections* of substances existing;" this definition is about as intelligible as are the theories of those who under, take to explain the principles which the subjects of metaphysics embrace.

METAPLASM, a figure in rhetoric wherein words or letters are composed contrary to their natural order.

METASTASIS, a translation.

METATHESIS, a transposition.

METHOD, that part of logic which treats of the disposition of thoughts

on any subject in such order as may best serve to find out unknown truths; to explain and confirm truths that are known, and to fix them in the memory.

METONYMY, a rhetorical figure by which one word is put for another, as, the cause for the effect, the author for his works, the subject for the adjunct, the thing containing for the thing contained, and the contrary, as—I read *Cicero*.

MIS, used in composition, denoting wrong or error, as misapply, to apply to a wrong purpose; mispel, to spell incorrectly.

MONOPHTHONG, a simple vowel sound.

MONOPTOTE, a noun used only in some oblique case.

MONOSTROPHIC, written in unvaried measure, free from the restraint of any particular metre.

MONOSYLLABLE, a word of only one syllable. The English language abounds in monosyllables, more particularly that portion of it which is derived from the Saxons.

"Monosyllables, properly speaking, have no accent; when they are combined with other monosyllables and form a phrase, the stress which is laid upon *one* in preference to others is called emphasis."

MONOTONE, want of proper cadence in pronunciation.

MONOTONY, uniformity of sound.

MOODS, p. 125.

MOVE, regular verb, p. 124.

MUST, an auxiliary verb, p. 123.

MUTES. Letters are called mutes when the sounds which they represent cannot be uttered without the aid of a vowel, as, *b, d, k.*

N.

N, has in English an invariable sound, as in *no, in, manner;* it is sometimes silent after *m*, as in *contemn*.

NAME. A name in grammar is either proper, as the name of an individual, or common, denoting a species, and applicable to any of the species.

PROPER NAMES, being used expressly to distinguish individuals of a class or genus from each other, might seem to admit of no plural, yet sometimes individuals have plurality or number from the causes following. In the first place, the individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new name for every new born individual. Hence, then, instead of one only being called Marcus, and one only Antonius, it happens that many are called Marcus, and many called Antonius, and thus it is, the Romans had their plurals Marcii and Antonii, as we, in in later days, have our Marks and Anthonies. Now the plural of this sort may well be called accidental, because it is merely by chance that the names coincide.

There seems more reason for such plurals as the Howards, the Pelhams, and the Montagues, because a race or family is like a smaller sort of species, so that the family name extends to the kindred, as the specific name extends to the individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper names become plural, was the high character or eminence of some one individual, whose name became afterwards a kind of common appellative to denote all those who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus, every great critic was called an Aristarchus—every great warrior an Alexander—every great beauty a Helen.—HARRIS.

NASAL, belonging to the nose. Those elementary sounds are called *nasal* that require the nose in uttering them, as *ng* in singing.

NEITHER, conj. p. 174.

NEGATIVE. Two negatives in English are equivalent to an affirmative, as, "We *not unfrequently* hear."

NEUTER means neither. Names of inanimate substances and objects in which the distinction of sex is wanting are said to be of the *neuter* gender. Modern grammarians question the propriety of this term, yet it would be difficult perhaps to find a more appropriate word to denote the absence of sex in a noun.

NOMENCLATURE, a vocabulary, a dictionary.

NOMINATIVE. The first case of nouns; that which is the subject of a sentence. The nominative case requires the verb to be in the same number and person, as, "I the Lord thy God *am* a jealous God," the verb agrees with the pronoun, and not with the nouns in apposition with it. The *pronoun* represents the *speaker* as the subject of the affirmation, and is therefore shewn by the verb to be the true nominative of the sentence; the *nouns* are little else than definitives to the pronoun.

NOR, conj. p. 172.

NOUN. In grammar the name of any thing, p. 40.

"Nouns are the names of the ideas of things, first as they are received by the stimulus of objects, or as they are afterwards repeated; secondly, they are names of more abstracted ideas which do not suggest at the same time the external objects by which they were originally excited; or, thirdly, of the operations of our minds, which are termed reflex ideas by metaphysical writers; or, lastly, they are names of our ideas of parts or properties of objects, and are termed by grammarians nouns adjective."—DARWIN.

NUMBER, in grammar, is applicable to nouns and verbs, p. 47.

NUMERAL ADJECTIVES are those which express number, as, one, two, &c., first, second, third, &c.

O.

O has two sounds, a long sound, as in *stone*, and a short one, as heard in *not*.

OBELISK, (†) a marginal note of reference.

OBJECTIVE *case* in English grammar is applicable to those nouns in a sentence that are either governed by a verb or by a preposition.

OBLIQUE, a term sometimes applied to any case of a noun, except to the nominative, which is called the *upright* case.

OBSERVANDA, things to be observed.

OBSOLETE, disused; applied to any word or form of expression that is not within the limits of *present* use, as *enow*, formerly used to express *enough* in number.

In determining what may be considered present usage, Dr. Campbell remarks that "regard must be had to the species of composition and the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater latitude than prose, therefore a word which in prose we should reject as a barbarism, may with strict propriety be admitted in verse. Here, also, there are limits that must not be passed, and perhaps any word which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of any contemporary, or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete. In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be employed which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man."

OF, *prep.* p. 158.

OFF, *prep.* p. 156.

ON, *prep.* p. 156.

ONOMATOPŒIA, a term more remarkable for the difficulty of its pronunciation than for the propriety of its signification. It is formed from the two Greek words ὄνομα *name* and ποιέω I make or feign, but the Etymons do not convey a notion of the essential characteristic by which the mind might be enabled to retain the meaning of the word. Onomatopœia, in grammar or rhetoric, is a figure of speech whereby names and words are formed to the resemblance of the sound made to the things signified, "The surest etymologies" says Mr. Walker, "are those derived from the Onomatopœia."

OPTATIVE is that mood of a verb which expresses an earnest desire that such a thing may be or happen.

OR, conj. p. 173.

ORATOR, a public speaker.

ORATORY, declamation. The art of *making* public speeches.

ORDINAL *numbers* are such as express the order of things, as, first, second, &c.

ORTHOEPIST, one skilled in pronunciation.

ORTHOEPY, the correct pronunciation of words.

ORTHOGRAPHY, p. 7.

OUGHT, irr. verb, p. 122.

OXYMORON, a rhetorical figure in which an epithet of a quite contrary signification is added to any word.

OXYTONE, the acute accent placed on the last syllable of a word.

P.

P is a labial consonant; its sound is sometimes omitted before *t*, as *accompt, receipt*.

PALATAL, a letter pronounced by the aid of the palate.

PALEOGRAPHY, the art of explaining ancient writings.

PALEOLOGY, a discourse on antiquities.

PALINDROMES are those sentences or words in which the syllables are the same read backward or forward, as

Lewd did I live—evil I did dwel.

"A noble lady in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, being for a time forbidden the court for too much familiarity with a great lord in favour, gave this device,—the moon covered with a cloud, and underneath this *palindrome* for motto—

"Ablata at Alba."

PAMPHLET, a small unbound book.

PANTOLOGIA, a work of general science.

PARABLE, a continued comparison, as, Whereunto shall we *liken* the kingdom of God? or with what *comparison* shall we *compare* it?

It is *like* a grain of mustard seed, which when it is sown in the earth is less than all the seeds that be in the earth; but when it is sown it groweth up and becometh greater than all herbs, and shooteth out great branches, so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the shadow of it.

And with many such *parables* spake he the word unto them.

PARADIGM, a synopsis, model, or example.

PARADOX, an assertion contrary to appearance, as

"All are not just because they do no wrong."

PARAGOGE, a figure whereby a letter or syllable is added to a word without altering its signification.

PARAGRAM, a kind of play upon words.

PARAGRAPH.

"Every thing included in separate divisions" says a modern writer, "is a paragraph." This is certainly a wide definition, and the learner would probably find some difficulty in comprehending the nature of a paragraph from such description. Mr. Cobbett is more clear upon this point, and with his usual precision, directs the reader at once to the subject. Thus, he would say, "from '*Every*' to the last word of this sentence is a *paragraph*."

The subdivisions of chapters, sections, or treatises, into paragraphs, cannot be reduced to the standard of any fixed rules, but must be left chiefly to the taste and judgment of the writer. Mr. Brenan's observations on the paragraph are so much to the purpose, that we may present them to the reader as containing all that is essential to be known respecting the limits and use of these divisions.

"Paragraphs should never be extended to a great length. If very long they will run the risk of not being read attentively. They make us impatient to go to the next, and if there be a succession of such protracted stages, we get tired and begin to think of repose. The eye must be pleased as well as the mind. The end of every paragraph is a certain relief to thought or attention—the commencement of the next is a new prospect for the sight, and if each be not somewhat gratified, desire will abate, and we shall feel inclined to halt on our journey. But it is not easy to fix a standard for the size of paragraphs. They must be diversified into long and short, for a monotonous sameness is displeasing here, as well as in other matters. Were I to give any thing like a general direction, I would say, that they should seldom contain less than sixty words, and not exceed five hundred. In newspapers, they often run to extraordinary length, but where columns are above a foot and a half long, and space an object, we cannot expect attention to such matters.

"Some authors are fond of the shortest paragraphs possible, and will continue them all through with only from thirty to fifty words in each. Such writing assumes too aphoristical an appearance; it is like a list of maxims or apophthegms. Finding a difficulty of connection, we read carelessly, and seeing no necessity for this starched formality, we are offended by such an uncalled for dictatorial pomposity. There is an appearance of too much self confidence and opinion, as if the author thought that every line should be got by heart, but he only forces us to recollect that every writer is not a Bacon."

The commencement of a paragraph may be known by the first line being indented, as at the beginning of this sentence.

PARALEPSIS, a figure in rhetoric by which a speaker pretends to pass by what at the same time he really mentions.

PARALOGY, a fallacious way of arguing; false reasoning.

PAREPH, any mark or flourish added at the termination of a person's signature.

PARAPHRASE, an explanation of the writings of another, by the use of many words, and a style better adapted to the capacity of the general reader.

PARATHESIS, a figure in grammar where two or more substantives are put in the same case, as "She went to the country where he was born (France) and died there." In rhetoric, a short hint, with a promise of future enlargement. In printing, the matter contained within two crotchets, marked thus [ ].

PARELCON, the addition of a word or syllable to the end of another.

PAREMBOLE, the insertion of something relating to the subject in the middle of a period; it differs from the parenthesis only in this,—the parembole relates to the subject, the parenthesis is foreign to it.

PARENTHESIS, a sentence so inclosed in another sentence as that it may be taken out without injuring the sense of that which encloses it.

Mr. Brenan, in his volume on Composition, has censured the use of the parenthesis, and consigns it to the lowest class of writers. There are, however, occasions where the use of the parenthesis appears almost indispensable, and an instance may be given in the very example condemned by Mr. Brenan.

"I give all I have (except my watch) to Alexander."

It would be difficult, by using any other form of words, to express so concisely and so clearly the meaning contained in this example.

The chief rules to be observed in respect to parenthesis are—to see that they are pertinent—that they do not obscure the meaning of the principal member of the sentence—and to avoid their too frequent use. A few examples will best shew the *abuse* of this useful auxiliary. Our first is a specimen of style which probably assisted greatly to bring parentheses into disrepute, the remarks *thrown in* are unconnected with the subject, and may therefore be justly called impertinent.

"These three following sermons (though conceived elsewhere) were first brought forth in your ancient and honourable city. The subject matter of them is seasonable for these sickly times. Though you, in your city, (as I am informed by those who have best reason to know) have been this last year as healthful as at other times (a mercy which you can never be too thankful for), yet the towns and villages about you, yea the most part of the nation (I hope you are sensible of it) have been sorely visited with sickness."

The use of commas instead of the marks denoting parentheses does not always serve the purpose. The following (even with the assistance of the signs) is rather a startling assertion.

"The sum of £200 has been ordered for Lucy Cully (the widow of the unfortunate police constable who was murdered at Coldbath-fields) by the Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury."

The sentence would have been less ambiguous if the writer had put the last member into a parenthesis thus—

The sum of £200 has been ordered (by the Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury) for Lucy Cully, the widow of the unfortunate police constable, who was murdered at Coldbath-fields.

The parenthesis, whether short or extended, marked or understood, is plainly a digression in a sentence, and it should always, unless very concise, be transferred to the next, or be so placed as to read smoothly, and to glide at once into our conception.

PARODY, a writing in which the words of an author are taken and by a slight change adapted to some new sense.

This kind of composition is confined to scribblers of the lowest description, who, having neither wit nor invention of their own, resort to this contemptible means of exhibiting their mimic powers.

Some pieces of composition seem to be in a peculiar manner open to the attacks of these writers—the soliloquy of Cato, for example, offers an easy means for the development of this talent, and has been the constant theme on which witlings have exercised their ingenuity. It is much to be regretted that such miserable attempts at *authorship* should ever find a place in respectable publications.

PARONOMASIA, a rhetorical figure, in which, by the change of a letter or syllable several things are alluded to. It is properly that figure which the French call *jeu de mots*, as—they are fiends not friends.

PARSE, to resolve a sentence into its parts of speech.

PARTICIPLE, a word partaking at once the nature of an adjective and a verb.

When a verbal attribute is separated from the verb or sign of affirmation, but at the same time is affirmed to belong to some noun, it is called a participle. Thus, the words "separated," "affirmed," "called," are participles. They are said to be so named because they *participate* in the nature of an adjective, and may in many cases be used before a noun to denote its quality.

The present participle ends in *ing*, and the past participle of a regular verb, in *d* or *ed*.

PARTICLE, a term formerly applied to the indeclinable parts of speech.

PARTITIVE, distributive.

PARTS *of speech*, p. 12.

It is said there are ninety thousand different words in the English language, yet these may all be arranged under the nine parts of speech.

PASSIVE VERB, p. 133.

PAUSES. A pause or rest in speaking is a total cessation of the voice during a perceptible, and, in many cases, a measurable, space of time.

The characters used in writing to denote the several pauses, are the comma , the semicolon ; the colon : the period or full stop . the note of interrogation ? and the note of admiration ! and to these may be added the dash —.

PEDANTRY, a needless ostentation of learning.

PENTAMETER, a Latin verse consisting of five feet.

PENULT, the last syllable of a word but one.

PERIPHRASIS, use of many words to express the sense of one.

PERORATION, the conclusion of an oration.

PERSON, derivation of, p. 202.

PERSONIFICATION is that figure by which we attribute life and action to inanimate objects. The technical term is *Prosopopœia*, but as personification is of the same import and more allied to our own language, the use of this word is to be preferred.

The abuse of this figure has been already noticed under the gender of nouns. Another example or two may, however, be here quoted. The following vigorous description of the progress of science is from a modern writer.

"An immense impulse was now given to Science, and it seemed as if the *Genius of Mankind*, being long pent up, had at length rushed eagerly upon *Nature*, and commenced *with one accord* the great work of *turning up* her hitherto unbroken soil, and *exposing* the treasures so long concealed."

It may be said of this specimen of figurative language what Dr. Johnson said of one of Prior's Poems, "It is not over decent."

"Use" says Dr. Campbell, "is the sole *mistress* of language—Grammar and Criticism are her *ministers*, but though *servants*, they sometimes, like other *ministers*, impose the dictates of their own humour upon the people as the commands of their *sovereign*."

The *Goddess*, Use, is by this author first styled the *mistress* of Language; in the next sentence *she* rises to the dignity of *sovereign*; and the *goddesses* Grammar and Criticism are her *ministers*, next these *ministers* are the *servants* of their *mistress*, then these *servants*, like other *ministers*, execute the commands of their *sovereign*.

The accuracy of this language may indeed be justified, since ministers are the servants of their sovereign, but is the use of such language in a work on science to be sanctioned or approved? In a treatise on Rhetoric, in particular, these exhibitions of the art should be carefully avoided. An author who professes to instruct cannot be too simple in his style, nor in the choice of his expressions.

PERSPECUITY, clearness of expression.

"Perspecuity is a quality so essential in every kind of writing, that for the want of it nothing can atone. Without this the richest ornaments merely glimmer, and, instead of pleasing, tend only to puzzle the reader."

Some critics have doubted whether there may not be an excess of perspecuity. This singular notion has been traced by Dr. Campbell to a want of discrimination in those who entertained it.

"The objection ariseth manifestly from the confounding of two objects, the common and the clear, and thence very naturally their contraries, the new and the dark, that are widely different."

"If you entertain your reader solely or chiefly with thoughts that are either trite or obvious, you cannot fail soon to tire him. All trifling minuteness in narration, description, or instruction, which an ordinary apprehension would render superfluous, is apt to disgust us."

Perspecuity may with truth be said to be the test of grammatical accuracy.

PHILIPPICK, any invective declamation. The following is said to have been uttered by Dr. Parr against Sir James Mackintosh: "Mackintosh, as the story goes, had described O'Connor as the *worst* of men, which Parr denied, saying, No, Sir—He was an Irishman, he might have been a Scotsman—he was a priest, he might have been a lawyer—he was a rebel, he might have been a renegado."

PHILOLOGY, criticism, grammatical learning.

PHRASE, an expression. A phrase differs from a sentence in that it has no finite verb.

"To fear the Lord," and "depart from evil," are *phrases* which scripture useth to express the sum of religion.

Sentences consist chiefly of esta-

blished phrases, which, like current coin, have received the stamp of authority, and have thus become the legal tender for the communication of ideas. The superiority of a language depends chiefly on the purity and perspecuity of its established phrases.

PHRASEOLOGY, style, diction.

PLEONASM, a figure by which more words are used than are necessary. Pleonasm is opposed to precision, and may truly be considered a defect, and not an ornament in composition.

Ex. "Viewing these sacred books in no higher light than as they present to us the most ancient monuments of poetry *extant at this day in the world*, they afford a curious object of criticism."

"Extant" means *now in being*, therefore the phrases "at this time" "in the world" are redundant.

PLURAL, implying more than one.

POEM, a metrical composition.

POESY, a short device engraved on a ring.

POETRY, metrical composition.

POLYGLOT, embracing many languages.

POLYSYLLABLE, a word of many syllables, as, Honourificabilitudinity, Anthropomorphitamanismicaliation.

POLYSYNDETON, a figure of rhetoric by which the copulative is often repeated, as, "The man *who* is doing well, *who* is in good health, *who* has a blooming *and* dutiful *and* cheerful *and* happy family about him, is not to be made to believe that he was born to be miserable."

POSITIVE, applied to the adjective in its simple form, the first degree of comparison, p. 69.

POSSESSIVE CASE. Much difficulty is often felt by inexperienced writers in determining when and where it is proper to use the *sign* of the possessive case. For example, "This is my *brother's* letter." "These are my *sisters'* companions." In the first instance some writers doubt whether the apostrophe ought to be inserted or not. In the last, they hesitate about adding another *s*, and if they happen to know that the second *s* is inadmissible, they still doubt the propriety of leaving the apostrophe in its proper place. To obviate the first difficulty, it is necessary that they be able to distinguish the different parts of speech. The general rule will then determine when a noun is in the possessive case. "Two nouns coming together signifying different things, the former is put in the possessive case, as, brother's letter.

The latter difficulty is overcome by *recollecting* that a noun plural ending in *s* in the possessive, requires only the *sign* of the possessive case, as—my sisters' companions. The *s* is also omitted in the singular of nouns ending in *ss*, as, for righteousness' sake.

POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS are those *published* after the author's death.

POSTSCRIPT, the paragraph at the end of a letter.

POSTULATE, a position assumed without proof.

POTENTIAL, a mood expressing the *power* of doing any thing, p. 129.

POWER of a letter, is the capability of utterance which the sound it represents posseses, thus a vowel has more power than a consonant, liquids have more power than other semivowels, and the semivowels have greater power than the mutes.

PRECISION, conciseness of expression; exact limitation.

"The exact import of precision may be drawn from the etymology of the word. It comes from *præcidere*, to cut off. It imports retrenching all superfluities, and pruning the expression so as to exhibit neither more nor less than an exact copy of his idea who uses it. In order to write or speak with precision, two things are especially requisite, one, that an author's own ideas be clear and distinct, and the other, that he have an exact and full comprehension of the force of those words which he employs."

"The use and importance of precision may be deduced from the nature of the human mind. It never can view clearly and distinctly above one object at a time. If it must look at two or three together, especially objects among which there is resemblance or connection, it finds itself confused and embarrassed. It cannot clearly perceive in what they agree or in what they differ. If, when you would inform me of your meaning, you also tell me more than what conveys it; if you join foreign circumstances to the principal object; if by unnecessarily varying the expression you shift the point of view and make me see sometimes the object itself and sometimes another thing that is connected with it—you thereby oblige me to look on several objects at once, and I lose sight of the principal."—BLAIR.

PREDICATE, that which is affirmed or denied by the subject, p. 109.

PREFACE, introduction to a book.
PREFIX, a particle put before a word to vary or alter its signification.
PRENOMEN, among the Romans, a name prefixed to the family name, answering to our christian name, as *Caius, Lucius, Marcus.*
PREPOSITIONS. Etymology of, p. 150; Syntax of, p. 162. Plutarch conjectured that prepositions were little fragments of words used in haste and for dispatch instead of the whole words.
PRESENT TENSE, denoting the actual existence of an attribute affirmed of some subject.
PRETERIMPERFECT, applied to the past tense of a verb.
PRETERITE, the past tense of a verb.
PRETERPERFECT, applied to the tense which denotes that the *existence* of the attribute is absolutely past.
PRETERPLUPERFECT, past before the *existence* of some other attribute which is also spoken of as past.
PRIMER, an elementary book in which children are taught to read.
PRIMITIVE. A primitive word is that which can be traced no further to any English root; thus, *circumspect, circumstance, delude, concave,* and *complicate,* though compounds in Latin, are primitives in English.

A derivative word is one that may be referred to a word in English of greater simplicity, as—*authority, authorize; usage, useful, usefulness.*
PROEM, preface, introduction.
PROLEGOMENA, introductory observations.
PROLEPSIS, a figure in grammar whereby we prevent or avoid what another intended to allege against us.
PROLIXITY, tediousness
PROLOGUE, that which is spoken by an actor before the commencement of a play.
PRONOUN, Etymology of, p. 77; Syntax of, p. 86.

That ambiguity or doubt would often arise if the noun were used instead of the pronoun may be seen in the following passage from Shakespeare:—

PROS. 'Tis twelve years since, Miranda, twelve years since
Thy *father* was the Duke of Milan, and
A prince of power.
MIRAN. Sir, are *you* not my father?
PROS. Thy mother was a piece of virtue and
She said thou wast my daughter.

It is probable that the writer in this instance purposely employed the *noun,* that by provoking inquiry he might introduce with greater effect the compliment he pays to the character of Miranda's mother.
PRONUNCIATION, the act of utterance. For pronunciation, the best general rule is to consider those as the most elegant speakers who deviate least from written words. It was observed by Dr. Darwin, "that *gl* is *dl,* as *glove* is pronounced by *polite* people *dlove,* and that *cl* is *tl,* as Cloe is pronounced Tloe by polite speakers." Immediately after this he remarks that "The spelling of our language in respect of pronunciation is WONDERFULLY defective." It would be wonderful indeed if it were not defective, when our best writers thus countenance the *lisping* peculiarities of the polite and effeminate.
PROPOSITION, a sentence in which any thing is affirmed, p. 109.
PROSODY, the part of grammar which teaches the sound and quantity of syllables, and the measure of verse.
PROSOPOPÆIA, personification, a figure by which things are made persons.
PROTASIS, a maxim. In the ancient drama the first part of a comedy or tragedy that explains the argument of the piece.
PROVERB, an adage, a bye word.
PROVINCIALISM, manner of speaking peculiar to a certain district of a country.
PUERILE. Among the number of styles of writing there is one which may be denominated the puerile. The reader is presented with the following extract as a specimen of this style, taken from the notes of a commentator on the Greek authors.

"The impression was probably written in their eyes, the windows of the soul, windows of all kinds being notorious, tell tales of the loves of the *inner* soul, particularly when the impression is made with a brilliant of the first water."
PUN, an equivocation, a quibble. Words that agree in the sound, but differ in the sense.
PUNSTER, a quibbler.
PUNCTUATION is the art of marking in writing the several pauses or rests between sentences according to their proper quantity or proportion, as they are expressed in a just and accurate pronunciation.
PURITY is the use of such words and such constructions as belong to the idiom of the language which we speak in opposition to words and phrases that are imported from other languages, or

that are obsolete or new coined, or used without proper authority.

PYRRHIC, in poetry a foot consisting of two short syllables.

Q.

Q is always followed by *u*, as, *quick, question, quote;* it is sometimes sounded like *k, quoit, conquer, pique, quay.*

QUADRISYLLABLE, a word of four syllables, as, con-tempt-i-ble. Words of more than three syllables are generally called polysyllables.

QUÆRE, a Latin word meaning inquire or seek. This word is seldom properly employed by English speakers.

QUALITY, a term sometimes employed by grammarians instead of *adjective*, to denote the properties or accidents of a noun.

QUANTITY, the measure of time in pronouncing a syllable.

A vowel or syllable is long when the accent is on the vowel, which occasions it to be slowly joined in pronunciation with the following letters, as, fate, fatal.

A syllable is short when the accent is on the consonant, which occasions the vowel to be quickly joined to the succeeding letter, as, fat, fatten.

A long syllable requires double the time of a short one in pronouncing it.

QUARTO, a book in which every sheet makes four leaves.

QUERY, an inquiry, a question.

QUIBBLE, a low conceit depending on the construction of a sentence, or the sound of a word.

QUOTATION, an extract taken from the writings of another—a quotation is marked by inverted commas.

R.

R, a semivowel, called the canine letter, because it is uttered with some slight resemblance to the growl or snarl of a cur.

RAPIN, on the dialects of the English language, p. 194.

RAILLERY, inoffensive satire; jesting.

RE, in composition means *again*, as re-admit, re-affirm.

RECITATIVE, a kind of tuneful pronunciation, more musical than common speech, and less so than song.

REDUNDANCY, superfluous words in a sentence. Redundancy differs but little from Pleonasm—both imply a *waste* of words.

Ex. "*It has been observed that* the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. This theory *I have remarked* is controverted by Mr. Tooke. *It must be obvious, however, from the preceding observations, that* the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real."—CROMBIE.

The phrases denoted by Italics in this example might be omitted, and the sentences would contain all that the writer had occasion to express, thus,

The essence of the verb consists in affirmation. This theory is controverted by Mr. Tooke, BUT the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real.

REGIMEN, the cases of a noun governed by a verb or participle.

REGULAR VERBS are such as have the past tense and past participle ending in *d* or *ed*, p. 124.

RELATIVE, a pronoun referring to an antecedent noun which it represents, p. 82.

REMARKS on the indefinite article, p. 32; on the definite article, p. 34.

REVISE, to review, to overlook; also a proof sheet of a book that has been previously corrected.

RHETORIC, the art of speaking well and eloquently.

RHYME, the correspondence of the last sound of one verse to the last sound or syllable of another.

RHYMING PROSE, or what by some authors is termed *jingling*, is a defect in composition that may be avoided either by altering the construction of the sentence, or by employing a synonymous term.

Ex. Homer with the Greek *vivacity* had also some portion of the Greek *loquacity*.—BLAIR.

A writer, speaking of Belisarius, says, "The popular tale, that he was obliged to beg for a *penny*, has been believed by *many*." The *jingling* between "penny" and "many" might have been avoided by saying "has been generally believed."

RHYTHM, metre, verse, numbers.

RIDDLE, an enigma, a puzzle.

RIGHT, derivation of, p. 200.

RUDIMENTS, the elements or first principles of a science.

S.

S has in English the same hissing sound as in other languages. In Dr. Johnson's Dictionary the reader will find

the following comment on the power of the letter S.

"It is the peculiar quality of S that it may be sounded before all consonants, except *x* and *z*, in which *s* is comprised, *x* being only *ks*, and *z* a hard or gross *s*; this is therefore termed by grammarians *suæ potestatis litera*. The reason of which the learned Dr. Clarke erroneously supposed to be that in some words it might be doubled at pleasure."

The phrase here explained by Dr. Johnson forms part of the Eton and other grammars for children, but can a child be expected to understand what the learned Dr. Clarke misunderstood?

"It should be a point," says a popular and elegant writer, "never to teach children to speak about what they do not understand." We fear grammarians pay very little regard to the excellent principle this writer inculcates.

SARCASM, a taunting observation.

SATIRE, a poem in which folly or vice is censured.

SAVE, *conj.* p. 177.

SAXONISM, an idiom of the Saxon language.

SCAN, to examine a verse by counting the feet.

SCOLIAST, a writer of explanatory notes.

SCHOLIUM, a note, an explanatory observation.

SCOTTICISM, an idiom peculiar to the Scotch people.

SEMICOLON, a stop, or point, marked thus ;

SEMIVOWEL, a consonant that can be partially sounded without the help of a vowel, as, *f*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*.

SENTENCE, any number of words so arranged as to express distinctly any opinion or sentiment which we wish to communicate to the hearer. The words so combined are said to make complete sense, because the end of speech is then answered.

Sentences are either simple or compound.

A simple sentence contains the enunciation of but one affirmation, and consequently includes but one finite verb.

A compound sentence contains two or more affirmations, which are united by means of relatives or conjunctions.

"There is a distinction of considerable importance to be attended to with respect to compound sentences, and that is, whether the connection is merely made arbitrarily for convenience, or to save time in speaking. Where several propositions, independent in themselves, are thrown by the lump, as it were, into the same sentence, as, 'Cæsar came, saw, and conquered,' or whether the connection is necessarily made in order to complete the sense, or to explain what has gone before, as, 'I will stay at home if you will.' Here the latter sentence is necessary to explain the meaning of the foregoing one, and cannot therefore be separated from it."—LEWIS.

In prose compositions very little variety is admitted in the collocation of words; they are mostly fixed to one order, and that order is what may be called the order of the understanding. The person who speaks or acts is placed first in the sentence, next the action, and lastly the object of the action: so that the ideas are made to succeed to one another, not according to the degree of importance which the several objects carry in the imagination, but according to the order of nature and of time.

Protracted sentences often originate from the want of a competent knowledge of the principles of language, but there is another cause which frequently produces this fault. Many writers begin a compound sentence before they have determined upon the extent and number of its members, or what relation they shall bear to each other. They link the thoughts as they arise by relatives and conjunctions, until the principal subject lies buried amidst a confused mass of half formed propositions.

Ex. "That the primary causes of the long-existing distressed state of our agricultural community were war prices having caused high rents to be both demanded and offered for land, and consequently high compositions to take place for tithes, the enlargement of farms, and the enclosure of common lands; and that the derivative causes have been loss of business by little farmers, on account of their farms having been taken from them and thrown into great ones; the enclosure of the commons having deprived these and many labourers of a common-right for their cow or a few sheep, as well as the enlargement of of farms throwing many of the latter out of, and preventing the former—who became labourers by being turned out of their little farm—from obtaining employ; and the rents being kept up partly by the continued rage for

becoming farmers of those who have but little if any knowledge of husbandry, and partially by farmers being unwilling to leave farms, in the soil of which they have buried nearly the whole of their property in hopes of better times; no one at all acquainted with rural affairs will deny: but the effects of these causes would have long since cured themselves, had not agriculture been kept in a very unsettled state by a political hubbub that induced farmers and their landlords to anticipate legislative advantages that neither have realized."

It is reported of Sophocles that he expired for want of power to recover his breath after a violent endeavour to pronounce a long period to the end.

As a contrast to the foregoing example, we shall quote a well constructed long sentence from a classical author, but at the same time we may be allowed to recommend the young and inexperienced writer to be content to admire rather than to imitate this kind of composition. A long sentence seldom pleases the reader, and is a hazardous task even from the pen of a skilful and practised writer.

Ex. "To suppose that two or three hundred years ago, when we well know the Highlands to have been in a state of gross ignorance and barbarity, there should have arisen in that country a poet of such exquisite genius and of such deep knowledge of mankind and of history as to divest himself of the ideas and manners of his own age, and to give us a just and natural picture of a state of society ancienter by a thousand years; one who could support this counterfeited antiquity through such a large collection of poems without the least inconsistency; and who, possessed of all this genius and art, had at the same time the self-denial of concealing himself and of ascribing his own works to an antiquated bard without the imposture being detected—is—a supposition that transcends all bounds of credibility."—Blair.

In this long sentence the infinitive "to suppose" is the nominative to the verb "is" at the close of the sentence. What comes between the nominative and the verb is merely an enumeration of those particulars connected with supposition.

Seriatim, in regular succession.

Shall *and* Will, remarks on, p. 118.

Short-hand, an abbreviated method of writing, said to have been invented and practised almost exclusively by the English.

Sibilant, those letters that produce a hissing sound, as the soft *c*, the *s*, and *z*. Foreigners complain of the too frequent recurrence of these letters in English, but a Frenchman, at least, ought not to be too fastidious, when his own language furnishes an example like this—

> Combien ces six saucisses ici?
> Six sous ces six saucisses ici,
> Six sous ces six saucisses ici!!!
> C'est trop ces six saucisses ici.

Simile. The comparison and the simile are so much alike that rhetoricians have found some difficulty to mark the distinction. Dr. Campbell says "the difference is this—simile is no more than a comparison suggested in a word or two, as, He fought like a lion, his face shone as the sun—comparison is a simile circumstantiated and included in one or more separate sentences."

The following has been given as an example of a comparison.

"The actions of princes are like those great rivers, the course of which every one beholds, but their springs have been seen by few."

"Similies appear with most beauty and propriety in works of imagination; they are frequently found most useful to the authors of philosophical treatises, and have often helped them out at many a dead lift by giving them an appearance of saying something when indeed they had nothing to say, for similies are in truth the bladders upon which they float, and the grammarian sinks at once if he attempts to swim without them."

"In the eyes of cats," says M. Buffon, "the contraction and dilatation of the pupil is so considerable, that the pupil which by daylight appears narrow and small, *like the black of one's nail*, by night expands over the whole surface of the eye-ball."

In this example the writer presumes that his reader's hands are as dirty as his own.

Since, *prep.* p. 156; *conj.* p. 177.

Solecism, a breach of the rules of syntax, as, "between you and *I* they *was* to blame."

A solecism is considered by grammarians as a much greater offence than either the barbarism or the impropriety, because it betrays a greater ignorance of the principles of language.

SOLILIOUY, a discourse to one's self.
SONNET, a short poem consisting of fourteen lines.
SOPHISM, a fallacious argument.
SORITES, an argument, or imperfect syllogism, consisting of accumulated propositions, in which the predicate of the former is still made the subject of the latter, till, in conclusion, the last predicate is attributed to the first subject, as—a horse is an animal, an animal is a body, a body is a substance; therefore a horse is a substance.
SPEECH, *parts of*, p. 12.
SPELLING, the act of expressing words by their proper letters, p. 8.
SPLUTTER, to speak hastily.
SPONDEE, a foot of two long syllables.
STAMMER, to speak imperfectly with hesitation. To stutter.

The following remarks on stuttering are taken from *Dr. Arnott's Natural Philosophy*. They are too valuable and too closely connected with the subject of language to require any apology to the reader for their insertion here.

"The most common case of stuttering is not, as has been almost universally believed, where the individual has a difficulty in respect to some particular letter or articulation, by the disobedience to the will or power of association of parts of the mouth which should form it, but where the spasmodic interruption occurs altogether behind or beyond the mouth, viz. in the glottis, so as to affect all the articulations equally. To a person ignorant of anatomy, and therefore knowing not what or where the glottis is, it may be sufficient explanation to say, that it is the slit or narrow opening at the top of the windpipe, by which the air passes to and fro from the lungs—being situated just behind the root of the tongue. It is that which is felt to close suddenly in hiccough, arresting the ingress of air, and that which closes to prevent the egress of air from the chest of a person lifting a heavy weight, or in making any straining exertion; it is that also, by the repeated shutting of which, a person divides the sound in pronouncing several times, in distinct and rapid succession, any vowel, as o, o, o, o. Now the glottis during common speech need never be closed, and a stutterer is cured if, by having his attention properly directed to it, he can keep it open. Had the edges or thin lips of the glottis been visible, like the external lips of the mouth, the nature of stuttering would not so long have remained a mystery, and the effort necessary to the cure would have forced itself upon the attention of the most careless observer; but because hidden, and professional men had not detected in how far they were concerned, and the patient himself had only a vague feeling of some difficulty, which, after straining, grimace, gesticulation, and sometimes almost general convulsion of the body, gave way, and the uncertainty with respect to the object has remained. Even many, who by attention and much labour had overcome the defect in themselves, as Demosthenes did, have not been able to describe to others the nature of their efforts so as to ensure imitation; and the author doubts much whether the quacks who have succeeded in relieving many cases, but in many also have failed, or have given only temporary relief, really understood what precise ends in the action of the organs their imperfect directions were accomplishing.

"Now a stutterer, understanding of anatomy only what is stated above, will comprehend what he is to aim at, by being further told, that when any sound is continuing, as when he is humming a single note or tune, the glottis is necessarily open, and, therefore, that when he chooses to begin pronouncing, or droning any simple sound, as the E of the English word *berry* (to do which at once no stutterer has any difficulty), he thereby opens the glottis, and renders the pronunciation of any other sound easy. If then, in speaking or reading, he joins his words together, as if each phrase formed but one long word, or nearly as a person joins them in singing (and this may be done without being at all noted as a peculiarity of speech, for all persons do it more or less in their ordinary conversation), the voice never stops, the glottis never closes, and there is of course no stutter. The author has given this explanation, or lesson, with an example to a person, who before would have required half an hour to read a page, but who immediately afterwards read it almost as smoothly as was possible for any one to do; and who then, on transferring the lesson and the speech by continued practice and attention, obtained the same facility with respect to it. There are many persons not accounted peculiar in their

speech, who, in seeking words to express themselves, often rest long between them on the simple sound of E mentioned above, saying, for instance, hesitatingly—" e. I. e. .... thinke... you may "— the sound never ceasing until the end of the phrase, however long the person may require to pronounce it. Now a stutterer, who, to open his glottis at the beginning of a phrase, or to open it in the middle of any interruption, uses such a sound, would not even at first be more remarkable than a drawling speaker, and he would only require to drawl for a little while until practice facilitated his command of the other sounds. Although producing the simple sound which we call the E of *berry*, or of the French words *de* or *que*, is a means of opening the glottis, which by stutterers is found very generally to answer, there are many cases in which other means are more suitable, as the intelligent preceptor soon discovers. Were it possible to divide the nerves of the muscles of the glottis, without at the same time destroying the faculty of producing voice, such an operation would be a most immediate and certain cure of stuttering: and the loss of the faculty of closing the glottis would be of no moment.

" The view given also of the nature of stuttering and its cure explains the following facts, which to many persons have hitherto appeared extraordinary. Stutterers often can sing well, and without the least interruption, for the tune being continued, the glottis does not close. Many stutterers also can read poetry well, or any declamatory composition in which the uninterrupted tone is almost as remarkable as in singing. The cause of stuttering being so simple as above described, one rule given and explained may in certain cases cure the defect, however aggravated, as has been observed in not a few instances; and this explains also why an ignorant pretender may occasionally succeed in curing by giving a rule of which he knows not the reason, and which he cannot modify to the peculiarities of other cases. The same view of the subject explains why the speech of a stutterer has been correctly compared to the escape of a liquid from a bottle with a long narrow neck, coming either as a hurried gush or not at all, for when the glottis is once opened, and the stutterer feels that he has the power of utterance, he is glad to hurry out as many words as he can before the interruption again occurs."

STANZA, a subdivision of a poem.

STENOGRAPHY, the art of writing in short-hand.

STEREOTYPE, a type metal plate to print from at the letter press.

STERLING, derivation of, p. 202.

STERN, derivation of, p. 199.

STROPHE, a stanza.

STYLE is the peculiar manner in which a writer expresses his thoughts, and is said to have always some reference to an author's disposition and manner of thinking.

SUBJECT, the noun to which the attribute expressed by the verb is said to belong.

SUBJUNCTIVE *mood*, p. 130; remarks on, p. 113.

SUBSTANTIVE, p. 40.

SUFFIX, a letter or syllable added to the end of a word.

SUPERLATIVE, the highest degree of quality, p. 69.

SUPINE, a verbal Latin noun.

SYLLABLE, so much of a word as is uttered by one impulse of the voice.

SYLLOGISM, a sentence or argument made up of three propositions so disposed as that the last is necessarily inferred from those which go before. The use of the syllogism has been thus whimsically exemplified—

> Nothing hath no property,
> But it is the property of nothing to have no property,
> Therefore nothing hath a property.

SYNALEPHA, the contraction of two vowels into one in a Latin verse

SYNARESIS, the shortening of a word by the omission of a letter, as *o'er* for *over*.

SYNCHYSIS, a confusion of words in a sentence.

SYNCOPE, a figure in grammar, whereby one or more letters are taken out of a word.

SYNECDOCHE, a trope, whereby a part is put for the whole, or the whole is put for a part.

SYNONYMES, words of the same signification. Synonymous words are those which, strictly speaking, have precisely the same meaning; there are very few such terms in any language. Words are called synonymous when they agree in expressing one principal idea; but for the most part, if not always, they express it with some diversity of circumstances; they are varied by some accessory idea which every word introduces, and which

forms the distinction between them; they are like different shades of the same colour, and an accurate writer can employ them to great advantage.

Ex. *Species* and *sort* have no other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom.

Ex. A *right* line and a *straight* line are in geometry synonymous terms.

SYNOPSIS, an outline or general view.

SYNTAX, that part of grammar which teaches the construction of words in a sentence.

Syntax of articles, p. 31; nouns, p. 55; adjectives, p. 72; pronouns, p. 86; verbs, p. 135; adverbs, p 148; prepositions, p. 162; conjunctions, p. 186.

SYNTHESIS, a joining together.

T

T is a mute consonant, it has sometimes the sound of sh, as *petition*.

TACHE, a catch, a loop, a button. Dr. Campbell calls the conjunctions "taches" by which the more significant words of a sentence are held together.

"The greater part of grammarians" Mr. Tooke observes, "content themselves by repeating that conjunctions are not themselves any parts of language, but only such *accessaries* as *salt* is to meat, or *water* to bread; or that they are the mere *edging* or *sauce* of language, or that they are like the *handles* to cups, or *plumes* to helmets, or *binding* to books, or *harness* for horses, or that they are *pegs*, and *nails*, and *nerves*, and *joints*, and *ligaments*, and *glue*, and *pitch*, and *lime*, and *mortar*, and so forth. In which kind of pretty similies philosophers and grammarians seem to have vied with one another, and have often endeavoured to amuse their readers and cover their own ignorance by very learnedly disputing the propriety of the simile, instead of explaining the nature of the conjunction."

TACHYGRAPHY, the art of quick writing.

TAUTOLOGY is the needless repetition of the same word, or of the same idea in different words, as "This change of pronunciation is very *common* and *frequent* in our language."

"It is not the repeating of the same sound that offends so much as the repetition of the same idea. If the same word displeases when used a second time, it is not because it hath already struck the ear, but because it hath before affected the mind, which grows weary and is disgusted, without the graces of novelty. Hence came the establishment of certain words we call pronouns, the repetition of which custom hath made familiar, having given them no other office than simply to recal the matter in question, without any redundancy of words. For the same reason what we call articles and prepositions are equally repeated without disgust, nothing being expected from them but a bare nomination or indication; for having nothing to determine of themselves, they always appear new when the subject they indicate is new. This is an undeniable proof that the beauty of words is more owing to their variety of meanings than to their different articulations, and that it is a multiplicity of ideas that produces in effect a multiplicity of terms."

TAUTOPHONY, a successive repetition of the same sound as, *mama, murmur*.

TECHNICAL, belonging to arts not in common or popular use.

TENSE, a variation of the verb to signify time, pp. 115, 131.

TERM, the word by which a thing is expressed.

TERMINATION, end of words as varied by their signification.

TERMINOLOGY, a definition of the terms used in any of the sciences.

TERSE, smooth, cleanly written, neat.

TEUTONIC, belonging to the Teutones or ancient Germans.

TEXT, that on which a comment is written; a sentence of scripture.

THAN, *conj.* p. 170.

THAT, p. 181.

"The word *that*, by being sometimes a demonstrative pronoun, sometimes a relative, and sometimes a conjunction, may produce a quadruple repetition of the same word, which, though not elegant, is strictly grammatical; a repetition which is, perhaps, peculiar to the English tongue."

"When this word is used as a pronoun demonstrative it has always an accent on it, and is heard distinctly rhyming with *hat*."—WALKER.

THE, the definite article used before a general term to restrict its signification, p. 24.

There is something particularly absurd in Mr. Tooke's ILLUSTRATION of the etymology of this word—

"The (our article as it is called) is the imperative of the verb *thean*, which may very well supply the place of the correspondent article *se*, which

is the imperative of *seon* (videre), for it answers the same purpose in discourse, to say see man or take man. For example—

The man that hath not music in himself
Is fit for treasons, &c.

That man is fit for treasons.

Take man (see man). Taken man hath not music, &c.

Said man or taken man is fit for treason.

THEME, a subject on which one speaks or writes; the original word whence others are derived.

A theme is only the miniature of a declamation, essay, oration, or sermon.

THEORETICAL, speculative, depending on theory or speculation.

THEORY, speculation, not practice; scheme, plan, or system; yet subsisting only in the mind.

THEREFORE, *conj.* p. 176.

THESIS, a position, something laid down affirmatively or negatively.

THOUGH, *conj.* p. 177.

TO, *prep.* p. 155.

TOOKE, MR. on the necessity of the article, p. 15; on the composition of ideas, p. 16.

The following event in the early life of Mr. Tooke is characteristic, and evinces the same spirit which prevails in his work on language.

Horne Tooke, when at Eton, was one day asked by the master why a certain verb governed a particular case? He answered, "I don't know." "That is impossible," said the master, "I know you are not ignorant, but obstinate." Horne, however, persisted, and the master flogged. After the punishment, the master quoted the rule of grammar which bore on the subject, and Horne instantly replied, "I know that very well, but you did not ask me for the *rule*, you demanded the *reason*."

TONE is the inflexion of voice in uttering words or sentences. The meaning of the speaker is often known by the tone in which a sentence is expressed.—

"A *word* that's but unkindly spoken"

may wound the feelings of a person, while the same word spoken with a different modulation might have conciliated his enmity or secured his friendship.

"To some nations it has appeared easier to express different ideas by varying the tone with which they pronounce the same word, than to contrive words for all their ideas. This is the practice of the Chinese in particular; the number of words in their language is said not to be great, but in speaking they vary each of their words no less than five different times, by which they make the same word signify five different things. This must give a great appearance of music or singing to their speech. For those inflexions of voice, which in the infancy of language were no more than harsh and dissonant cries, must, as language gradually polishes, pass into more smooth and musical sounds, and hence is formed what we call the Prosody of a language."—BLAIR.

TRAGEDY, a dramatic representation of a serious action.

TRALATION, the using of a word metaphorically, in a less proper but more significant sense.

TRANSITIVE.

In grammar a verb is called *transitive* when the action implies an object acted upon by the agent, or when the action necessarily requires one or more objects for its development, as "Richard *gave* the book to Charles." "Charles *opened* the book."

TRANSPOSITION. When the order of the words or clauses of a sentence differs from the usual collocation, the words or clauses are said to be transposed, as,

"This to me,
In dreadful secrecy, impart they did."

TRAVESTY, to turn into burlesque.

TRIBRACH, a poetical foot consisting of three short syllables.

TRIPHTHONG, a coalition of three vowels to form one sound, as, *eau* in beauty, *iew* in view.

TRIPTOTE, a noun used but in three cases.

TRISYLLABLE, a word of three syllables, as, con-tent-ment.

TRITE, worn out, stale, common, not new.

TROCHEE, a poetical foot, consisting of a long and a short syllable. In English the first syllable of a Trochee is accented, the last unaccented. Trochaic verse is of several kinds the longest Trochaic verse that our language admits consists of six trochees.

"On ă mōuntain strētch'd bĕnēath ă hōarў wīllŏw."

TROPE, a *figure* in speech; the changing of a word from its original signification.

"Writers on rhetoric," says Dr. Ash, "have generally made a distinction between tropes and figures. Quintilian, indeed, acknowledges that some authors have confounded them; yea, that some have gone so far as to call all tropes figures, but he is still for keeping up the distinction, and says 'They resemble one another so nearly that the difference is not instantly perceivable, there is therefore the more reason why we should carefully distinguish them.'

"'A trope is a transition from the natural and original signification of a word to that which is foreign and uncommon.'

"'A figure is a certain form of style different from the common and obvious way of speaking.'

"We will not say this is a distinction without a difference, but we may venture to say the definition of the figure is equally applicable to the trope. Quintilian shall be judge himself. 'There is a particular method of forming tropes, and they alter the plain course of style, both which are the properties of figures.' The truth is, a trope is a species of figure, for though every figure be not a trope, yet every trope is a figure."

TRUISM, an identical proposition.

TRUTH, the contrary to falsehood, p. 200.

TYRO, one yet not master of his art; one in his rudiments.

U.

U. This vowel is said to have three sounds, as heard in—tube, tub, full.

UN, a Saxon negative particle, placed commonly before adjectives and adverbs; it is often conveniently employed with another negative to render an assertion less positive, as "He is not unmindful of the favours you confer."

UNACCENTED, not accented.

UNDECLINED, words not varied by termination.

UNGRAMMATICAL, not according to the rules of grammar.

UNILITERAL, consisting of one letter only, as the pronoun I, and the interjection O.

UNINTELLIGIBLE, not to be understood.

Ex. "Every name that is put for a quality degenerates into a quality which we may call a respective quality."

Ex. "Thus much," says Dr. Campbell in his Rhetoric, "shall suffice for explaining the spirit, the intent, and the distinguishing qualities of each sort of address, all which agree in this, *an accommodation* to affairs of a serious and important nature."

It would not be a difficult task to compile from works on languages alone a volume of remarks and *instructions* as totally unintelligible to ordinary minds as the instances here given.

UNIVOCAL, having one meaning.

UNLESS, *conj.* p. 169.

USAGE. Those words which are most generally received among the learned and polite, as well as the bulk of speakers, are the most legitimate; we may therefore conclude that a majority of the three classes (the learned, the polite, and the common speakers), ought always to concur in order to constitute what is called good usage.

USE is that which is said to give law to language.

"The source of that preference which distinguisheth good use from bad in language is a natural *propension* of the human mind to believe that those are the best judges of the proper signs, and of the proper application of them, who understand best the things which they represent."

The sentence here quoted may furnish a point for discussion whether the author has not opposed "reputable use" by employing the term *propension* instead of *propensity*.

"In what concerns words themselves, their construction and application, it is of importance to have some certain, steady, and well known standard to recur to, a standard which every one hath access to canvass and examine. And this can be no other than authors of reputation. Accordingly, we find that these are by universal consent in actual possession of this authority as to this tribunal when any doubt arises the appeal is always made."

UTTERANCE. The French have characteristically distinguished this property of pronunciation by saying that the English for the most part bite their words, that is, they do not give them a full utterance.

A word is properly pronounced when the *accent* is placed on the right syllable, and the letters are distinctly *uttered* with a proper *tone*.

V.

V is a consonant classed among the

semi-vowels. It has one uniform sound, that of flat *f*, as *vat, have, move.*

VADE-MECUM, a book that is carried by a person as a manuel for memorandums, or for constant reference.

VAGUE, unsettled, indefinite.

VERB, that part of speech which affirms, p. 101.

The verb implies being or doing in that person or thing to which it is joined by the affirmation; it also expresses the attribute that is said to belong to the nominative.

The irregular verbs offer an easy means of improvement in the English language, since many of this class are not so far corrupted by usage as to render unattainable the re-establishment of the regular form of the past tense and past participle; thus the words *lighted, choosed, catched,* and many others, require only the sanction of good writers to obtain for them the preference.

VERBAL NOUNS, nouns derived from verbs.

VERBATIM, word for word.

VERBIAGE, empty writing or discourse.

VERBOSE, exuberant in words.

VERNACULAR, peculiar to the country one lives in or was born in, native.

VERNACULARLY, agreeable to the native idiom or manner.

VERSE, metrical language.

VERSEFIER, a maker of verses. A versefier and a poet are two different things; the first is contemptible, the latter honorable, in the opinion of all men of sense and learning in all ages and nations.

VERSIFICATION, the art of making verses.

VIDELICET, written *viz.*, but not to be read according to the abbreviation. It is usually rendered into English by its equivalent term "namely," or "that is."

VOCABULARY, a collection of words.

VOCAL, belonging to the voice.

VOCATIVE *case*, a noun representing a person spoken to or addressed, p. 54.

VOWELS, those letters of the alphabet that have or represent a perfect sound, as *a e i o u*, and in some cases *w* and *y*.

In the words, abstemiously and facetiously, the vowels appear in their alphabetical order, and are propounded in their usual manner.

VULGARISM, an expression or form of speech current among the illiterate.

"The genuine source of the vulgarism seems to be the affectation of an easy, familiar, and careless manner; it is conquered by discipline and the study of good authors. 'An *itch for novelty*,' continues this writer, is sure to corrupt the style of young persons."

The vulgarism here employed by Dr. Campbell is rendered more glaring and reprehensible because he is at the time admonishing others to avoid the fault which he himself commits.

W.

W is reckoned a consonant at the beginning of words or syllables, but in every other case it is considered a vowel. Mr. Knowles agrees with Webster and Sheridan, that W *always* marks a vowel sound. Its name, like those of other consonants, has little or no connection with its sound.

"This distinction between the *nature* and *name* of a consonant," says Mr. Murray, "is of great importance, and should be well explained to the pupil. They are frequently confounded by writers on grammar. Observations and reasonings on the *name* are often applied to explain the *nature* of a consonant, and by this means the student is led into error and perplexity respecting these elements of language. It should be impressed on his mind that the *name* of every consonant is a *complex* sound, but that the consonant itself is always a *simple* sound."

WAGE, the singular of wages. Pay given for service. Gage, pledge.

WAGES of sin, p. 137.

WAS, the past tense of the irr. verb *to be*, p. 112.

WHAT, a relative pronoun.

WHICH, a pronoun relative, p. 84.

WHO, a pronoun relative applied to persons, p. 84.

WITH, prep. p. 153.

WITHOUT, prep. p. 153.

WORDS, the arbitrary signs of ideas, p. 203.

The number of words in the English, or indeed in any modern language, cannot be accurately ascertained.

It is stated that the French Revolution added nearly five thousand words to the French language.

X.

X, though found in Saxon words, begins no word in the English language. This letter is always sounded like *z* in words from the Greek beginning with *x*, as *Xenophon, xerotes, xyster*, pronounced *zenophon, serotes, zister.*

Y.

Y is a consonant when it begins a word or syllable; in other situations it is considered a vowel. This letter in old English is sometimes prefixed as an increasing syllable to the past tense and past participle of a verb, as *yclad*, clothed or clad.

YE, the formal nominative plural of *thou*.

YOU, personal pronoun, p. 80.

YOURSELF, pronoun, p. 82.

Z.

Z has uniformly the sound of hard *s*. It is said that no word of English original begins with this letter.

ZEUGMA, in grammar, when a word agreeing with divers nouns, or an adjective with divers substantives, is referred to one expressly and to the others by supplement, as "Lust overcame shame; boldness, fear; and madness, reason."

ZOILUS, a backbiting poet who wrote against Homer's works; hence all envious persons, or such as maliciously carp at other men's works, are called *Zoilists*.

Printed by J. Unwin, St. Peter's Alley, Cornhill, London.

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